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international policy is currently witnessing a renewed interest in customary 
tenure systems as well as traditional leadership, through which it aims to 
enhance the efficiency of local governance, and create general access to and 
secure rights in land. contrary to these ideas, practice reveals a lack of secu-
rity of customary tenure in areas with a high competition for land. mounting 
evidence displays that customary systems often evolve inequitably and that 
traditional elites benefit disproportionally from commodification of land. 
in an effort to understand customary land management by traditional autho-
rities, and the role policymakers, lawmakers, judges and civil servants play 
in this process, this book studies practices of land management in peri-urban 
ghana where traditional leadership forms a vibrant part of social life.
this book combines local case studies with theories about efficient land 
management, the resilience of traditional leadership, the negotiability of cus-
tomary law and the gap between judges’ customary law and local practices. 
doing so, it offers a unique body of empirical and theoretical knowledge for 
those interested in customary land management, as well as those interested 
in how customary law functions both at the local level and at the level of 
the state.
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1 Introduction: Land, CustomaryLaw, and Traditional
Authorities
Janine M. Ubink

1. Introduction: land, customary law, and
traditional authorities
Land reforms for poverty reduction
‘‘Land remains an asset of great importance to African econo-
mies, as a source of income, food, employment and export earn-
ings. As well as its economic attributes, land continues to have
great social value – as a place of settlement, providing a location
within which people live and to which they return–as well as
symbolic and ritual associations, such as burial sites, sacred
woodlands, and spiritual life.’’ (Toulmin and Quan 2000a: 1-2)
Access to land and the ability to make effective use of it are critical to
the welfare of poor people worldwide. Since land is a key asset for the
rural and urban poor, land policies are of fundamental importance for
economic activity, poverty reduction, sustainable management, and the
well-being of households. In the last decades, many countries in Africa
have undertaken land reform in one guise or another, aimed at enhan-
cing the security of property rights (Alden Wily 2003). Despite conver-
ging aims, these reforms have varied significantly in the methods ap-
plied to achieve them. In the first decades after independence, main-
stream land reform ideology held that agricultural productivity was
inhibited by customary law unreflexive to an agriculture that was capi-
talizing and adopting new technologies, and would increase through
the creation of individual property rights. Private property was to solve
the lack of tenure security which was considered to exist under custom-
ary law. Enhanced security would encourage farmers to invest in their
land and hence lead to increased productivity (Acock 1962; Demsetz
1967; Feder and Noronha 1987; World Bank 1975).
This policy direction was taken, however, without rigorous empirical
analysis of the hypothesized causal relationship between individual
rights in land and improved tenure security and agricultural outputs in
the African context. In the following years research showed that these
causal links were not immediate and simple. Mounting evidence was
produced that individual land registration and titling programs fea-
tured high economic and social costs and negative consequences for
the poor (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Coldham 1979). As a result,
policy makers went back on land titling as a panacea for land tenure in
Africa and realized that land policy must start from existing realities
and systems. Customary systems thus came to be revalued as mechan-
isms for land access and employment creation (Deininger and Bins-
wanger 1999; DFID 1999; Toulmin and Quan 2000c).
A return to the local arena as the place of action squared with the
liberalization policies of the 1990s and donor calls for structural adjust-
ment, emphasizing a smaller state, cuts in public expenditure, and the
strengthening of civil society. The adoption of multi-party democracy
and democratic decentralization and the trend to consider the state as
just another actor in an increasingly complex and interwoven global or-
der, all seem to have opened new public spaces for traditional leader-
ship and local management on the basis of customary law (Englebert
2002: 59; Kyed and Buur 2005: 3; Oomen 2002). Notwithstanding
this, the return to local customary realities as the starting point of any
tenure reform can be largely attributed to the failure of registration
and titling programs (cf. Woodhouse 2003: 1715) – just as the earlier
policies of land titling were inspired by a disappointment with agricul-
tural output under customary tenure. This shows that policy shifts are
often driven by ‘default reasoning’ more than by thorough knowledge
of the proposed alternatives, a danger that continues to be eminent in
new policies.
Idealizing Research
Just as policy makers sometimes lack critical assessment of customary
land management, some academic studies also seem to be ‘‘based on
hypothetical models of how land was managed in traditional systems’’
(Amanor 2001: 63). These studies emphasize that customary tenure re-
gimes embody important principles concerned with equity, social se-
curity and the maintenance of ecological balance, and that they are
built on core values of negotiation and consensus-building. Kasanga,
for instance, speaks of ‘‘the egalitarian tenurial systems’’ and claims
that ‘‘customary land law offers the best security of tenure to indivi-
duals, families and local communities’’ and that ‘‘there are reasonable
checks at the local level on almost everybody’’ (Kasanga 1996: 89-100).
And Platteau, although claiming not to fall ‘‘into the snare of romanti-
cism’’, but rather displaying ‘‘a pragmatic attitude grounded in a realis-
tic assessment of Sub Saharan Africa’s present predicament’’, makes
the following statement about informal village practices with regard to
land: ‘‘(…) considerations of social security and equity usually dominate
pure efficiency concerns (…) customary systems continue to generate a
remarkable degree of consensus, in particular on the norms and values
justifying land claims’’ (Platteau 2000: 72).
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A comparable tendency to romanticize ‘traditional communities’ is
found in the literature on chieftaincy, where assumptions abound con-
cerning the egalitarian, inclusive structure of local communities, the
democratic nature of chiefly administration and the well-functioning
checks and balances on traditional authorities. For instance, Buur and
Kyed describe two studies on the role of traditional structures in local
government in Mozambique that emphasize the ‘‘depoliticized sphere
of human relations that, despite colonial impositions, war and displace-
ment, continued to have legitimacy and exercise profound authority.
(…) Traditional authorities represent ‘the whole community, beyond po-
litical differences, embodying the will of all people and not excluding
anyone’’’ (Buur and Kyed 2005: 11-12). These studies culminated in a
Decree that recognized traditional leaders as community authorities
without a single paragraph to set the terms for the relationship be-
tween community and community leader or to ensure the participation
of community members in the selection of community authorities. An-
other example is found in Ayittey’s book Indigenous African Institutions
in which he claims the following: ‘‘Political power or office in tradi-
tional Africa was not used as the basis to accumulate wealth’’; ‘‘The re-
pository of the greatest political power or influence was the Village As-
sembly of Commoners, giving true meaning to the phrase: ‘power lay
with the common people’’’; ‘‘the chief did not rule; he only led or as-
sessed – an important distinction’’ (Ayittey 1991: 27, 78, 96). See for a
last well-known example outside Africa Brody as quoted in Kuper: ‘‘For
the peoples of the Northwest Coast [of Canada], as to any hunter-gath-
erer society or, indeed, any oral culture, words spoken by chiefs are a
natural and inevitable basis for truth’’ (Kuper 2003: 391).1
Many of the above-mentioned studies on customary law and tradi-
tional authorities assert the positive attributes of customary law as ideal
principles rather than show that they operate in practice, relegating all
consequences of social stratification within communities to the back-
ground. According to Thornton (2003: 130) ‘‘most participants in these
debates seem to prefer the ideology to the reality.’’ These ‘idealizations’
are not without danger, since assertions of a democratic principle of
traditional land administration can serve the interests of the local rul-
ing class as a means of ideologically justifying their demand for the
state to leave local land administration to traditional rulers (Amanor
1999: 10; cf. Woodhouse 2003).
Commodification of Land
Studies revealing a lack of security of customary tenure in many areas
in Africa challenge the ‘romanticized’ descriptions of customary law
and traditional authorities. This lack of tenure security is often a result
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of commodification caused by various factors such as population
growth, the rising value of real estate and the expansion of urban resi-
dential areas, the development of new commercial export agricultural
sectors, and the extinction of remaining agricultural frontiers. Mount-
ing evidence of increasingly restricted and insecure access to land for
the poor majority and increasing inequity in the face of land shortage
and competition displays that customary systems are often unable to
evolve equitably (Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily 2003; Bruce 1988; Kasan-
ga et al. 1996; Swindell and Mamman 1990).
A number of excellent studies reveal the social differentiation within
African communities and emphasize the importance of power struc-
tures (Amanor 1999; Amanor 2001; Berry 2001; Carney and Watts
1990; Daley and Hobley 2005; Juul and Lund 2002a; Oomen 2002;
Peters 2002; Ribot 2001; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Woodhouse
2003). They describe internal processes of contestation, assertion and
transformation and portray political struggles to define and redefine so-
cial relations in the customary sphere. A number of these studies de-
monstrate that local elites have been able to use their position and the
ambiguities of customary law to appropriate land to further their own
economic and political interests. This includes traditional leaders who
have ruled arbitrarily with few checks and balances on their adminis-
tration, giving power considerations precedence over the objectives of
development. Some authors expect that chiefs’ dealings with land affect
people’s views on the tasks and activities of chiefs and their attitude to-
wards chiefs and chieftaincy in general (Claassens 2006: 26; Fisiy
1992).
Tenure Security
The main benchmark for evaluating land tenure2 systems is the con-
cept of tenure security. It is broadly defined as the perceived right by
the possessor of a land parcel to manage and use the parcel, dispose of
its produce and engage in transactions, including temporary or perma-
nent transfers, without hindrance or interference from any person or
corporate entity, on a continuous basis (Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994:
3). This definition thus not only encompasses certainty, but also the
elements of extent and duration.3 Certainty again is a function of two
elements: (1) assurance in exerting rights, and (2) the costs of enfor-
cing these rights, which should not be inhibiting (Place, Roth, and Ha-
zell 1994: 19-21). Lund cautions that when the extent and duration of
rights determine the measure of tenure security, this seems to imply
that private property has the highest tenure security possible. However,
while increasing exclusivity may produce more tenure security for the
excluding party, the opposite will be the case for the one who is being
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excluded. Thus increasing tenure security for one usually correlates
with decreasing tenure security for another (Lund 2000: 16).
Most land reforms aim to enhance tenure security, and policy docu-
ments abound with descriptions of the positive effects expected from
enhancing tenure security (EU 2004; USAID 1986; World Bank
2003b). These include (1) more willingness to invest through an in-
creasing likelihood that the operator will capture the investment re-
turns; (2) enhancing the land’s collateral value and improving the cred-
itworthiness of the landowner, thereby increasing not only the willing-
ness but also the ability to invest; (3) increasing production and
enhancing sustainability of production through more investment; (4)
diminishing the amount of disputes over land, thereby freeing re-
sources that otherwise would have been used for litigation; (5) by put-
ting an end to ambiguity in property rights, reducing transaction costs
and thus having a positive effect on the land market;4 (6) these five fac-
tors all lead to an increase in the value of land (Place, Roth, and Hazell
1994: 16-8). Caution is needed, however, with regard to the causal rela-
tionship between tenure security, investments, and yields. First, en-
hanced tenure security will only lead to higher investment demands
when the farmer has knowledge of and access to inputs, viable technol-
ogies, and advice, and when investments are profitable and investment
returns are not too risky. Second, even when demand for investment is
enhanced, the absence of household labor and financial resources may
prevent farmers from exercising this demand. Small farmers, even
when they have a clear and secure title to their land, can still have ex-
treme difficulties in acquiring a loan. Third, land improvements do not
necessarily increase yields, as households may target their investments
towards reducing yield variance rather than increasing mean yield, or
they may prefer leisure or pursue off-farm opportunities (Atwood
1990; DFID 1999: 9; Shipton and Goheen 1992: 317-8).5
Evidence thus shows that tenure security does not necessarily lead to
increased production. Nonetheless, even if tenure security does not
have an effect on production, it is still crucial for the people concerned.
It is first and foremost needed to guarantee continuation of current
use rights, i.e. for ‘maintaining the status quo.’ Many people depend
on land for food and some additional income through market sale of
surplus production. Tenure security of this land is thus of vital impor-
tance for their well-being and survival. Or, as Migot-Adholla and Bruce
(1994: 7-8) put it, the right of continuous, unchallenged use of agricul-
tural land is perhaps the most critical measure of security of tenure.
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Contestations over rights to land in peri-urban Ghana
Areas with land commodification make interesting cases for the study
of the functioning of customary law and traditional rule and the regula-
tion of customary tenure systems. They provide a dynamic environ-
ment in which to analyze the following questions: How do traditional
authorities regulate customary land in the changing setting? How does
this affect the tenure security and livelihoods of local farmers, and to
what extent can these farmers influence local land management and
traditional rule? How do the various actors attempt to use, transform,
or create customary law in this process? To what extent and in what
ways do governmental actions and discourse influence local land man-
agement and the development of customary law? Are state courts im-
portant actors in the ensuing struggles?
Ghana
Like most African countries, Ghana has in the last decades witnessed
an increasing commodification of land, which has resulted in attempts
to redefine land ownership and tenure and in contestation of rights to
land. At the heart of these contestations lie the issues of the authority
to allocate rights to customary land and the entitlements to the pro-
ceeds from such allocations. For instance, peri-urban areas witness se-
vere struggles between farmers and families on the one hand, and
chiefs on the other, over the right to convert farmland into residential
land.6 In agricultural areas similar struggles over land and its proceeds
can be witnessed. Amanor (1999; 2001) describes in detail how new
land pressures and commodification have led to contestations and re-
definitions of rights to land and labor in the cocoa, oil palm, and for-
estry sectors of Ghana. Others describe how chiefs have tried to tap a
‘gateway to prosperity’ by allocating land to migrant pastoralists for
substantial payments to the detriment of indigenous farmers (Tonah
2002: 53-57), and point to struggles over the right to lease out land to
tomato growers (Berry 1997: 1235). These and other struggles for land
in the local and national arena have resulted in deteriorating access to
land and security of tenure for immigrants, pastoralists, youth, women
and the poor (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001).
Ghana is especially interesting for studying customary tenure sys-
tems, since it is a state characterized by strong legal and institutional
pluralism. The position of traditional authorities7 in Ghana is, if not
unique, at least exceptionally strong in comparison to other African
countries. In the colonial period the British ruled the Gold Coast
through traditional leaders. Their naive assumption that the traditional
government arrangements in the various communities must all be like
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those found among the Akan communities, combined with their pre-
ference for clear hierarchical structures, led in some areas to the inven-
tion of traditional leaders that had no root in tradition, and in other
areas to invented or strengthened hierarchies among traditional leaders
(Kumado 1990-1992: 196-7). The British made several inroads into the
authority of the chiefs, for instance, by making the position of the
chiefs dependent upon governmental recognition, by weakening and
circumscribing their ‘judicial’ powers, and by restricting some of their
powers over land (Kumado 1990-1992: 197-200; Ray 1998). While un-
der indirect rule the chief lost his independence, he at the same time
increased his powers over his subjects because the traditional checks
and balances to his authority were watered down by the colonial autho-
rities. The result was the weakening of the ties between the chief and
his subjects, and this led to many destoolments and attempted destool-
ments (Kumado 1990-1992: 203).
The first government after independence seriously tried to curtail
the powers of the chiefs, but subsequent governments have been more
or less supportive of the chiefs. Besides the creation of a system of
elected local government which gradually diminished the role of chiefs
in local government issues, they have mainly implemented a laissez-
faire policy. The 1979 Constitution eliminated the requirement that
chiefs selected by customary practice must be ratified in their positions
by the central government (Kofi-Sackey 1983: 72; Van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal 1987: 19). This requirement was briefly reinstated in 1985,
but the position of chiefs is again guaranteed in the 1992 Constitution
which withholds any power from Parliament to ‘‘confer on any person
or authority the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a
chief’’ (article 270 (2) (a)8). This power was given solely to the Tradi-
tional Councils and the Houses of Chiefs who are charged with chiefly
succession and status disputes (Ray 1998: 61). Traditional leaders in
Ghana are thus recognized by the state, but are not transformed into
mere state agents; they possess political power in many localities, with-
out being politically co-opted by the regime in order; and they are not
reduced to a mere ‘folklorized’ version of themselves, as described for
some other African countries (Van Binsbergen 1999; Van Rouveroy
van Nieuwaal 1996: 43; Von Trotha 1996: 87).
The Constitution recognizes customary law as a source of law in
Ghana (article 11) and explicitly states that both the selection of chiefs
and the management of stool land are to be ‘‘in accordance with the re-
levant customary law and usage’’ (articles 267 (1) and 270 (2) (a)). It
vests all customary or stool9 lands – which constitute approximately
80% of the land in Ghana – in the appropriate stool on behalf of and
in trust for their people, and confirms that such lands be managed ac-
cording to the fiduciary duty of the traditional authorities towards their
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people (articles 267 (1) and 36 (8)). The origins of the formulation of
customary tenure date back to the struggles of the British administra-
tion in the early colonial period to control land and vest it in the colo-
nial state, and to the creation of a system of indirect rule. In the 1890s
the rapid pace of land sales and mining concessions were of concern to
the colonial government that had little control over the process (Ama-
nor 1999: 46). The British attempted to enact legislation which would
place all ‘‘unused land’’ under the Crown and enable the colonial gov-
ernment to control the granting of concessions (Berry 2001: 1-27; Lentz
2006: 7-8). These attempts met with considerable opposition from the
traditional and modern Gold Coast elite. The Gold Coast intelligentsia
developed a literature on customary land relations (Hayford 1970; Sar-
bah 1968) in which they couched their propertied interests in terms of
the customary rights of Africans to land and the violation of customary
law by colonial interventions (Amanor 1999: 47-9). Colonial policy cir-
cles in this period were polarized by debates between those who sup-
ported constructivist imperialism and a more laissez-faire policy based
on liberalism. The liberal policy gained ascendancy, and a policy of in-
direct rule was established in which colonial rule was affected through
an alliance with traditional rulers organized into Native Authorities,
overseen by District Commissioners. From this period, the manage-
ment of land came under the authority of chiefs and the British colo-
nial administration supported the privileges of chiefs and their control
over land and natural resources. A theory of African communal tenure
was developed, in which land was vested in chiefs to manage on behalf
of their communities and in which chiefs were recognized as the only
social group that could transact land (Amanor 1999: 52-3). By control-
ling chiefs, the colonial government was thus able to control land. This
construct of customary communal tenure did not reflect the social rela-
tions and permanent alienations in land that had existed in the nine-
teenth century (Amanor 1994; Hill 1963: chapter V; Rathbone 1996;
Wilks 1975).
Commoner perceptions of wide-scale abuses of privileges by chiefs
under indirect rule led to many destoolment actions against unpopular
chiefs, as in for instance Akyem Abuakwa (Firmin-Sellers 1995: 868).
By the late 1940s the Native Administration system had alienated
much of the population, who called for the establishment of a system
of local democracy and the reduction of the role of the chief. Although
this led to the creation of a system of democratically elected govern-
ment in the 1950s, and a gradual demise of the importance of chiefs
in local governance issues, traditional authorities continued to enjoy
rights of control over land. Since independence, successive govern-
ments have continued to maintain the claims of chiefs on privileged
rights in land. Under the current NPP government, the pivotal position
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of traditional leaders in land management might even be enhanced by
the Land Administration Project Ghana, a long-term program with
multi-donor support, started in 2003, under which the government is
piloting the management of stool lands by Customary Land Secretar-
iats under the aegis of traditional authorities (DFID 2004; Ministry of
Lands and Forestry 2003: 12).10
Peri-urban Kumasi
In this book, we study the area of peri-urban Kumasi to examine the
regulation of customary tenure systems and the functioning of custom-
ary law. Peri-urban areas form tenure hotspots where property relations
are subject to intense contestation and where access to wealth and
authority undergo rapid change. The peri-urban area is most appropri-
ately thought of as an interface zone, approximating a continuum from
rural to urban. It is characterized as having a rural basis with strong
urban influences, easy access to markets, services and other inputs,
ready supplies of labor but relative shortages of land and risks from
pollution and urban growth (Edusah and Simon 2001; Simon et al.
2001). Due to expansion of urban centers and population growth, peri-
urban areas witness a high demand for residential and sometimes
commercial land, which triggers struggles over the rights to convert
farmland, cultivated by community members, and to sell it for other
purposes. Since traditional authorities maintain a strong position with
regard to land, they play a prominent role in these conversions.
Peri-urban Kumasi, the zone around the capital of the Ashanti Re-
gion, is a case in point. Kumasi, a bustling city and an important trans-
portation hub, houses the still vibrant royal court of the Asantehene,11
the powerful king of all Asante. Its population has grown by 4.2% an-
nually since 1960, to 1,400,000 at present. This has led to the above-
mentioned pressure on land in the peri-urban area. Increasingly farm-
land is being converted into mainly residential, but also commercial
and industrial, land, especially alongside the major roads to Kumasi,
where access to the city is easy and where electricity is available. Many
peripheral villages have now become fully encapsulated by Kumasi.
Customary law
For customary land tenure systems the terms and conditions on which
land is held, used, and transacted are regulated by customary law. This,
however, is a much debated and not unproblematic phenomenon that
has troubled researchers, administrators, lawyers, and judges alike,
from the colonial period until the present. What is customary law?
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Where can we find it? How do we study it? Even the term itself is am-
biguous, as it evokes an image of an unchanging, antiquarian, and im-
mutable normative system, whereas historical and anthropological re-
search has revealed that customary law is dynamic and the historical
result of interaction between local actors and state intervention (Benja-
minsen and Lund 2003a: 2; Juul and Lund 2002b: 3; Lavigne Delville,
Ouedraogo, and Toulmin 2002: 9; Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994: 3-4;
Sklar 1999: 120).12 As these questions underlie all other aspects of cus-
tomary land management, the efforts of various local and supra-local
actors to use, ascertain, transform, create, and recreate customary law
will form a recurrent theme in this book. To offer background on this
aspect of the research, I will now provide a broad sketch of the litera-
ture relevant to a number of these issues.
In the same way it had been discussed with regard to Asia, from the
beginning of European contact with Africa, researchers and adminis-
trators hotly debated whether ‘primitive’ societies in Africa could be
considered to have law. In the early twentieth century, two distin-
guished anthropologists dominated this debate about the definition
and essence of law. Radcliffe-Brown, who defined law in terms of poli-
tically organized sanctions, concluded that preliterate societies had no
law (Radcliffe-Brown 1933). His contemporary, Malinowski, instead de-
fined law as the processes of social control by which any society main-
tains order and discourages disorder, which led to the conclusion that
every society could be said to have law (Malinowski 1926: 50-68). This
last view became dominant among future generations of researchers
studying primitive societies (Nader 2002: 85-6).13
A new controversy arose around the question of methodology. How
to study the unwritten – tribal, customary – law of a society? Early legal
anthropologists and colonial administrators tried to ascertain rules of
customary law through conversations with traditional leaders and other
‘experts’, to be conserved in textbooks and codifications. Danquah’s
1928 Gold Coast: Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa Consti-
tution and Shapera’s 1938 A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom are
well-known African examples.14 In 1941, legal realist Llewellyn and
anthropologist Hoebel published their joint work The Cheyenne Way.
The authors were of the opinion that ‘‘the safest main road into the
discovery of law’’ was through the study of disputes or ‘trouble-cases’,
since ‘‘not only the making of new law and the effect of old, but the
hold and the thrust of all other vital aspects of the culture, shine clear
in the crucible of conflict’’ (Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941: 29). This book
was a response to the case law method for teaching law at American
law schools – introduced by Langdell, who became the Dean of Har-
vard Law School in 1870 – which stressed the order and logic in the
law. Legal realists criticized this view for severing the ties between the
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study of law and everyday life (Nader 2002: 89). By studying the law
of the Cheyenne Indians mainly through an investigation of disputes,
Llewellyn and Hoebel tried to show that ‘‘law is not an autonomous
phenomenon separated from its cultural matrix’’ (Pospisil 1973: 539),
and that the study of trouble-cases ‘‘offers a possibility of study of a cul-
ture at work on and through its people, for which no schematization of
‘norms’ can substitute’’ (Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941: 28). They ac-
knowledged that the study of disputes could not be fully understood
without a reference to abstract norms or rules and to the actual beha-
vior of members of a society (Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941: 21). Still,
their arguments were largely based on fifty-three trouble-cases, and
their work induced a generation of legal anthropologists to concentrate
almost exclusively on conflict and its resolution.
In the 1950s and 60s several major works were produced in this
field that advocated the study of customary law through an analysis of
actual processes of adjudication, mostly restricted to public forums (Bo-
hannan 1957; Gluckman 1955; Gulliver 1963; Nader 1969; Pospisil
1958). Pospisil, for instance, restricted the field of law to the rock-bed
of legal decisions and such principles as could be abstracted from
them, thus excluding stated rules not confirmed by such decisions
(Pospisil 1958: 256-7, cf. Ter Haar and Supomo 1950: 475). These stu-
dies challenged the older approaches of ascertaining customary law
through conversation with experts. Although it lost considerable
ground, this approach did not fully disappear. It was for instance still
followed by Allott (London School of Oriental and African Studies),
who started an ambitious project of Restatement of African Law, that
aimed to abstract and systematize the unwritten rules of African cus-
tomary substantive law (Cotran 1968-9; Ibik 1970-1; Kludze 1973; Ro-
berts 1972; Rubin 1965).15
Some scholars have criticized the case method approach as unduly
restrictive, complicating the necessary analysis of the full range of so-
cio-legal occurrences. (Malinowski 1941-2: 1252; Moore 1970: 270; Na-
der 2002: 97). A well-known proponent of this view, Holleman, propa-
gates a move away from an exclusive focus on situations of dispute to
an analysis of ordering in non-dispute situations (Merry 1988: 890).
He observes that: ‘‘in the study of the substantive law and its practice,
and in a field of law in which litigation is rare, a fieldworker relying
mainly on a case-method focused upon actual trouble-cases may get a
skewed idea of the accepted principles and regularities in this particu-
lar field. (…) The trouble-less case then becomes a necessary check on
the trouble-case, rather than the other way around’’ (Holleman 1973:
599).16 He therefore pleads for a much closer integration of, and equal
emphasis on, all components of the ‘‘methodological triad of legal
anthropological approach’’: normative statements (rules/norms), prac-
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tice (troubleless cases) and disputes (trouble cases) (id.: 606-7). It
should be noted here that Holleman’s point of departure was that
through a combination of these methodologies, the customary rules,
valid in a certain locality at a certain period of time, could be ascer-
tained. Criticism was also heard from within the group of scholars fo-
cusing on disputes. By the 1970s a crucial move was underway to shift
the focus from the description and analysis of dispute settlement insti-
tutions to the description and analysis of behavior connected with dis-
puting (Just 1992: 373-4). The processualists, represented by legal
anthropologists such as Nader, Starr and Gulliver (Gulliver 1979; Na-
der and Todd Jr. 1978; Starr 1978), analyzed the entire process of con-
flicts in their total social context, thereby effecting a shift away from
judge- and judgment-oriented accounts of dispute settlement that see
customary rules as having the capacity to determine the outcome of
disputes in a straightforward fashion, towards analyses that see cus-
tomary rules as objects of negotiation and a resource to be managed
advantageously (Comaroff and Roberts 1981: 14; cf. Just 1992: 374).
In the next decade scholars studying disputing made an effort to
synthesize the rule-centered approach and the processual approach
(Moore 1978; Moore 1986; Comaroff and Roberts 1981). Comaroff and
Roberts, in their study on Tswana disputing, show that rules governing
conflict behavior were not internally consistent codes of action analo-
gous to western written law but were instead negotiable and internally
contradictory repertoires that were applied with discretion (Merry
1992: 360). Arriving at this conclusion, the authors challenged the ex-
istence of one set of ascertainable, valid rules, just as the processualists
had done before them. Another scholar who has questioned the possi-
bility of finding the valid customary rules of a certain group of people
is Martin Chanock, who observes in his work Neither Customary nor Le-
gal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law Reform that within
each group there will be variations within and conflicts about custom-
ary rules, which finds expression both in normative statements of
group members and in their actions (Chanock 1989). Analyzing the
application of customary law by colonial officials, he concludes that
what is represented as the ascertainment of valid rules of customary
law by officials often entails a political choice from various locally exis-
tent versions (cf. Chanock 1998: xi).
Research in n the 1980s and 1990s shows an increasing attention to
how legal institutions and actors create and transform meanings, and a
greater concern with the ways law both reflects, constructs, and decon-
structs power relations (Collier 1988; Merry 1992: 360). This research
reinforced the insight that there was no such thing – and never had
been such a thing – as a fixed body of customary law ready to be ascer-
tained, but that customary law was fluid, relational, and negotiable,
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and was intimately tied to fluctuating social and political relations (Oo-
men 2002: 21). With regard to official versions of customary law, this
insight led to the conclusion that what had been portrayed as the ascer-
tainment of customary rules by colonial administrators and judges was
actually, at least partly, an invention of tradition. Revisionist scholars
displayed how official interventions, such as codification and judicial
applications, created a customary law changed in form, content, and ef-
fect (Fitzpatrick 1984: 21-2). This was done in a dialogue – albeit with-
in highly skewed power relations – between colonial administrators
and African people (Chanock 1998; Mamdani 1996; Mann and Roberts
1991; Merry 1992: 364; Moore 1986; Ranger 1983; Snyder 1981a).17
Whereas in the past legal anthropologists mainly restricted the context
of analysis to the local situation, there now came ample attention for
the interaction between local and supra-local levels and the mutually
constitutive nature between local customary law on the one hand and
state law and official customary law on the other (Allott and Woodman
1985; De Sousa Santos 1987; Griffiths 1986; Moore 1986; Oomen
2002; Vanderlinden 1989; Von Benda-Beckmann 1984b; Von Benda-
Beckmann and Strijbosch 1985; Woodman 1988).18 This led to an in-
creasing awareness and often condemnation of the gap between local
customary law – sometimes termed ‘living law’ (Ehrlich 1936; Moore
1973) or ‘sociologists customary law’ (Woodman 1977) – and official
customary law as pronounced in court judgments, textbooks, and codi-
fications (Tamanaha 1997: 102).
Although the problem of official representation and application of
customary law by judges, legislators, and policy makers has been dis-
cussed by many eminent scholars, it still remains unresolved. The field
seems to suffer from a limited cross-fertilization between, on one
hand, the legal knowledge of processes of adjudication, law making
and codification and the legal reasoning of officials, and on the other,
the legal-anthropological knowledge of how local customary law func-
tions. While many legal scholars and practitioners writing on the is-
sues of ascertainment and codification of customary law (such as Allott
1960; Allott 1970; Asante 1969; Bennett 1985; Elias 1958; Kludze
1985; Osinbayo and Kalu 1991; and Zorn and Care 2002) have taken
the state legal system and the role of state officials as their main refer-
ence point, paying limited attention to complex local realities, the value
of many anthropological descriptions lies in their contribution to the
study of comparative jurisprudence; however, these descriptions ‘‘can
hardly have much impact on the more mundane level of the day-to-day
administration of justice’’ (Allott 1969 in Moore 1992: 23) or be used
in ‘‘the search for a local law’’ (Chanock 1998: vii) of the communities
investigated (Elias 1958; Poulter 1975: 182). Systematic studies, build-
ing a bridge between these two kinds of knowledge to understand not
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only the local functioning of customary legal systems, but also the ways
in which officials confronted with the complex reality of negotiable and
fluid norms interpret, apply, and transform customary law, are rare.19
The present book aims to contribute to this field by constructing some
of the pillars required to support this bridge.
Research questions and methodology
Main Research Questions
In this book the study of the local functioning of customary legal sys-
tems and traditional rule and the way officials apply and interpret cus-
tomary law is based on an analysis of customary land management in
peri-urban Kumasi. As said previously, in this geographical area cus-
tomary tenure is under high pressure and customary norms and rules
are being contested in numerous struggles and negotiations in which
traditional authorities often play a central role. These contestations
bring to the fore questions regarding how customary law evolves in the
localities and the way officials respond to those changes. Thus, the
main research questions are: 1) How is stool land managed by tradi-
tional authorities, what effects does this have on the tenure security
and livelihoods of the various local actors, and what factors can explain
these outcomes and their winners and losers? 2) What role does cus-
tomary law play in stool land management; how and to what extent do
the various actors try to defend, reshape, expand and capitalize on their
customary rights to land; and which factors can explain their degree of
success? 3) How, to what extent, and with what objectives has govern-
ment policy sought to regulate customary land management over time,
and what have been the effects? 4) To what extent do state courts serve
as an alternative channel for restraining chiefs in individual cases, and
which factors can explain the limited effect of court decisions on local
practices in general? 5) What effect does the role of chiefs in stool land
management have on their positions and tasks and on the institution
of chieftaincy? 6) How and to what extent do international policy pres-
sures translate into national policy; how do lawmakers, national and in-
ternational policy makers, and judges interpret, apply and build on cus-
tomary law; which factors explain their method of working; and what
normative bench-marks should guide their search for customary law?
The scope of this research goes beyond peri-urban Kumasi. Many
countries, especially within sub-Saharan Africa, but also outside, are
faced with issues of commodification of land, increasing inequity in
customary land management, and the roles of traditional authorities
and (weak) governments therein. The present study hopes to contri-
bute to existing knowledge and understanding of customary land man-
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agement, traditional rule, and customary law and the way officials dis-
cover, interpret and apply it in Ghana as well as in other countries in
Africa and beyond. For this purpose, a further research question is
needed: 7) What new insights (for Ghana and in theory) do the an-
swers to the questions posed above provide about customary land man-
agement, the application of customary law and the functioning of tradi-
tional rule?
An Interdisciplinary and Multi-level Analysis
It is commonly acknowledged that struggles for land are never merely
a question of land, but also a question of property,20 and that property
is not about things, but about social and political relationships between
and among persons with regard to things (Lund 2002: 11; Moore 1998:
33). Contestations over land and its revenues can thus not be disen-
tangled from struggles over rules, political authority, and social and
cultural capital, and are heavily influenced by the specific social, politi-
cal and historical-geographic contexts (Bassett 1993: 21; Berry 1997:
1228; Juul and Lund 2002b: 4). Research into customary tenure thus
requires an interdisciplinary, processual and institution-focused ap-
proach, encompassing aspects of the studies of law, anthropology, poli-
tical sciences and public administration. These varying disciplines are
necessary to study not only actual dealings with land, but also the un-
derlying struggles to define rules of ‘customary’ tenure and – since
claims of an institution to define property are also claims to the institu-
tion’s legitimacy itself (Berry 2002b; Lund 2002) – to affect, enhance,
or change authority.
Questions with regard to customary land tenure obviously need a
thorough analysis of village affairs, as property regimes are only as ro-
bust, solid, and enduring as the ongoing reproduction or re-enactment
which enables them to persist (Juul and Lund 2002b: 4). Analyzing
customary land tenure firstly requires the mapping of the various local
actors involved. Families, farmers, chiefs, elders, heads of families, lo-
cal government representatives, women, youngsters, and immigrants
all have different interests in land. How and to what extent do these ac-
tors try to defend, reshape, expand, and capitalize their rights to land?
What pallet of, negotiations, power plays, and struggles is encountered
in the villages? To what extent and how is customary law used as a re-
source in local struggles? How do current developments influence the
actors’ positions and livelihoods? However, as the local arena does not
function as an autonomous social field (Moore 1973), local contesta-
tions for land cannot be studied by focusing exclusively on the village
level. They require a multi-level analysis taking supra-local actors into
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account. In this study, a number of supra-local institutional actors are
of special importance.
Firstly, as chiefs play a pivotal role in land conversions, village affairs
are heavily influenced by traditional authorities surpassing the village
level, i.e., paramount chiefs and the Asantehene. Are they combating
sales by their village chiefs or, on the contrary, condoning or even en-
couraging them? What position do they take when village chiefs are
brought to their courts with charges of land mismanagement? What is
the nature of the relationships between village chiefs and their super-
iors? To what extent do the superior chiefs try to influence the enstool-
ments and destoolments21 of village chiefs? Do they claim part of the
revenue from village land conversions for themselves? What example
do they set in their own land administration? Do they use their power
and esteem to set certain rules of proper behavior and guidelines for
the division of revenue? Do they attempt to use, create or transform
customary law as legitimation for chiefs’ actions?
A second institution influencing village land tenure is the govern-
ment. The Ghanaian government is not all-powerful, and local arenas
are relatively autonomous. The interventions of the government may
not be hegemonic, ‘‘the degree to which their ‘intrusive’ acts (Berry
1993: 101) influence the patterns of access to and use of land needs to
be a question rather than a conclusion that they have limited effect’’
(Peters 2004: 294). Through legislation, policy, and public administra-
tion, the government is a partner in stool land management. The Con-
stitution recognizes that stool land is vested in the stools, and the Land
Act prohibits the vesting of freeholds on customary land; but how
should these provisions be interpreted? Land sector agencies are man-
dated to be involved in the collection and distribution of stool land rev-
enue, the provisioning of consent and concurrence for allocations of
stool land, and in land use planning. How do these agencies function
in practice? How are their tasks interpreted by street-level bureaucrats
(Lipsky 1980)? What is the local effect of their activities, and what are
the constraints on their functioning? What role do local government re-
presentatives, active at the village level, play with regard to customary
land tenure, and what are their relationships with traditional leader-
ship? What attitude do higher levels of government display with regard
to chieftaincy and land affairs? What can be deduced from governmen-
tal and political discourse? How do policy makers interpret and work
with customary norms and processes? Can the government control
chiefly land management, or is this inhibited by the close ties between
the current governmental and traditional elite (Amanor 1999)? What
effect will Ghana’s Land Administration Project have on local power
configurations?
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State courts and judges could also have an influence on local land te-
nure. But are state courts accessible to the average peri-urban villager,
or to the poor sectors of these communities, and do these people want
to take their cases to this forum? Do state courts often try stool land
cases, and if so, what kind of issues are tried? How do these courts
gain knowledge from and interpret and apply customary law? Do court
decisions protect smallholders or find favor with the chiefs’ actions?
And what kind of effects do court decisions have on village affairs?
How wide is the often mentioned gap between court decisions and lo-
cal practices, and how can it be explained?
Finally, as ‘‘(g)lobalization would appear to be a permanent charac-
teristic of Asante’’ (Woodman, Wanitzek, and Sippel 2004: 177), the de-
velopments in peri-urban Kumasi cannot be understood without look-
ing at global developments and actors at the supra-national level (cf.
Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 1999). Globalization
leads to a decline in the unique and overwhelming power of the na-
tion-state through an increasing influence of the international arena
(Woodman, Wanitzek, and Sippel 2004: 3-4). For instance, interna-
tional policy pressures towards structural adjustment and decentraliza-
tion open up public space for traditional authorities. The World Bank
has in 2003 provided a US$ 5 million grant directly to traditional
authorities in Ghana, bypassing the government. At present, interna-
tional donors and policy makers furthermore largely favor privatization
of land and the establishment or enhancement of a free market in land
(EU 2004; USAID 1986; World Bank 2003b). How do these pressures
translate into national policy, such as in Ghana’s Land Administration
Project?
Historical and Other Bench-marks for Customary Land Management
This research intentionally limits itself to a description and analysis of
current developments and does not attempt to sketch a comprehensive
picture of allocation of customary rights and duties in earlier phases of
Ghanaian history. Even if such an endeavor were desirable, it would be
extremely complicated, as a number of excellent historical studies pre-
senting struggles, contestations, and negotiations for the rights to land
in former eras of Ghana and the Gold Coast reveal large differences in
normative statements and actual practices between and within areas
and periods of Ghana (Amanor 2008, forthcoming; Berry 1993; Fir-
min-Sellers 1995; McCaskie 1984; McCaskie 1995; Rathbone 1996). To
quote Martin Chanock, ‘‘we do not have a ‘traditional’ world as an iden-
tifiable baseline’’ (Chanock 1998: 10). Historical sources should thus
be seen as providing particular representations rather than universally
accepted descriptions of certain historical processes and occurrences.
INTRODUCTION: LAND, CUSTOMARY LAW, AND TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES 31
Reference will be made to these sources to demonstrate how certain
groups or individuals have represented norms and practices over time.
As said previously, the extensive variation in and struggles about
norms and practices have characterized customary land management
throughout history. This variety has always complicated the already dif-
ficult task for judges, administrators and even anthropologists to deter-
mine the ‘valid customary norms of the moment.’ Written representa-
tions of customary law in case law and certain textbooks can thus rea-
sonably be expected to diverge to a certain extent from customary law
practices in the localities, or to represent only one of the various prac-
tices found locally. Nevertheless, I describe and use them in this book,
to provide at least some sort of bench-mark for the complexity of strug-
gles and contestations. As with historical sources, they should not be
seen as attempts to sketch the reality of customary law in the localities,
but rather as representations by certain actors, or indicators of how
these actors interpreted customary law at a certain time.
Methods
My first acquaintance with Ghana was in 1999, when I was still a stu-
dent, and the idea of PhD research had not even crossed my mind. I
visited an SNV-sponsored22 Legal Awareness Program, run by the for-
midable lawyer Hilary Gbedema. Hilary and her team of ‘legal literacy
volunteers’ went into the remote villages of the Volta Region to educate
communities on the rights of women and fought legal battles in court
to defend these rights. Reading through the files of these cases and fol-
lowing the volunteers on their tour to the villages, it became clear that
rights to land were at the heart of many of the battles fought within
the program. The paramount importance of land for rural people was a
lesson that would influence my later research.
In 2001, while drafting a PhD-proposal, I returned to Ghana for two
months to put my initial research questions to the test. My main re-
search question at that time focused on how judges ‘deal with’ custom-
ary law. I was intrigued by how judges, accustomed to the British legal
system, gain knowledge of customary law, especially in the fields of
land and family matters. These judges are academics, educated in the
capital Accra or sometimes even in the UK, having had one or two
courses on customary law in their whole curriculum. What knowledge
do they have of the customary law, in their geographical jurisdiction,
that varies from one ethnic group to the other and that changes over
time and adapts to new circumstances? Although most judges inter-
viewed agreed this was a most interesting theoretical question, they
also candidly admitted that in almost all cases they ‘found’ customary
law by turning to precedent, without so much as a thought to collect-
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ing any sociological evidence. It would thus be hard to find cases to
study this issue and collect enough material to write a PhD thesis.
Although this was a bit of a disappointment at the time, it was soon
compensated by the fact that the fields of law that I had in mind for
analyzing judicial customary law – land and family law – did turn out
to be very interesting. Land, especially, was an extremely hot topic in
Ghana, and was not only debated in state courts, but also in local are-
nas, at traditional councils, by local government representatives, street
level bureaucrats, high-level policy makers, and by international donors
and financial institutions.
As a result of this trip, I broadened the focus of the research from
the courts to all levels and institutions involved in land tenure. After a
year of reading up on legal, anthropological, political, administrative,
and historical material on the topic, I revisited Ghana in 2002 to select
the geographical region for the field research, or rather the peri-urban
area that I wanted to settle in, for I had decided to focus on an area
with high demand for land. Kumasi, a bustling city with a pleasant at-
mosphere, rapidly swallowing the neighboring villages, came out top
of the list, not in the least because it also houses the royal court of the
Asantehene and thus forms the centre of gravity of a strongly hierarch-
ical and vibrant chieftaincy. Furthermore, I was so lucky as to come
into contact with an interesting research project on ‘land law and its le-
gal institutions’, carried out by the University of Science and Technol-
ogy in Kumasi in collaboration with the Institute for Development Stu-
dies at the University of Sussex, UK. One of the participating research-
ers, Dr Daniel Hammond, enthusiastically invited me to collaborate
and promised practical assistance with initial logistics, which later
proved to be a great asset.
The next eight months were spent on learning the local language,
Ashanti-Twi, taking courses in field work methodology, reading addi-
tional literature and anything else geared towards the real fieldwork. In
March 2003, my partner and I left for almost a year of fieldwork in
peri-urban Kumasi. My first task was to find a village to settle in. I
toured the major roads leading to Kumasi, watching for construction
work to determine the borders of the peri-urban interface of interest
for the research, and visited the various District Assemblies of the area
and a number of villages in each interesting district. To avoid entering
the villages through the chief, I first approached either the local repre-
sentative of the District Assembly or a member of the Unit Committee,
the lowest level of local government in Ghana. It soon became clear
that most villages within a certain zone witnessed their own struggles
and negotiations over land, which would provide insights into custom-
ary land tenure. But how to decide in which village to settle?
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Before leaving for Ghana, I had asked many people who had pre-
ceded me in local field research how they had selected their residence.
Among them my supervisor, originally trained as a lawyer, who, half
bashful, half proud, answered that his wife, a social anthropologist,
had made this decision. When I repeated my question to her, she gave
the somewhat disconcerting answer that besides all kind of practical
considerations and reflections concerning the content, a place also had
to ‘feel right.’ I remember wondering whether a village has a feel, at
least one that becomes visible upon a first or second visit, and I
strongly doubted whether I would possess the antennae to pick up
such ‘obscure vibrations.’ However, history would prove her right. I
had already visited a number of villages where people had told interest-
ing stories with friendly candor and sometimes even warm pleas to se-
lect their village, but no particular ‘feeling’ from my side. Then I vis-
ited Tikrom, and before I was well out of the taxi, a strong tension
seemed to cover me like a blanket. This village later turned out to be a
place with serious struggles over land and authority, where accusations
of threats, bribery, and even talk of suspect deaths were heard. It was
an ideal case-study, which I therefore included in my research, but not
the preferred village in which to spend almost one year. A similar, but
reverse, feeling came over me in the last village I visited, Besease. De-
spite numerous struggles regarding land, the atmosphere was pleasant
and relaxed, and I soon made the decision to settle there.
Besease became the initial fieldwork site and operating base from
which to visit eight other peri-urban villages, four of which were, like
Besease, situated on or near the road from Kumasi to Accra – Jachie,
Tikrom, Adadeentem, and Boankra – and four on the road from Kuma-
si to Obuasi – Ahenema Kokoben, Kotwi, Brofoyeduru, and Nkoransa.
All villages lie within a range of ten to forty kilometers from Kumasi,
and could therefore easily be reached by local minibus (trotro). In these
localities I combined participant observation with semi-structured inter-
views with farmers, chiefs, elders, youth leaders, local government re-
presentatives, and religious leaders. At the end of the fieldwork period
I supplemented my qualitative research with quantitative data, ob-
tained by conducting a survey among 240 households.
I combined this local fieldwork with regular visits to the district capi-
tal Ejisu, the regional capital Kumasi, and the national capital Accra, to
interview judges, lawyers, politicians, civil servants, policy makers, aca-
demics and donors on the one hand, and to study literature, policy
documents, court records, and archival records on the other. Access to
documents was mostly easy and merely required some patience and
friendliness, although that did not guarantee the documents’ quality or
continued existence. One place where I spent a considerable amount of
time was at the premises of the Council for Law Reporting, the institu-
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tion in charge of the publication of annotated case-law in the Ghana
Law Reports (GLR). As the council was understaffed and underfunded
there was a severe backlog and the most recent GLR at the time of my
fieldwork covered the years 1993-1996. To realize my goal of compar-
ing court decisions of customary land cases with peri-urban practice, I
thus had to sift through all decisions collected from the superior courts
of judicature, which were to be found in large numbers of huge heaps
of paper in the library.
The combination of studying local, district, regional, and national ac-
tors and institutions, which I perceived as highly stimulating, produced
a rich set of data, allowing for a thorough multi-level analysis of cus-
tomary land management in peri-urban Kumasi.
Outline
As it seeks to gain insights in the functioning of customary law and
traditional rule through a multi-level analysis of customary land man-
agement in peri-urban Kumasi, this book is divided into chapters deal-
ing with a variety of actors at various levels. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal
with local actors in Besease and peri-urban Kumasi, centering on farm-
ers, chiefs and elders, local government representatives, and other opi-
nion leaders. The other chapters analyze the activities and attitudes, re-
spectively, of the government of Ghana (Chapter 2), national and inter-
national policy makers (Chapter 2 and 3), and courts and judges
(Chapter 6). Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, will draw together the
various actors and levels to form a comprehensive picture of the opera-
tion of traditional rule and customary law in the field of land manage-
ment in peri-urban Kumasi.
Chapter 2 describes governmental influence on stool land manage-
ment. To what extent, how, and with what objectives has government
policy sought to regulate land management by chiefs over time? And
what are the consequences of this regulation? The functioning of a
number of governmental institutions, the discourse of the government
on issues of customary land management, and the current activities
undertaken in the Land Administration Project Ghana, are assessed for
their risks, challenges, and impact on local struggles for land.
Chapter 3 first investigates how policy makers have perceived cus-
tomary tenure systems over time. It describes policy changes with re-
gard to tenure security and the role of customary norms and authori-
ties therein. It shows that international and Ghanaian land policy is
currently witnessing a renewed interest in customary tenure systems,
and argues that this shift is mainly inspired by the practical necessity
to start from existing systems and is based on ‘default reasoning’
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brought about by disappointment with state programs of titling and re-
gistration. This chapter then turns its attention to land management
practices in peri-urban Kumasi and argues that a specific set of factors
enables chiefs to profit disproportionately from peri-urban land conver-
sions and complicates the possibilities of local farmers to resist conver-
sions. These factors lie respectively within the traditional system itself
and in its interaction with the government. The combination of erosion
of customary checks and balances on chiefly functioning and the gov-
ernment’s ‘policy of non-interference’ in chieftaincy affairs has ser-
iously disrupted the fragile balance between chiefs and people. This
has given chiefs the power to abuse their prominent positions as guar-
dians of stool land and experts of the customary realm to manipulate
customary law to legitimize their claims.
Chapter 4 zooms in on Besease to provide a detailed analysis of
struggles for rights in stool land in one peri-urban village. With its mi-
croscopic view of processes of contestation it displays several actors, ac-
tions, and arenas that resurface throughout the book. It questions the
current trend to place all local dealings with land under the term ‘nego-
tiations’, even when one party outright negates or redefines the other
party’s rights, and emphasizes the necessity of taking local stratifica-
tion and power inequalities into account when assessing customary te-
nure systems.
Chapter 5 deals with the question of how peri-urban land manage-
ment by traditional authorities, often leading to a loss of land for indi-
genous farmers, has influenced popular perceptions of chiefs and
chieftaincy. Statistical data reveal the seeming contradiction between
the highly critical attitude of many farmers towards land management
by their chiefs and the people’s continued support for the institution of
chieftaincy. As the way people feel about their chief seems not to influ-
ence their opinion of the institution of chieftaincy, reasons for the pop-
ular support for chieftaincy result not from a high level of satisfaction
with the way chiefs perform their tasks, but are rather found in the
realms of custom and identity. This squares with the fact that in peri-
urban Kumasi dissatisfaction with local land administration and anger
towards a particular chief hardly seem to lead to discussions of the de-
sirability of the institution of chieftaincy. For the majority of the peo-
ple, chieftaincy seems to be a fact.
Chapter 6 specifically deals with the courts and the question of
whether they could serve as an alternative channel of resistance. Both
their decisions and aspects related to their functioning – such as ac-
cess, delays and backlogs, and comprehensibility – are analyzed. The
‘judicial customary law’ is compared with peri-urban practices, and the
gap between the two is analyzed and explained by a number of legal
and political factors, including the nature of the state legal system, the
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difficulty for a judge to ‘know’ the applicable rule of local customary
law, and the political configuration at local and national levels.
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, first summarizes the conclusions
from the earlier chapters to compose a comprehensive picture of cus-
tomary land management in peri-urban Kumasi. As many other coun-
tries are also faced with issues of commodification of land, leading to
increasing inequity in customary management, the conclusions hold
relevance beyond Kumasi or Ghana. This chapter then focuses on a
more abstract level, and turns to a discussion of general lessons regard-
ing the study, application, and interpretation of customary law, through
which I hope to contribute to theory formulation in this highly relevant
field of study. The chapter concludes by answering the dual question of
whether problems of access to and security of land in Ghana can be
solved within the sphere of customary law and chiefly rule, and to what
extent the national legal system can play a role in this process.
Notes
1 Contrasting with this highly positive view on traditional leadership, some literature de-
scribes traditional authorities as outdated institutions with no role to play in the modern
era of democratic decentralization. For instance in the debate over the role of traditional
authorities in post-apartheid South Africa, opponents claimed that ‘‘traditional leaders
in South Africa have lost all legitimacy because of their involvement in the apartheid
government’’ (Oomen 2002: 182).
2 Land tenure may be defined as the terms and conditions on which land is held, used
and transacted (Adams, Sibanda, and Turner 1999).
3 When read literally, the definition does not include the realization or certainty of this
perceived right. As the words ‘‘without hindrance or interference’’ refer to the perceived
right, in this definition a person feels secure of his tenure when he has the perception
to have a right to do certain things without hindrance, no matter his perception of hin-
drances in reality.
4 This should encourage land acquisition by those able to make best use of it. Research,
however, shows that the operation of the land market does not appear to work in favor
of allocative efficiency (cf. Platteau 2000: 71).
5 According to Atwood (1990: 664-5) four limiting conditions are likely to substantially re-
duce the impact of land titling on credit-related increases in agricultural production: (1)
major financial market distortions can prevent increased agricultural lending; (2) trans-
action costs and risks to formal lenders of dealing with small farmer borrowers, even
with titled land, may be prohibitive; (3) there may not be an active land market which
permits easy transfer of land under collateral; (4) where informal lending predominates,
collateral will be of little value.
6 This is elaborately explained in chapter 3.
7 In the course of this book, I will use ‘traditional authorities’ and ‘traditional leaders’ as
synonyms. In Ghana, these terms can denote chiefs, heads of families, or tendamba –
descendants of the pioneer settlers of their respective villages and representatives of the
‘earth God’ (Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 14). In the Ashanti Region of Ghana, the terms
are only used to refer to chiefs.
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8 This is an entrenched provision that can only be amended by parliament after a number
of time-consuming and difficult measures have been completed (Ray 1998: 61).
9 The customary community is called ‘stool’ in reference to the carved wooden stool which
is believed to contain the souls of the ancestors and is a traditional symbol of chieftain-
ship.
10 See chapter 2.
11 Ohene is the word for king or chief in (Ashanti-)Twi, the indigenous language of the
Asante. Within the Ashanti Region each village chief (ohene or odikro) is subordinate to
a paramount chief (omanhene), who again is subordinate to the Asantehene.
12 Whereas some researchers therefore prefer to talk about local land-holding systems and
‘socially determined land-use rules’ (logiques sociales du territoire) (Toulmin and Quan
2000c: 99), this book maintains the term ‘customary law’ following common terminol-
ogy in Ghana.
13 For a discussion of the debate over a social scientific concept of law from the 1950s
through the 1970s, see Tamanaha 1997: 91-128.
14 In The Netherlands Indies, a huge project was undertaken to ascertain the various cus-
tomary laws (Dutch: adatrecht), under the direction of the Dutch scholar Van Vollenho-
ven, who, however, explicitly included the average citizen in his queries, see Van Vollen-
hoven 1918.
15 According to Allott, the restatements were conceived of as a contribution to nation-build-
ing and modernization. He explains that there was a large demand for a source of refer-
ence on the customary laws, cast into a legal language, and that earlier work by anthro-
pologists failed to meet the criteria for a work usable by the courts (Allott 1969 in
Moore 1992: 23). See for a discussion of this project Twining 1963. Even today, the idea
of restatements has not disappeared, see for instance Hinz 2006; Osinbayo and Kalu
1991.
16 Holleman discusses the difficulty of abstracting rules focused upon single interests or
actions from decisions in conflict situations involving a plurality of these. Real-life dis-
putes, he observes, often present a much more complex set of issues than can be cov-
ered by a single rule, and circumstantial factors can play a role and lead to an outcome
which is not strictly in accordance with the rules. Furthermore, the rule-finding exercise
is complicated by the fact that conflict resolution often seeks a feasible compromise
rather than the enforcement of a rule of conduct (Holleman 1973: 590).
17 It is a different question whether such created customary law also existed out of the con-
texts in which it was produced (Von Benda-Beckmann 1984b: 29), i.e., to what extent
this official customary law influenced local customary law.
18 See Merry 1992: 363 for an overview of the literature. Some work in this field was al-
ready published in the 1970s; see for instance Moore 1973 and Woodman 1977.
19 Some notable exceptions are Allott and Woodman 1985; Von Benda-Beckmann 1984b;
Von Benda-Beckmann and Strijbosch 1985.
20 Property can be seen as sets of rules governing people’s rights to access, use and control
resources.
21 As the chief’s throne is called the stool, the installation and deposition of a chief are
called enstoolment and destoolment.
22 SNV is a Netherlands based international development organization.
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2. How to combine tradition and modernity?
Regulating customary land management in
Ghana
Introduction
International trends in land policy in developing countries tend to em-
phasize the importance of recognizing and building on customary te-
nure systems in order to achieve equitable land management, in the
context of poverty reduction (Deininger and Binswanger 1999; DFID
1999; EU 2004; Toulmin and Quan 2000a; Whitehead and Tsikata
2003; World Bank 2003a). However in Ghana, as in other countries
where land transactions have become increasingly monetized in recent
years as a result of growing scarcity and increased land values, the
equity of customary tenure systems is being questioned. The new de-
velopments and the changing values in land that they create result in
attempts to redefine land ownership and tenure and contestation of
rights to land. These processes have increasingly concentrated control
of the economic benefits flowing from land in the hands of traditional
chiefs, which has a direct effect on people’s livelihoods and creates
high tensions in many localities. It is against this background that we
want to analyze the role of the government of Ghana in customary land
management. This chapter will take the example of peri-urban Ghana
to explain how, to what extent, and with what objectives government
policy has sought to regulate customary land management by chiefs
over time, with special emphasis on the Land Administration Project
Ghana (LAP), a long-term program with multi-donor support, which
started in 2003 with the objective ‘‘to develop a sustainable and well
functioning land administration system that is fair, efficient, cost effec-
tive, decentralized and that enhances land tenure security’’ (Ministry of
Lands and Forestry 2003: 12). A key issue addressed by this chapter is
whether or not the state, through the approach adopted under LAP is
able to regulate customary land management in a way that contributes
to the avowed objectives of fairness and tenure security.
After a brief discussion of land struggles in peri-urban communities
in Ghana, we will discuss the history, the legal mandates, and the ac-
tual functioning of a number of governmental institutions involved in
customary land management. In addition, we will study the discourse
of the government on issues of customary land management and
chiefly administration in general. We will then turn our attention to
the Land Administration Project Ghana, under which the government
is piloting the management of customary lands by Customary Land Se-
cretariats (CLSs) under the aegis of traditional authorities. After contex-
tualizing this ‘model’ within the contemporary international policy
trend to recognize and build on customary tenure systems, we go on to
compare the aims and discourse of the CLS component of LAP to the
actual processes and outcomes so far. The chapter concludes by consid-
ering the impact, risks and challenges of state intervention on local
struggles for land.
The chapter draws on general literature, policy documents and data
collected during field research in peri-urban Kumasi between 2002-
2005 and during policy and project advice on the development and
implementation of the LAP on behalf of DFID, from 2002 until the
present.
Customary land management and governmental institutions in
peri-urban Ghana
The 1992 Constitution vests all customary lands – which constitute ap-
proximately 80% of the land in Ghana (Alden Wily and Hammond
2001: 46-8; Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 13; Larbi, Odoi-Yemo, and Darko
1998: 1; – in the appropriate stool, skin, or land-owning family on be-
half of and in trust for their people, and confirms that such lands be
managed according to the fiduciary duty of the traditional authorities
towards their people on the basis of customary law, which is recog-
nized as a source of Ghanaian law (articles 267 (1), 36 (8) and 11, 1992
Constitution). In large parts of southern Ghana, customary land is re-
ferred to as stool land in reference to the carved wooden stool which is
a traditional symbol of chieftainship and is believed to contain the
souls of the ancestors. In the north of Ghana, customary land is de-
fined as skin lands, for here the chiefs sit on a hide. In other areas,
such as the Volta Region and Greater Accra, where family heads have
jurisdiction over land, we speak of family lands. The Constitution does
not however make more specific provision on how customary lands
should be managed by traditional authorities, and in practice increas-
ing land values leads to widespread disputes over the powers to allocate
rights in customary land and entitlements to the proceeds of these land
allocations. For instance, peri-urban areas witness severe struggles be-
tween farmers and families, on the one hand, and chiefs on the other
over the right to convert farmland into residential land (Abudulai
1996, Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Kasanga et al.
1996; Maxwell et al. 1998). In agricultural areas similar struggles over
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land and its proceeds can be witnessed (Amanor 1999, Amanor 2001,
Amanor 2005; Boni 2006; Firmin-Sellers 1995; Fred-Mensah 2000;
Hill 1963; Lentz 2006; Lund 2006).) describes in detail how new land
pressures and commodification have led to contestations and redefini-
tions of rights to land and labor in the cocoa, oil palm, and forestry sec-
tors of Ghana. Others describe how chiefs have tried to tap a ‘gateway
to prosperity’ by allocating land to migrant pastoralists for substantial
payments to the detriment of indigenous farmers (Tonah 2002: 53-57),
and point to struggles over the right to lease out land to tomato
growers (Berry 1997: 1235).
This chapter focuses on peri-urban areas, where traditional authori-
ties are displaying a tendency to adopt landlord-like positions with re-
gard to customary land. Alden Wily and Hammond (2001:44, 69-73)
speak of the ‘‘curtailment of communal property rights, through a
form of feudalization of land relations.’’ Research has shown that
chiefs are rapidly converting farmland, in which indigenous commu-
nity members or families have usufructuary rights, into residential
land which they allocate to outsiders through customary leases (Berry
2002a; Gough and Yankson 2000; Kasanga and Woodman 2004;
Ubink 2007), and which may or may not be registered with the Lands
Commission. Although the Constitution prohibits the sale of custom-
ary land and only allows leases, nearly everyone speaks of the ‘selling’
of land and many people, ‘sellers’ as well as ‘buyers’, seem to regard
land allocations for residential purposes as definitive transfers. The al-
location papers seen during the field research, merely stated that plot x
was allocated to person y, neither mentioning the word lease, nor speci-
fying a time period for which the allocation would be valid.
As a result of the allocations, the original land users, with weaker
bargaining power, frequently lose their land, their employment, and
their income base. Kasanga and Kotey (2001: 18) even claim that ‘‘the
displacement of poor and marginalized families from their land is a
national disease.’’ Traditional authorities display little accountability in
the use of monies generated, and most indigenous land users realize
little or no benefit from the leasing out of land: they are rarely and
then inadequately compensated for land loss; and in most villages only
a meager share of the revenue is used for community improvement.
Although the new lessees are benefiting from the land conversions,
they are also affected by the lack of investment in community facilities,
since the areas in which they are building their houses are seldom ser-
viced with electricity, roads, and sewers. Furthermore, the numerous
accounts of multiple sales of the same piece of land to different buyers
and of sales of alleged residential plots on land unsuitable for residen-
tial purposes show the buyer’s vulnerable position. In sum the practice
of customary land management in peri-urban Ghana differs widely
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from the constitutional provision that puts the interest of the commu-
nity first.
In addition to the constitutional recognition of customary land under
management of traditional authorities, the state has sought over the
years to regulate certain aspects of stool land management emphasiz-
ing the authority and role of formal land administration agencies over
the chiefs, enabling formal registration of customarily acquired rights
to provide documentary evidence of tenure, and seeking to generate
government revenues from customary land transactions. Successive
governments have taken piecemeal measures in the areas of land use
planning, land title registration, issuance of formally registered leases,
stool land revenue collection, and adjudication of land disputes. We
will first turn our attention to the principal agencies involved in these
fields, and their mandates, roles, and performance with regard to cus-
tomary land administration in peri-urban areas.
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands
The Constitution provides for an Office of the Administrator of Stool
Lands (OASL), which was established by the OASL Act, 1994 (Act
481). This office is responsible for the establishment of a stool land ac-
count, and for the collection of all ‘‘rents, dues, royalties, revenue or
other payments whether in the nature of income or capital from the
stool lands’’ to be paid into this stool land account (article 267 (2),
1992 Constitution and section 2, OASL Act, 1994 (Act 481)). Of the
revenue accruing from stool lands 10% shall be paid to the OASL to
cover administrative expenses. The other 90% is to be disbursed in the
following proportions: 25% to the stool for its maintenance; 20% to
the traditional authority; and 55% to the District Assembly (sections 3
and 8, OASL Act, 1994 (Act 481)). There is no legal requirement that
the 25% of the revenue received by stools is reinvested in the commu-
nity. Rather, the provisions encourage chiefs to retain the revenue ‘‘for
the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status.’’ The use of the
20% share to the Traditional Council is not specified. According to Al-
den Wily and Hammond (2001: 118-9) the government in this way ‘‘en-
dorses the perception of chiefs of themselves that they are the owners,
not merely trustees acting on behalf of the real owners, the community
at large.’’
This provision has a long history pre-dating the current 1994 Act. It
dates back to the Local Government Ordinance, 1951 (Cap 64) and its
original purpose was to be the first step in depriving the big chiefs of
any role in land management and eventually of ownership and their
claims to have the right to collect land ‘rents’ (Rathbone 2000: 30).
Chiefs, therefore, have always resisted handing over ‘their’ income to
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the OASL. Since in peri-urban areas the conversion from agricultural
to residential land accounts for most land revenue, chiefs in these
areas centre their resistance on the definition of stool land revenue.
They claim that the money they receive for the allocation of land is not
purchase money but ‘drink money’ or ‘drinks.’ They refer to the cus-
tom of bringing some drinks to the chief when acquiring land from
him as an acknowledgement of the ownership of the land, to show alle-
giance towards the chief, and for the customary pouring of libations on
the ground to seek the Gods’ blessings for the transaction. Whereas a
bottle of Schnapps was sufficient in times of land abundance, when
land became more valuable a small amount of cash money was added
to the Schnapps. In peri-urban Ghana and other areas where land is
highly valued and demand is increasing, the amount of cash de-
manded has gradually risen and now effectively constitutes a market
price for the purchase of land leases (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001;
Edusah and Simon 2001; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; McCaskie 2000a).
The chiefs continue to call this payment ‘drinks’ and claim that it
should therefore not be regarded as ‘stool land revenue’ in the sense of
the OASL Act, and they resist the disclosure of the sums collected. In
peri-urban areas the only land revenues that flow to the OASL consist
of ground rents – annual governmental fees payable on land leases –
which are distributed according to the constitutional formula. These
rents are small compared to the sums of ‘drink money’ collected di-
rectly by the chiefs in selling land leases. The total amount of ground
rent on a ninety-nine year residential lease adds up to about 5% of the
amount of ‘drink money.’ Because ‘drink-money’ is portrayed by the
chiefs as a ritual device rather than the means of exchange in a sales
transaction, it is not collected by the OASL, and so not subject to distri-
bution under the constitutional formula, and thus becomes, effectively
part of the income of the chief.
Contrary to Kasanga and Woodman (2004: 185), who for unclear rea-
sons claim that ‘‘it has been accepted by everyone concerned that those
(sums in ‘drinks’) do not amount to revenue from stool lands within
the meaning of the statute law’’, most officials interviewed consider
that the law meant to include this ‘drink money’ in the definition of
‘stool land revenue’ (interviews at the Regional Lands Commission Ku-
masi, 9 April 2003; Regional OASL Kumasi, 27 June 2003; Ejisu Jua-
ben District Assembly, September 2003). This interpretation seems to
square with the very broad definition of stool land revenues provided
in the OASL Act, as quoted above. This issue has, however, never been
tested in the courts. In the highly personalized society of Ghana, if a
case were brought to court by an officer of the OASL, this would not
be considered an action on behalf of the government, the ruling politi-
cal party, or even of the OASL in general, but as a personal action of
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that particular officer. Such an action would surely provoke the wrath
of all chiefs. According to the District Chief Executive of Ejisu-Juaben
district, ‘‘The one who does it will become an enemy of the chiefs,’’
and this can pose serious dangers to the career of the official con-
cerned (interview 9 September 2003). In a number of cases officials
have been ‘transferred’ after standing up to a powerful paramount
chief or the Asantehene. According to the District Chief Executive of
Ejisu-Juaben district ‘‘careless statements by land officials could be
dangerous. They may have to pay a price for discourtesy’’ (interview 12
January 2004). Furthermore, as the Deputy Regional Lands Officer in
Kumasi explains, every official is also ‘‘subject of a stool and subordi-
nate to the chief’’ and such an action would be considered as an act of
disloyalty towards him (interview 9 April 2003). The one official we en-
countered who did want to go to court over a sum of ‘drink money’ of
Cedis 3 billion (at the time of sale the equivalent of approximately E
300,000.-) claimed that he was stopped by ‘the government’, because
‘‘the President does not want to pay for such an action’’ (interview Dis-
trict Chief Executive Ejisu-Juaben district, 9 September 2003).
The lack of an effective political mandate for OASL to exercise the
role intended by the Constitution is however only part of the story. A
lack of funds, qualified staff, equipment, and vehicles on the one hand,
and mismanagement, corruption, and a lack of accountability in
OASL’s own use of land revenues on the other (Grant 2004: 20-21, 40-
41; Kasanga and Kotey 2001: iii; Kasanga and Woodman 2004: 185)
also severely hamper the functioning of OASL and affect its legitimacy
in the eyes of the people. To date the revenues collected and distributed
by the OASL have never been publicly disclosed, and the use of land
revenues received by all parties remains unaccounted for and non-
transparent. Accusations of irregularities in both spheres are rampant.
Lands Commission
The Lands Commission (LC) first came into existence following the
1969 Constitution, under the Lands Commission Act, 1971 (Act 362)
and since the advent of the 1992 Constitution operates under the
Lands Commission Act, 1994 (Act 483). The LC is responsible for the
management of all public and vested lands,1 is meant to advise and
make recommendations on policies with respect to land use and devel-
opment, and advise on and assist in the execution of the registration of
land titles (section 2, Lands Commission Act, 1994 (Act 483)). With re-
gard to stool land, section 4 of Act 483 states: ‘‘There shall be no dispo-
sition or development of any stool land by any person unless the Regio-
nal Lands Commission (…) has certified that the disposition or develop-
ment is consistent with the development plan drawn up or approved
46 JANINE M. UBINK AND JULIAN F. QUAN
by the planning authority’’ (cf. article 267 (3) of the 1992 Constitution).
The stated government objectives behind this intervention include (1)
the correction of anomalies and problems in the customary sector such
as litigation, land disputes, inimical agricultural tenancies etc; (2) the
introduction of written records to confer security and promote invest-
ment in landed property through the use of registered documents for
collateral purposes; and (3) the acceleration of the pace of development
by easing land acquisition and documentation procedures (Kasanga
1996: 93). This section continues the practice begun in 1962 by the
Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) to require the consent of
the state to the alienation of stool land (Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 3).
Thus if a stool wants to dispose of land, it has to ask the LC for its con-
sent and concurrence.
In practice, consent before an allocation of stool land is never sought.
Concurrence after the allocation is sometimes sought, although not by
the chief, but by lessees who want to formalize their acquisition, and
this is still quite rare. Typically only the more educated people or peo-
ple with connections in the bureaucracy go through the long, cumber-
some and expensive process of formalization. In our survey among
242 people in peri-urban Kumasi, 123 people (50.8%) answered they
had never heard of the LC. Of the 119 (49.2%) that had heard of the
LC, 65 (27%) were not aware of its tasks and functions. It takes on
average between six months and two years to process a document sub-
mitted to the Lands Commission (Grant 2004: 95).
The provision of consent and concurrence is not enforced by the LC
and therefore does not in practice provide an effective check upon the
administration of lands by chiefs. Like the OASL, the LC is hampered
by a shortage of trained and motivated staff, lack of basic logistics and
support services, poor remuneration and incentive packages, low mor-
ale, and endemic corruption (Centre for Democracy and Development
2000: 99-105; Grant 2004: 21-21, 40-41, 95; Report on the Beneficiary
Assessment Survey of the Lands Commission – Ghana, 1997, quoted
in Hueber and de Veer 2001: 195; Kasanga 2000b: 14; Kasanga and
Kotey 2001: iii, 8; cf. interviews with Deputy Regional Lands Officer
Kumasi, 9 April 2003; and Technical Director Forestry, Ministry of
Lands and Forestry, 15 August 2003). According to Antwi and Adams
(2003: 2090), the fact that bureaucrats still insist on the concurrence
procedure despite the fact that only a few people seek formal documen-
tation – in their survey among 286 housing land purchasing house-
holds in Accra, 76.9% had not even attempted to seek any formal doc-
umentation of their title – can only be explained by the rent seeking
opportunities the procedures provide.
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District Assembly
The Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) designates District Assem-
blies (DAs), which have been created since 1986 but which only re-
ceived constitutional backing in 1992, as the main planning authority
charged with the overall development of the district. With regard to
land administration, they have legislative powers to make by-laws with
respect to building, sanitation, and the environment. The preparation
and approval of planning schemes, the granting of building permits,
and the enforcement of regulations and sanctions for non-compliance
all rest with the DA (Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 9). District level govern-
ment is dominated by the District Chief Executive, who is the single
most powerful local government official. Villages and towns are sup-
posed to draw up a land use planning scheme, with help of the Town
and Country Planning Department (TCPD) of the DA. Such a planning
scheme designates the uses of the various areas, and shows the bound-
aries of the individual plots. When a prospective developer applies for a
building permit, the TCPD is to check whether the site plan conforms
to the planning scheme, and whether the allocation paper is signed by
the local chief.
Ammissah et al. (1990: 34, quoted in Hueber and de Veer 2001:
191) argue that ‘‘Since the main aim of the chiefs is to maximize finan-
cial returns within the shortest possible time, important land uses such
as open spaces, playgrounds, schools, markets, refuse dumps, roads,
etc. are sacrificed, in order to augment the supply of building plots.
This is a major cause of haphazard and unauthorized development in
all statutory planning areas.’’ By means of the land use planning pro-
cess, the DA could provide some checks on the land administration by
chiefs, preventing double allocations, and reserving land for public pur-
poses or even for agriculture. Chiefs can however prevent the drawing
up of a planning scheme by withholding their co-operation and not
providing any information. ‘‘If a chief does not co-operate, you cannot
make a planning scheme’’ (interview director TCPD Ejisu- Juaben dis-
trict, 27 May 2003, cf. planning officer TCPD Kuntanase district, inter-
view 7 April 2003). According to the TCPD in Ejisu, ‘‘It is in the bene-
fit of the chief not to have an approved planning scheme. Therefore
the co-operation of chiefs is not very high. Most have their own unap-
proved planning scheme’’ (interview with TCPD director, Ejisu-Juaben
district, 27 May 2003). In a DFID-sponsored research project 34 of the
37 villages in peri-urban Kumasi possessed village layout plans, but the
majority of these plans was prepared without reference to the statutory
agencies responsible for planning (DFID 2001: D8, E13). Unapproved
village layout plans, necessary because of the high awareness among
buyers/lessees that upon the allocation of land they are supposed to re-
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ceive a site plan and an allocation paper, leave open the possibility of
later changes in the plan. Furthermore, although awareness of plan-
ning schemes and building permits is increasing, it is still low and
most people do not comply with the demand for a building permit, or,
also due to the lengthy bureaucratic procedures and the costs involved,
the building precedes the formal planning process (Edusah and Simon
2001: section 4.4; Hueber and de Veer 2001: 191; Toulmin and Long-
bottom 2001: 29-30). According to the law, the whole process of acquir-
ing a building permit should not take longer than three months. But
in 2003 the Ejisu-Juaben district had not seen a meeting of the Plan-
ning Committee in over two years (interview Director TCPD Ejisu-Jua-
ben district, 27 May 2003).
Fieldwork showed that the implementation of planning regulation is
often lacking, due to a lack of personnel, funds, and logistics (cf. DFID
2004: 12; Hueber and de Veer 2001: 188-9; Kasanga and Kotey 2001:
9-10) and mismanagement and corruption (cf. Kasanga 1996: 99; Ka-
sanga and Kotey 2001: iii). And even when violations are found, severe
sanctions, such as demolition of unauthorized structures, are avoided
(cf. Hueber and de Veer 2001: 191). Furthermore, when the DA does
not have a financial interest, it tries not to get involved in ‘local affairs.’
For instance, if there is more than one land-owning chief in a village,
the TCPD will accept the signature of any one of the chiefs as a valid
one. And if there is an agreement within a village that a Plot Allocation
Committee – a locally initiated committee consisting of representatives
of both the chief and the village that should sign all allocation papers
and secure a percentage of the revenue for community development –
is also to sign the allocation papers, this is considered an internal vil-
lage affair by the TCPD and they do not check whether such a signa-
ture is found on the allocation paper. In this way, the locally agreed
upon solution to problems of transparency and distribution of land rev-
enue is not supported by the government.
While the land use planning system could in theory provide a check
on chiefly land administration it also provides chiefs with additional
powers in local struggles over land. The formalization of the land allo-
cation process by the government, with the signature of the chief as a
key element, gives chiefs an extra official card to play, especially those
higher up in the hierarchy of traditional authorities. For instance Abu-
dulai (2002: 85) describes how in Tamale the sub-committee of the LC
attributes most of the problems in the field of land administration to
the lack of documentary evidence. It therefore decided, to bring some
order into the system, that divisional chiefs must countersign alloca-
tion papers. Similar actions were encountered during fieldwork, at the
DA in Ejisu – where it was decided that building permits could be gi-
ven only when the allocation papers bore the countersignature of the
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paramount chief, so as to prevent future land disputes and litigation,
not least involving the paramount chief himself – and at the LC in Ku-
masi – where despite a court ruling that Kaase stool lands did not fall
under the authority of the Asantehene, the LC tried to convince the
Kaasehene to have all land allocations countersigned by the Asante-
hene at the cost of one third of the purchase price (interview Deputy
Regional Lands Officer Kumasi, 16 December 2003). A comparable ex-
ample is found in the distribution of OASL revenues, which are usually
paid to the paramount chief, who is supposed to redistribute them in
his area according to the constitutional formula. These actions can be
explained by a combination of ‘administrative efficiency’ – dealing with
one big man instead of a whole group of people – and attempts to sa-
tisfy the person with the greatest troublemaking capacity.
Every electoral area has its own representative at the DA. In many
villages, these local assembly members and the members of the Unit
Committee (UC) – the lowest level of local government – are public fig-
ures, who are widely known, easily accessible, and often most actively
involved in development of the community. They are aware of the fact
that a lot of money for town development could be generated by stool
land allocations. It is therefore not surprising that where chiefs are un-
willing to distribute land revenues, UC and DA members are often in
direct confrontation with the chief, or lead the public actions against
him. Yet while the UC and DA members are a local force to be reck-
oned with, they are not always backed by the district authorities. The
District Chief Executive (DCE) of Ejisu, for instance, while acknowled-
ging the negative effects of chiefly land conversions in his district, went
no further than the occasional public statement that chiefs should
spend part of the land revenues on community development. When we
proposed the idea to back up local Plot Allocation Committees (PACs)
by providing building permits only when allocation papers carry the
PAC’s signature, he rejected the proposal because land revenue would
then be spent by the UC and fall outside his own responsibility (inter-
views District Chief Executive Ejisu-Juaben district, 9 September 2003
and 12 January 2004). More generally, during UC and DA inaugura-
tion ceremonies members are often instructed to refrain from interfer-
ing in chieftaincy and land matters (interview District Chief Executive
Ejisu-Juaben district, 9 September 2003). This is directly in line with
the national government’s informal ‘policy of non-interference’ in
chieftaincy affairs.
State Courts
As regards the position of state courts in the field of customary land
management, chiefly re-appropriations and conversions of stool lands
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in which community members have a usufructuary interest are not
supported by court decisions (Ubink 2002-2004). Although a trend
can be discerned in judicial customary law towards more power to the
chief as administrator, to ensure sound town planning and more equal
distribution of land, this cannot be interpreted to mean that the chief
has the power to deal with land as he wishes, without regard for com-
munity interests or compensation for farmers. Customary law in the
Ghanaian courts rather conveys an image of protection of usufructuary
rights against the chiefs’ attempts to re-appropriate stool lands for ‘de-
velopment’ purposes. First, usufructuary rights are quite secure. Sec-
ond, the transfer of the usufructuary title does not need the consent of
the allodial title holder. This seems even to apply when farmland is
transferred for non-farm purposes, such as housing or cemetery plots.
And even if a chiefly grant were needed to change land use from agri-
cultural to residential, as was stated in one court case (unreported judg-
ment, no. 5/97 of 13 May 1997), it seems that the community member
has a right to receive this grant unless overriding communal interests
prohibit it. Thirdly, chiefs can be held accountable for the way they use
stool land revenues, since there is a ‘‘statutory imperative that monies
from stool land acquisitions should be lodged in a designated fund’’
(Owusu v. Agyei [1991] 2 G.L.R. 493, at 506).
The effect of such court decisions on land practices is, however, lim-
ited. Notwithstanding the large number of land cases in the courts,
many more land conflicts never reach them, either because of ag-
grieved parties’ lack of access or interest, or because the land conflicts
are embedded in ‘chieftaincy affairs’ for which state courts have no jur-
isdiction. Moreover court decisions seem to have little effect on land
disputes beyond the specific cases on which the court decides. This can
be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, people have minimal
knowledge of court decisions. During fieldwork people hardly referred
to case law or legislation and when they did they often misunderstood
it or invented their own provisions. Secondly, the fact that chiefs are re-
garded in the localities and by the government as authorities in the
field of customary law and guardians of stool land offers them a power-
ful position to define custom in a way that confers and legitimates
their powers over land (Chanock 1998; Firmin-Sellers 1995; Mamdani
1996; Oomen 2002). Combined with an erosion of local checks and
balances, and a lack of control by the government, it is not surprising
that chiefs do not comply with the rules of customary law as set out by
the courts that protect the interests of the usufructuary (Ubink 2002-
2004).
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A policy of non-interference
In the sections above a number of examples display a lack of political
willingness to enhance the functioning of Land Sector Agencies (LSAs)
such as the OASL and the LC and strengthen their checks on chiefly
land management: the unwillingness of the political establishment to
bring before the court the question whether ‘drink money’ is stool land
revenue in the sense of the OASL Act; the instructions to DA and UC
members to abstain from chieftaincy affairs; and the refusal of the
TCPD to check land allocation papers for a signature of the Plot Alloca-
tion Committee, where such committees exist. Abudulai (2002: 81) de-
scribes a further example in peri-urban Tamale where ‘‘there are appar-
ent sales of plots to wealthier people who ‘can put up a building the
next day. When that happens, you lose everything, and you have no-
body to complain to. The LC will tell you that they solve issues invol-
ving land disputes, but not houses already built.’’
This lack of political support – which results in large part from a de-
ference to chiefly authority and power amongst local government offi-
cials – is also mirrored in the policy discourse of the present govern-
ment. In the media, government officials at all levels regularly and ve-
hemently proclaim that they will not ’meddle in chieftaincy affairs’ (see
for instance Daily Graphic 25 August 2003: 3; Ghanaian Times 5 Au-
gust 2003: 1, 25 August 2003: 3). According to Boafo-Arthur (2003:
138), President Kufuor himself ‘‘has made it clear that the current rul-
ing party is not interested in meddling in chieftaincy affairs.’’ These
‘non-interference’ statements are sometimes made in reaction to chief-
taincy disputes, for which section 15 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971
(Act 370) declares the government has no jurisdiction, but also to ex-
press in more general terms that the government will not interfere in
chiefly administration such as in the field of land management, which
is not dictated by any legislative provision whatsoever. The former Min-
ister of Lands and Forestry, Professor Kasanga, argued that ‘‘The state
should not attempt to enforce local checks and balances. This should
be done by the citizens themselves’’ (interview 3 December 2005). The
bureaucracy, and those charged with directing reform under LAP, tend
to adopt a similar perspective. For instance, the former coordinator of
LAP at the Ministry of Lands and Forestry, asked in an interview: ‘‘Is it
the business of the government to address the accountability of chiefs?
Within the local system there exists accountability, they can ‘destool’ a
chief, or remove his authority. We do not want to impose accountability
on the chiefs, since land is essentially a chief’s thing’’ (interview 19 Au-
gust 2003). Obviously, such state discourse, together with what we re-
fer to as government’s ‘policy of non-interference’ provides chiefs with
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ample room to manoeuvre, and gives them little reason to fear state in-
tervention in land matters.
The primary basis for the present government’s policy of non-inter-
ference appears to be a deliberate political alliance with powerful
chiefs, coupled with a recognition of chiefs’ considerable local political
power and influence, and their roles as the key vote-brokers, especially
in the rural areas. In addition, the current tendency to fill chieftaincy
positions with highly educated professionals blurs the traditional dis-
tinction between governmental elite and chiefs, and creates new alli-
ances between these two groups (Ray 1992; Bierschenk 1993 describes
the same phenomenon for Benin). The elite of the party presently in
power, the NPP, is especially closely connected to the chiefs. Not only
does it have its stronghold in the Ashanti Region, with its powerful
chiefs, but president Kufuor himself is through marriage connected to
the royal family of the Asantehene. Many members of the current gov-
ernment, up to high levels, are chiefs or royal family members in their
hometown.
It should also be noted that rampant irregularities and mismanage-
ment by state institutions in procedures of compulsory acquisition of
land do not give the state a strong moral position from which to judge
the quality of chiefly land administration (Kotey 1996; Daily Graphic,
22 August 2002: 17). Moreover, when the state needs to make new
land acquisitions itself, a cooperative relationship with chiefs will be
useful.
Chiefs seek to capitalize on the government’s current support for
chieftaincy by rekindling discussions on certain subjects, such as: the
creation of a second chamber of parliament consisting of chiefs; the re-
presentation of chiefs on DAs; the referral of all proposals for legisla-
tion to the National House of Chiefs for comment as an integral part
of the legislative process; the de-vesting and return of former stool
lands vested in the president; and an increase of the percentage of stool
land revenue to be disbursed by the OASL to the chiefs (see for in-
stance the welcome address of the president of the national House of
Chiefs, Odeneho Gyapong Ababio II, at the conference on African tra-
ditional leaders, held in Kumasi, on August 3, 2003; and the speech en-
titled ‘‘African traditional systems and the growth of democracy and
good governance’’ given by the paramount chief of Ashanti Asokore, S.
K.B. Asante, at the same conference). Chiefly statements and demands
on these issues at workshops and policy meetings generally go unchal-
lenged by government representatives.
The overall picture of governmental intervention in customary land
throughout most of the post independence period is one of piecemeal
attempts to control the management of stool lands, motivated by a
wish to rein in the power of the chiefs and enforce the power of the
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state. To do this the government has utilized the laws and institutions
for land management and institutions bequeathed by colonialism,
further developing these through successive legislation - notably the
1992 Constitution which created OASL – but in a fragmentary rather
than a comprehensive way.
We have seen that the institutions created and mandated to act as a
check on stool land management do not in reality exercise effective
control upon the chiefly administration of land due to a combination
of factors: a lack of chiefly co-operation with the tasks and duties of
LSAs; the LSAs’ lack of funds, staff and material, and their problems
of mismanagement and corruption; and the difficulties for and unwill-
ingness of officials to challenge chiefly behavior. In this context, the
lack of political interest by the present administration to contest the
authority of the chiefs by tackling their frequent lack of co-operation in
land matters is so pervasive that we can speak of a policy of non-inter-
ference. The formal system, however, has also proved incapable of deli-
vering effective land management and security of tenure for the major-
ity of land users.
Land Administration Project
Against this background of state institutions and discourse, the govern-
ment of Ghana, after decades of piecemeal legislative and state man-
agement measures, formulated its first comprehensive National Land
Policy in 1999 (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999) and has em-
barked, with multi-donor support, upon a Land Administration Project
(LAP) intended to reform land institutions and develop land policy so
as to provide greater certainty of land rights for ordinary land users
and enable greater efficiency and fairness in the land market (Ministry
of Lands and Forestry 2003; World Bank 2003a). The underlying pro-
blems that LAP was designed to address include the high level of land
disputes in the country and cumbersome land administration proce-
dures involving various statutory agencies as well as customary institu-
tions. Recent research in Ghana has shown how difficult it can be for
people to obtain documentary evidence of tenure through existing re-
gistration mechanisms (Alhassan and Manuh 2005; Kanji et al. 2005).
Instead, land transactions take place increasingly through locally wit-
nessed agreements of little legal value, pointing towards the need to in-
corporate customary systems of documentation within a broader, inclu-
sive land administration system.
Under the LAP the medium to long-term plan is that government
should divest itself of responsibility for the management of stool lands.
This should proceed incrementally, on the basis of the satisfaction of
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certain criteria, including the setting up of Customary Land Secretar-
iats (CLSs) with appropriate governance structures to assure institutio-
nalized community-level participation and accountability in the use of
stool land and the revenue it generates.
The transfer of responsibility for the management of stool lands
from LSAs to CLSs in the LAP reflects the problems of delivering te-
nure security in Ghana through statutory mechanisms, but is also very
much in line with the renewed policy emphasis on the importance of
recognizing and building on customary tenure systems. This policy
trend is, however, subject to critique because customary land rights are
the outcomes of negotiations, struggles, disputes, and implicit agree-
ments embedded in social relations of family, kinship and community.
These social relations are also inherently unequal, involving power rela-
tions between ordinary land users and customary authorities, whose
powers and opportunities to redefine customary ‘‘law’’ in their own in-
terests may increase as a result of the formalization of customary te-
nure systems and institutions over which they exert significant influ-
ence and control (Bassett 1993: 20-21; Berry 1993; Shipton and Goheen
1992). As noted above, the phenomenon of local elites using their
power to capture the value of customary land has been identified in a
variety of African countries (Chauveau et al. 2006; Juul and Lund
2002a; Lavigne Delville 2000: 113-5; Rose 1992; Woodhouse 2003).
Also in Ghana, as we have seen, customary authorities frequently do
not manage lands in the interests of the holders of customary rights
because of the opportunities to generate revenues from sales and trans-
actions in land. Whereas these circumstances do not in our opinion
lead necessarily to an outright disqualification of attempts by LAP to
transfer responsibility for the management of stool lands to CLSs at
the local level (contrary to Whitehead and Tsikata 2003 who do criticize
these attempts and argue instead for the replacement of customary
land management by more democratic land administration systems
under the control of district authorities), they do show that LAP’s twin
goals of greater certainty for ordinary land users and gains in efficiency
and fairness in the land market will only occur if the CLS as an institu-
tion is designed in such a way as to promote the land rights of small-
holders.
However, from the inception of LAP, it has been government’s clear
political choice that CLSs should fall under the aegis of traditional
authorities rather than opting for more community based approaches
to the management of customary land. By placing the customary land
secretariats under the aegis of the chiefs LAP ignores the fact that the
notion of the ‘‘customary’’ powers and rights of chiefs is loaded with
political inventions and endorses the roles that chiefs were accorded in
land administration in the colonial period as if this were a timeless
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principle of customary tenure (Amanor 2005: 110-1). This approach,
which was not necessarily the donors’ intention, displays a highly
skewed interpretation of the trend to recognize and build on customary
tenure systems, and enhances the abovementioned risks of elite cap-
ture of increasing land revenues to the detriment of ordinary land
users. These issues call for a closer look into the design and function-
ing of CLSs.
CLS Objectives
The support to customary land management under LAP is intended to
strengthen the accountability of customary authorities in land manage-
ment, in line with constitutional requirements. A program to establish
a set of pilot CLSs intends to provide effective land management har-
monized with government land agencies and DAs, so as to establish a
unified, decentralized public record of land availability, use, and trans-
actions. Research linked to the CLS piloting process was intended to
identify improvements to the institutional, policy, and legal framework
for customary land administration, including alternative dispute resolu-
tion, clarification of the nature of usufructuary rights, and to build on
the diverse interests and settings found within Ghana (DFID 2004,
CLS Project Memorandum para 5).
The CLS piloting process, linked to debate and learning amongst
LSAs, traditional authorities, and DAs, was expected to ‘‘bring benefits
in terms of: lower costs and simpler methods for confirming claims to
land; easier public access to information regarding land use and hold-
ings; improved boundary dispute resolution; and opening up of debate
at local level regarding the procedures and norms which should guide
land administration’’ (DFID 2004: para 39). Successful establishment
of CLSs has also been anticipated to lead to increased land market
transactions and generate additional land revenues for community use.
The principal beneficiaries were expected to be the majority of people
for whom the current land administration system is effectively inoper-
able, due to the lack of transparency in the land allocation process, un-
certain tenure rights, high costs, and slow, complex bureaucratic proce-
dures (DFID 2004: para 6).
Guaranteeing security of title of small land owners in peri-urban
Ghana against powerful chiefs and elders requires a clarification of the
nature of usufructuary rights and a protection of these rights against
the chiefs’ conversion drive (cf. DFID 2004: 19; Ministry of Lands and
Forestry 2003: 13; World Bank 2003a: 37). Alden Wily and Hammond
(2001: 28, 54) show, however, that during the LAP conception and de-
sign process there was no wide and open discussion of the role of
chiefs in the administration of stool land – including the tendency of
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chiefs to behave like private landlords – or of the possible checks and
balances the state could place on stool land administration. This situa-
tion was confirmed in discussion with the DFID rural livelihoods advi-
sor, responsible for moving DFID’s support to LAP forward to imple-
mentation: ‘‘Government doesn’t like to include words like accountabil-
ity, equity and transparency. It wants DFID to tone down the language
(of the CLS project design document)’’ (interview 27 January 2004).
Although the lack of open discussion of the role of chiefs can partly be
explained by tactical considerations – government’s wish not to antago-
nize the chiefs – it may also be the case that the ‘policy of non-interfer-
ence’ is currently so pervasive that the problems involved in chiefs’ jur-
isdiction over land and their possible solutions are not open for public
discussion.
Although the program is still at too early a stage to provide systema-
tic evidence of the effectiveness of establishing CLSs as a policy inter-
vention, we now consider the emerging evidence regarding the perfor-
mance, potential, and risks of CLS establishment within a framework
of the changing political economic relations and incentives between
state, chiefs, and citizenry.
Establishment of Pilot CLSs
Since the end of 2004, ten pilot CLSs have been established with the
object of enhancing the quality of the management of customary land
in the area under their jurisdiction. The initial selection was made by
the government of one CLS in each of the ten administrative regions
of Ghana, so as to provide a representative spread. In addition, a roll-
ing program to identify and establish further pilot CLSs is underway.
Of the ten initial pilot CLSs, some were in peri-urban areas, either in
major cities such as Accra (Gbawe) and Kumasi (Asantehene’s Land Se-
cretariat), or in growing rural towns, such as Kyebi. Others operate in
more rural areas, including Wassa Emenfi in the Western Region and
Tabiase in the Upper East. These CLSs operate either at stool level, un-
der a chief or paramount chief, or under land-owning families, as in
the Greater Accra area, where family heads (the principal elders of line-
age groups) are the operative customary authorities with jurisdiction
over land.
Gbawe in Greater Accra is generally regarded as the paradigm of
CLS good practice (Kasanga and Kotey 2001). It is a fully functioning
CLS avant la lettre which was installed by the Gbawe elders prior to
LAP, and provided a source of inspiration for the design of the CLS
component of LAP. In Gbawe, LAP is working to help consolidate bet-
ter rent collection systems, improved land and financial records, in-
cluding published accounts, the provision of secure, registered rights
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to settlers, and the use of land revenues to support community facil-
ities. The existence of an organized land allocation system, which facili-
tates settlers’ access to documented land rights, alongside investments
in local infrastructure undertaken by the land owners, are reflected in
a high level of demand for residential plots. In 2005 the family elders
explained compensation arrangements for farmers who lose agricultur-
al land including the provision of a residential plot, new farm land
where available, and entitlement to the proceeds of sale of an addi-
tional residential plot (interview with Gbawe Kwatey family elders, 11
August 2005). The elders noted that a number of displaced farmers
were able to use compensation money to invest in more intensive snail,
mushroom, and poultry production ventures. Within a year, however,
the family head pointed out that no more agricultural land was avail-
able, having been lost to residential development including encroach-
ment by neighboring groups, and that Gbawe was ‘‘engulfed by Accra.’’
The development of the CLS was cited by the elders as an important
factor stimulating the demand for residential land in Gbawe and lead-
ing to increased income for the family, as well as resources for invest-
ment in community infrastructure. Examples of new community in-
vestment underway since the previous year included construction of a
police station, a youth employment project, plans to improve sanita-
tion, street lighting and provide public toilet facilities (interview Gbawe
Kwatey family head Nii Adom Kwatey and elders, 9 June 2006). The
CLS does not, however, record or disclose payments of ‘drink money’
to the family head as initial down payments on land leases, which, as
noted earlier, constitutes the greater part of all land revenues. Despite
this sizeable limitation, the Gbawe CLS provides an example of pro-
gressive practice in land management as a spontaneous innovation by
customary authorities. It must be asked, however, to what extent these
innovations are replicable elsewhere under LAP.
In contrast, in other pilot CLSs linked to large and powerful stools,
the orientation of traditional authorities has been to use the CLS to
consolidate the centralized control of the stool over leasehold transac-
tions. In Kumasi, the capital of Asante Region and Kyebi in Central Re-
gion, land secretariats were originally established during the colonial
period under the aegis of powerful paramount chiefs, then aligned to
the colonial regime. In Kyebi, as in Kumasi, the paramount chief is
concerned with reining in local chiefs who transact in land without
authorization and without accounting fully to the paramount stool. In
both of these cases the paramount chiefs have adopted a system where-
by ‘‘caretaker chiefs’’ are responsible to the paramount chief for docu-
menting and authorizing land transactions. The Okyenhene, or Kyebi
paramount chief, has sought to control any local land transactions in-
volving commercial investment such as development of plantation
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crops and residential land, including the conversion to new uses of co-
coa plantations established by tenant farmers under long standing
sharecropping arrangements with local families. The ‘drink money’ or
customary fees collected are then divided between the local chiefs and
the Okyenhene. Five per-cent is intended to go to the land user who
has sought to dispose of the land or has been required to give it up,
but the use to which the money is put by the chiefs is not disclosed (in-
terview Kyebi CLS registrar, Kyebi, 15 August 2005). In Kumasi the
Asantehene’s Land Secretariat has operated since colonial times a sys-
tem for registering land transactions in the Kumasi traditional council
area, facilitating the stool’s centralized collection and management of
‘drink money’ (alongside a fee element to support the Land Secretariat
itself) and the Asantehene’s authorization of development plans, thus
enabling official registration of leases at the Land Commission by the
lessees of residential properties (interview Asantehene’s Land Secretar-
iat, Kumasi, 16 August 2005). Here, LAP has been perceived as an op-
portunity for the traditional authorities to regain the official support
and authority over land they formerly enjoyed under British control. In
both of these cases the expectations expressed by CLS staff appointed
by the chiefs and members of their traditional councils were that gov-
ernment would provide financial, technical and material support to fa-
cilitate sales of residential plots to outsiders and improve centralized
control of land revenues on behalf of the stool. In Kyebi, the response
of the LAP CLS facilitator team was to organize systematic inventories
of existing land occupation so as to document the land claims of indi-
genous land users, tenant farmers and urban settlers. This exercise
may in turn provide a basis for the eventual formal registration of land
rights and an orderly process of land use change in which the tenure
rights of all are respected. In Kumasi, the LAP has not reached an
agreement with the traditional authorities yet and no concrete actions
have been taken, apart from the initial supply of computer equipment
and furniture.
In Wassa Emenfi in Western Region, a predominantly rural area
with a high incidence of migrant sharecropping principally for cocoa,
where access to land is now becoming more competitive, resulting in
tension and disputes between indigenous and migrant groups, govern-
ment’s proposal to establish a CLS was welcomed by the chief. At first
the stool’s objectives in developing a CLS were not clear, but it soon be-
came evident that the CLS was seen as a way to seek to maximize land
availability for profitable disposals and for allocation within their own
communities through changing long standing land allocations to stran-
gers. A first proposal of the local CLS coordinator, appointed by the
chief, was to use the CLS to convert the secure tenure arrangements of
migrants created through long established oral and sometimes written
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sharecropping contracts with land holding families (Alden Wily and
Hammond 2001; Amanor and Diderutuah 2001), arguably equivalent
to land purchases, into fixed term leaseholds subject to rent collection
and eventual discretionary renewal by the CLS (interview with head of
Wassa Emenfi CLS, Wassa Akropong, 18 August 2005). LAP project
staff – consisting of Ghanaians employed at the Ministry of Lands, For-
estry and Mines – disabused the CLS of the legitimacy and legality of
such a move. The principles under which LAP operated, with the sup-
port of the donors, were to encourage CLSs to document the full range
of land claims on the ground, without discrimination, including the es-
tablished customary rights of both indigenes, which become vulnerable
when chiefs sell their land, and tenants, who are vulnerable where in-
digenous groups try to repossess their land. Following dialogue with
the Wassa chief and subchiefs, and a public ‘durbar’, it was agreed that
the CLS should seek to document land rights and support the manage-
ment of land transactions in the interests of all land users, and the
CLS is now registering indigenes’ land rights, which should be fol-
lowed by the registration of migrants. However, as the inventory of
land occupation proceeded (a process coordinated by LAP project staff
as a pilot CLS activity) LAP enumerators and visiting evaluators were
firmly directed away from migrant cocoa farmer settlements by local
subchiefs, apparently because of sensitivities surrounding the compet-
ing land claims of indigenous and migrant groups.
Elsewhere, pilot CLSs have been inaugurated in areas where custom-
ary political and land management systems are less centralized. In
Kate Krache in Volta Region a number of land-owning families have
come together to establish a CLS. In parts of Upper East, including in
peri-urban areas of Bolgatanga, the regional capital, where the custom-
ary jurisdiction of traditional land priests (Tindana or Tendamba) over
land allocation is frequently now disputed by chiefs, the establishment
of CLS has been regarded as a non-starter by the ministry.
Difficulties in CLS Practice
The process of establishing pilot CLSs under LAP as a wider program
to reform land administration in Ghana has raised a number of issues
and difficulties that display similarities with problems of customary
land management by state institutions discussed earlier. These concern
transparency in customary land management, resistance to CLSs by
the formal Land Sector Agencies, efficiency problems in project deliv-
ery, the position of the state in relation to accountability of chiefs, and
hazards inherent in the CLS experiment. After discussing these in
turn, we summarize the risks for CLS.
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i. Chiefs and elders prefer opacity
We have seen that in peri-urban Ghana, the chiefs and elders of certain
communities have coalesced into an interest group that is reinterpret-
ing customary land law to support today’s opaque, inequitable, and
somewhat convoluted system of customary land administration. In this
system, chiefs’ administrative roles in land rights transactions enable
them to appropriate community members’ interests for purely econom-
ic motives. The CLS objectives of enhancing transparency of land trans-
actions and ensuring accountable and equitable land administration
thus run counter to those of this interest group.
Since the present NPP government under Kufour is broadly pro-
chieftaincy in its orientation, and politically committed to the introduc-
tion of CLSs, powerful chiefs have rather seen in LAP an opportunity
to restore and extend their political and economic control over land (cf.
World Bank 2003a: 24). They seek to use CLSs – and the opportunities
this provides for centralizing the management of land transactions and
the recording and formal documentation of land rights – as instru-
ments for land disposals by the elite by concentrating on facilitating
and documenting new land transactions, and failing to document the
rights of indigenous land holders.
At the time of writing the processes are incomplete and the effects
of improved systems of documentation remain to be seen. In peri-ur-
ban areas the CLSs could lead to faster conversion, demarcation and
leasing out of farmland, as well as increased revenue generation, with
prospects of increased sales revenues for the chiefs. On the other hand
better documentation of existing land rights and occupation could be
expected to strengthen the ability of both indigenes and tenant farmers
to retain their land or to negotiate higher levels of compensation in
cases where the traditional authority or land holding group redevelops
or disposes of the land. Generally, where there is market demand for
land access, customary authorities display tendencies to maximize rev-
enues through leasehold disposals to outsiders – generating both ‘drink
money’ as sales revenue, and regular rental incomes – and through re-
defining land relations with strangers. The risks are that they are able
to use CLSs to facilitate both of these processes. Although comprehen-
sive and inclusive systems of land records provide an important foun-
dation for security of tenure and equity in land relations, the overriding
need to gain the support of the chiefs themselves in establishing pilot
CLSs has led to restraint in pushing for a clarification of the rights of
land users in areas such as Wassa and Kyebi. CLS activities have been
unable to address the need to create neutral public arenas for negotia-
tion and settlement of conflicts of interest around land, which was part
of the original rationale in developing a CLS program under LAP
(DFID 2004). The importance of having officially recognized spaces
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for negotiation of land rights, as a priority function of CLSs, as op-
posed to administrative secretariats directly controlled by the chief, has
also been emphasized by authorities on customary land management
in Ghana (Sara Berry personal communication 2004).
ii. Land Sector Agencies resist decentralization
In addition to the policy perspectives of government in relation to cus-
tomary land mentioned in section 3, we should also consider the posi-
tion within the land administration bureaucracy. The behavior of the
LSAs in relation to the management of customary land is in line with
that predicted by the economic analysis of bureaucracies (Niskanen
1975, Niskanen 1994, quoted in Antwi 2006). They operate adminis-
trative systems that are portrayed as essentially indispensable to the
management of customary land rights transactions and enable them to
extract rents in the process (both officially in the form of stipulated
fees, and unofficially in the form of bribes to ensure that applications
and transactions are actually processed) but which in fact add no value
to transactions or services provided. We find evidence of this in the
need for the Lands Commission’s consent and concurrence of certain
customary land transactions (Antwi and Adams 2003: 2095). The CLS
objectives of decentralizing land management run counter to the inter-
ests of the bureaucracy because they will reduce the involvement and
thus the rents and fees generated by LSAs and their officials. Given
that a major objective of LAP is to reform and modernize the LSAs
themselves, and that their officials are key participants in LAP and the
transferal of tasks from LSAs to CLSs, it can thus be expected that the
LSA bureaucracy will attempt to employ all sorts of tactics to hinder
CLS creation and functioning (cf. Grant 2004: 99). Resistance against
the emergence of CLSs as decentralized land management institutions
under the aegis of chiefs can however also arise from the conviction
that the state has a legitimate role in tackling mismanagement and
poor governance of land in the customary sector and that the LSAs
were established for this purpose in the interests of Ghana’s citizens as
a whole. Besides active deliberate resistance, the co-operation of LSA
personnel can also be hindered by the earlier described lack of moti-
vated staff, equipment, and personnel. However, while the LSAs’ con-
stitutional position has become self sustaining and some of its officials
will defend the agencies’ roles because they gather revenue from stool
land management, allowing them to maintain their position and
authority, there are also of course modernizing interests within LSAs.
These align more closely with the stated objectives of LAP in recogniz-
ing the potential for new arrangements between LSAs and the custom-
ary authorities to promote CLSs as decentralized and publicly accounta-
ble land management institutions.
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iii. Mainstreaming hinders CLS efficiency
The implementation of donor-supported programs as an integral aspect
of an existing ministry’s business – generally referred to as ‘main-
streaming’ – risks subjecting the program to the motives of politicians
and senior officials who may aim to utilize and allocate project re-
sources in such a way as to legitimate their authority and to maximize
votes, without necessarily having regard to objectives of equity and/or
efficiency (Tullock 1976). Since the LAP is managed directly by the
Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines (MLFM), the beneficiary institu-
tions, i.e. the ministry and the various LSAs, are expected to reform
themselves, build their capacity for new ways of doing business, and
moreover, pilot and develop the policy and institutional framework for
CLSs as new institutions intended to relieve government of direct re-
sponsibility for the management of customary land. The selection of
CLS pilot locations has been heavily influenced by a political populist
agenda which concedes growing influence to the institutions of chief-
taincy across the country. The selection was ‘supply driven’ by political
considerations, including providing visible support to powerful, politi-
cally influential chiefs, and ensuring a regional spread. The state also
seeks to measure success in terms of numbers (originally aiming to es-
tablish fifty pilots in five years) rather than functionality and the ability
to serve as lesson learning laboratories. Furthermore, mainstreaming is
reliant on a somewhat opaque and cumbersome ministry system of
procurement of goods and services (attributed by officials to the re-
quirements of the Procurement Act, but which at the same time main-
tains control of key managers over procurement and scope for political
influence over the award of contracts and staff selection) involving
multiple levels of approval, which delays decision making and hinders
the activities of CLS field officers charged with the implementation of
the project.
iv. The state and the question of chiefly accountability
Based on past history of government interventions, chiefs were initially
suspicious of government’s proposals to introduce CLSs and had to be
assured that CLSs would not compromise the policy of non-interfer-
ence. ‘‘At first, chiefs were afraid that the government would take away
their land,’’ explains the World Bank’s natural resource management
specialist. However, these fears were soon dispelled. ‘‘We reacted
quickly and got their support. Now they like the project because we do
not prescribe anything’’ (interview natural resource management spe-
cialist, World Bank, 19 January 2004). At the inception of LAP, and
prior to recruitment of dedicated CLS development personnel, the gov-
ernment presented the idea of pilot CLSs to traditional leaders as
packages of equipment and technical support to help resource and im-
HOW TO COMBINE TRADITION AND MODERNITY? 63
prove efficiency in existing customary land management practices. Ac-
cording to DFID’s rural livelihoods advisor, in conveying this message,
‘‘LAPU (the LAP Unit at the MLFM) has done more wrong than right
in its first year of the CLS project. Chiefs are now asking for their
money and package’’ leading to expectations that government and do-
nors will assume responsibility for meeting CLS salary costs and other
recurrent expenditures (interview, 27 January 2004).
LAP documents make a clear commitment to enhancing the ac-
countability and transparency of customary land management through
CLSs and the participation of land using communities in the CLS de-
velopment process. This includes efforts to clarify the nature of usu-
fructuary rights, and provisions for legislative reform to clarify the
strength of the rights held by different land users, including both
members of stools and land holding families, and their lessees and te-
nants. The usufructuary rights of members of land holding groups are
often referred to as ‘customary freeholds.’ However, the issue of
whether or not customary rights held in perpetuity by members of the
stools can be considered equivalent to freehold rights, and at what
levels these rights might exist – stool, family, lineage, household, or in-
dividual – are widely debated in Ghana and subject to differing inter-
pretations. Through the CLS piloting process, LAP staff also have op-
portunities to draw up, discuss, and introduce Memoranda of Under-
standing (MoUs) between the ministry and the chiefs, setting out the
responsibilities on both sides and working towards the establishment
of a wider regulatory framework for CLSs, which would be informed
by the piloting process. However, government has not as yet made ef-
forts to clarify the nature of usufructuary rights, or to adapt model
MoUs drafted by the CLS facilitation team and have them signed as
formal agreements between the Ministry and the chiefs to govern the
operations of the pilot CLS. LAP has even advised against the use, in
draft MoUs, of language which might be interpreted by the chiefs as
imposing requirements of accountability, disclosure of revenues, or sig-
nificant commitments of stool resources to supporting CLSs. Govern-
ment has not so far introduced a clear policy on the purpose and re-
sponsibilities attached to CLSs, and the parameters for establishment
of each pilot CLS remain somewhat ad hoc. What is clear is that, in or-
der to secure the votes that the chiefs command, government in the
short to medium term is unlikely to risk antagonizing the chiefs by re-
quiring public disclosure of land revenues and accountability in their
use, in line with government’s broader policy of non-interference in
chiefly affairs. According to DFID’s rural livelihoods adviser, ‘‘Land re-
form is not the sort of thing you’d sensibly pursue, with the 2008 elec-
tions in your mind’’ (interview, 14 September 2005). He also pointed
out that LAP project staff have found it difficult to speak up when not
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backed up by the minister. For instance at a meeting with the National
House of Chiefs2 in 2005, the LAP project staff was reluctant to pre-
sent the content of a comprehensive expert report on the need for legis-
lative reform (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba 2004) and to
discuss their own views or how they expected to make use of the re-
port. They simply handed it over: ‘‘As long as that doesn’t change, tradi-
tional authorities will take advantage of LAP’’ (id.). Recognizing the in-
stitutional and political difficulties in establishing CLSs, the customary
land management objectives of LAP constitute ‘‘a high risk interven-
tion with a modest chance for success, to put it mildly’’ (interview rural
livelihoods advisor, DFID, 27 January 2004).
LAP includes provisions for strengthening civil society participation,
and advocacy in relation to land management, but this has been slow
to develop, and at the time of writing remains problematic. On the one
hand Ghanaian civil society has limited pre-existing capacity and vir-
tually none in place for the engagement and advocacy on land. It is dif-
ficult to induce this by external intervention because of widespread de-
ference to chiefly authority and a history of cooption of civil society by
both chieftaincy institutions and political parties (Amanor 2001: 112-3).
On the other hand MLFM has been reluctant to give up control over
funds intended to support civil society partners or to commission ser-
vices from them, and there is a lack of alternative mechanisms such as
independent trusts or programs capable of managing funds to meet
donors’ and government’s requirements.
In general, it could thus be said that until now, the government has
been reluctant to impose requirements of equity and accountability or
otherwise interfere with the management and disposal of land by
chiefs.
v. Moral hazards, ownership and CLS sustainability
LAP is faced with the moral hazard that traditional authorities, after
having been supported with equipment and necessary training for the
efficient operation of CLSs, employ the supplied resources with less
care, diligence, and efficiency than they would have done if they had
spent their own monies to acquire the resources (Antwi 2006: 5). Re-
quests for the repair of equipment (for instance from the pilots at Was-
sa and Tamale) imply a perception of CLSs as a state or donor initia-
tive, rather than as an entity owned by the customary authority or the
community. For some CLSs there may be general problems of afford-
ability of or access to technical support services, in which case the ap-
propriateness of a pre-conceived package of CLS equipment must be
questioned.
Inability or unwillingness of customary authorities to pay CLS staff
salaries is emerging as a common constraint to CLS development and
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appears to be a key indicator of (a lack of) CLS ownership and sustain-
ability. In cases where land market activity and land revenues are low,
the establishment of a full-blown CLS may not be justified or afford-
able; on the other hand, in cases where the land market is more active,
it is clear that chiefs are also not yet sufficiently convinced of the value
of a CLS to commit additional resources. In the Asantehene’s CLS in
Kumasi, which does pay salaries, LAP has faced repeated demands for
funds to refurbish the building, located within the Asantehene’s palace
and to provide the resources that will allow it conduct business as
usual, as directed by the Asantehene. In the absence of expected higher
levels of material and financial support from LAP, Kumasi CLS staff
have refused to collaborate with the LAP team in discussing how they
might help to improve the equity and efficiency of customary land ad-
ministration (interview Asantehene’s Land Secretariat, Kumasi, 16 Au-
gust 2005). It can be concluded that the sense of ownership amongst
the chiefs of the model of CLSs so far developed under LAP remains
limited, with CLSs perceived as an imposition of government, which,
though they are not wholly unwelcome, are not fully understood, gen-
erating concerns expressed by chiefs about how the staffing, manage-
ment, and equipment costs of CLSs are to be met.
We have seen that one of the expected benefits of CLSs is to use the
secretariat as the starting point for comprehensive exercises in docu-
menting existing land holdings, which provides both a basis for the in-
cremental strengthening and formalization of rights and a source of
evidence to avert or resolve disputes over land rights within a CLS
catchment. As discussed earlier, this is being done in two CLS pilots,
Wassa and Kyebi, initiated by the LAP and organized with project re-
sources rather than by the customary land owners themselves. How-
ever it is not clear how these initiatives could be replicated elsewhere
and it is unlikely that other CLSs would be able to mobilize the re-
sources (transport, survey management, additional computer equip-
ment, and competent personnel) to develop and manage land user da-
tabases without either sustained outside support or full commitment
by the stools. In any event it is quite likely that the costs of this sort of
exercise would exceed available resources, as well as the likely financial
benefits even if the chiefs were willing. Moreover this sort of data col-
lection is arguably a public land administration function which should
somehow be resourced by the state. Thus there is a risk that unless a
clear relationship and basis for cost sharing for CLSs is established be-
tween the state and traditional authorities, CLSs will come to depend
permanently on ad hoc donor and government support to collect and
manage data. This could lead to a situation in which project resources
are inefficiently employed and the pilot CLSs never grow beyond their
embryonic stage.
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The Risks to Equity of CLS
Well functioning CLSs based on the present model could be expected
to have some benefits for some groups in peri-urban areas, notably the
chiefs and land-owning families themselves and those wishing to settle
and develop businesses in expanding residential peri-urban areas who
can afford to purchase leases. A clearer, more widely used and more ef-
ficient land allocation and registration system, based on the Gbawe
model, which is decentralized and accessible to users, would lower
transaction costs by making buying and selling land easier and would
also reduce conflict. However, there could be serious problems of equi-
ty, in which members of indigenous land holding groups, and others
who had obtained land through previous oral contracts and informal
arrangements, remain vulnerable to arbitrary dispossession, with in-
adequate or non-existent compensation.
CLSs which strengthen the political and economic weight of the tra-
ditional authorities by providing formal recognition of their powers to
administer and allocate land (cf. DFID 2004: 26) would sanction their
ability to generate substantial profits from the disposal of land, over
which the original land users exert legitimate claims. If government
does not clearly spread the message of the legitimacy of communal in-
terests in land, as recognized by the courts, and the need for the ac-
countability of the chiefs, which is stated in the Constitution, then it
would provide de facto support for chiefs’ claims that they can convert
land in which community members have usufructuary land rights.
In conclusion, the risks to this CLS model are that traditional autho-
rities may use enhanced and equipped CLSs to further the tendencies
of dispossessing community members of lands (cf. Antwi 2006: 5).
This will have the perverse effect that people are disenfranchised rather
than empowered. The present approach to the management of custom-
ary land in Ghana therefore does not appear capable of combining tra-
dition and modernity in an equitable way in the interests of all citizens,
an objective espoused by LAP.
Some conclusions on the influence of the government of Ghana
on customary land tenure in peri-urban areas
In this chapter we have analyzed the influence of the government of
Ghana on customary land tenure. We have focused primarily on peri-
urban Ghana, where traditional authorities are assuming the right to
convert farmland, cultivated by community members, into residential
land which they allocate to outsiders. We have seen that various gov-
ernmental institutions, despite their mandate, in practice do not act as
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a check upon the functioning of traditional authorities. The OASL does
not control the great part of all peri-urban land revenues, as a result of
the fiction of ‘drink money.’ The LC is only rarely requested for concur-
rence, and then not by chiefs seeking to develop and dispose of land,
but by lessees who want to acquire a formal lease. The DAs’ check on
chiefly land administration by means of the planning process is
severely hampered by uncooperative chiefs, ignorance of planning
requirements, and by mismanagement, corruption, and the lack of
adequate personnel and logistics for implementation. Where local re-
presentatives of the DA and UC stand up against chiefly maladminis-
tration of land, they are not backed up politically. The planning process
actually enhances the position of chiefs to a certain extent, since build-
ing permits are only issued when a land allocation paper contains the
signature of the chief. The interpretation of customary law by the
courts shows a similar trend towards recognition of the power of the
chief as administrator, although this does not mean that the chief has
the power to deal with land as he wishes, without regard for commu-
nity interests or compensation for farmers. Although Ghanaian courts
do protect the interests of individual land users against chiefs’ attempts
to re-appropriate stool lands for ‘development’ purposes, the effect of
such court decisions on land practices is limited.
All in all, governmental institutions do not provide effective checks
on land management by chiefs in peri-urban Ghana, due to a combina-
tion of factors: a lack of chiefly co-operation; limited challenges to
chiefs from LSA officials; a present lack of political support for admin-
istrative controls on land management by chiefs; LSAs’ lack of funds,
staff, and material; and their problems of mismanagement and corrup-
tion. The lack of political support, mirrored in state discourse, constitu-
tes a ‘policy of non-interference’ with regard to matters involving
chiefs. This policy also influences the execution of the CLS component
of the LAP, an explicit attempt to improve customary land manage-
ment, but one which runs up against problems of chiefs’ vested inter-
ests in land disposals, misunderstandings, lack of resources, and an ab-
sence of public debate on the type of institutions required for the gov-
ernance of customary lands. The above shows that the LAP’s starting
point, that LSAs do not function effectively, is justified. Nevertheless,
the transfer of their powers in customary land management to CLSs
under the aegis of traditional authorities is disenfranchising ordinary
land users. Although there are isolated cases of spontaneous good prac-
tice (such as Gbawe) and some chiefs express goodwill towards CLSs
as a state and donor led innovation, land holding community members
and land users themselves currently lack forms of organization capable
of counterbalancing the power of chieftaincy, and there is a significant
risk that government will not commit to building equitable and ac-
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countable arrangements for the management of customary land. The
empowerment of chiefs through the resourcing of CLSs without devel-
oping appropriate checks and balances brings significant risks in that
powerful customary leaders may utilize CLSs to consolidate their politi-
cal control over land, with negative consequences for poorer, less
powerful land users.
The early failures of the chiefs to take responsibility and ownership
of the CLSs, expectations that the state should resource them, together
with their preferences that CLSs prioritize particular functions linked
to generation of revenue for the stools, as well as the reluctance to see
CLSs established as fully accountable institutions, suggest that an alter-
native approach to that adopted so far by LAP is likely needed. Simply
subsidizing traditional authorities with material and technical support
for CLSs and hoping for the best will not provide the basis of a sustain-
able approach. Any substantial change to the CLS experiment will,
however, rely on clearly articulated political will and commitment to
craft a partnership between state, traditional authorities and land users
if it is to establish an effective framework for the governance of cus-
tomary land in Ghana. Without significant political change, the possi-
bilities of enhancing the certainty of land rights for ordinary land users
– one of the main objectives of the LAP – are extremely limited.
If such political will were to exist, a road could be taken towards the
creation of tripartite institutions that involve LSAs, chiefs, and local peo-
ple. Such institutions would need to be differentiated according to local
circumstances. The relationship between land users and traditional
authorities, for instance, differs widely between a locality with strongly
centralized land management under the auspices of a paramount chief
and a locality where land is managed by a head of family. Chiefs can per-
haps be softened and persuaded to such a new approach by governmen-
tal concessions in related areas, such as the return of or payment of
compensation for vested lands, a full disclosure of the collection and al-
location of stool revenues by OASL, and the establishment of a new fra-
mework for the division of powers and responsibilities in local affairs be-
tween chiefs and the District Assemblies (Quan and Antwi 2008, forth-
coming). Designing the governance arrangement for such customary
land management institutions, and determining how different stake-
holders would be empowered and their interests represented, presents a
considerable challenge, one which LAP has yet to consider. Could a role
be envisaged for the courts, for the Commission on Human Rights and
Administrative Justice, or an ombudsman? Whatever approach is
adopted, changes need to be made. If government were to press ahead
with the creation of CLSs as unregulated estate agencies run by chiefs
and land holding families, the CLS experiment in improving governance
and equity in land matters will be a failure.
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Notes
1 Land ownership in Ghana is classified into two categories: private lands and public
lands. Around twenty percent of the land area is public land (see article 257 of the 1992
Constitution), which falls into two main categories: land which has been compulsorily
acquired for a public purpose or in the public interest under the State Lands Act, 1962
(Act 125) or other relevant statute; and land which has been vested in the president, in
trust for the landholding community under the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act
123). The rest of the land area in Ghana is private land, which consists, besides a small
amount of common law interests, primarily of estates in customary communal owner-
ship (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001: 46-48). According to Kasanga and Kotey the cus-
tomary sector holds 80 to 90 percent of all undeveloped land in Ghana (Kasanga and Ko-
tey 2001: 13).
2 In Ghana, there is an elaborate system of Houses of Chiefs. This includes several hun-
dred traditional councils, each of which elects members to one of ten Regional Houses
of Chiefs, each of which sends five members to a National House of Chiefs. Its adminis-
trative staff is provided by the Government of Ghana, which also maintains a Chief-
taincy Division in the President’s Office for liaison purposes. Some of the main func-
tions of the National House of Chiefs are to advise on matters affecting chieftaincy and
to adjudicate appeal cases in chieftaincy matters (see articles 272, 273 of the 1992 Con-
stitution).
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3. Land policies for tenure security or the reality
of customary land management in peri-urban
Ghana
Introduction
The area around Kumasi, the capital of Ghana’s Ashanti Region, dis-
plays a mounting pressure on land due to strong urbanization and po-
pulation growth.3 In response to the rising demand for mainly residen-
tial land, the chiefs are rapidly leasing communal land to outsiders for
valuable consideration. This is leading to increasing tenure insecurity
among community members. They lose their agricultural land, which
renders them immediately or ultimately landless, and they are no long-
er able to grow their own food and generate income by selling the sur-
plus at the market. Most of the (often poorly educated) farmers are be-
coming unemployed or are resorting to petty trade, as food prices rise
in these communities, which in turn leads to a higher cost of living.
Peri-urban poverty rises dramatically and the old parts of the villages
turn into shantytowns. Furthermore, local people cannot compete for a
plot of land with outsiders employed in the formal sector, which makes
it hard for them to find land for residential purposes in their own vil-
lage.4
Despite the fact that the chiefs are customarily and constitutionally
obliged to administer the land in the interests of the whole community,
they generally display little accountability for any money generated and
most indigenous community members are seeing little or no benefit
from the leases. The customary land users are only rarely – and then
very inadequately – compensated for the loss of their farmland, and in
most villages only a meager part of the money is used for community
development. Although the new lessees are benefiting from the land
conversions, they are also affected by the lack of community improve-
ment, since the areas they are building their houses in are seldom ser-
viced with electricity, roads and sewers. Furthermore, the numerous ac-
counts of multiple sales of the same piece of land to different buyers
show the buyer’s vulnerable position.
The conversion of farmland to residential land and the effects on
farmers’ tenure security and livelihood described above for peri-urban
Kumasi5 have also been documented for the outskirts of a number of
other major Ghanaian towns, such as Accra (Gough and Yankson
2000; Kasanga et al. 1996; Maxwell et al. 1998; NRI (Natural Re-
sources Institute) and UST (University of Science and Technology)
1997: 28-30, D13-14; Wehrmann 2002),6 Tamale (Abudulai 2002), and
Wa (Hammond 2005: 18). According to Kasanga and Kotey evidence
from all ten regional capitals ‘‘confirms that the displacement of poor
and marginalized families from their land is a national disease’’ (Ka-
sanga and Kotey 2001: 18). Alden Wily and Hammond describe the
‘‘curtailment of communal property rights, through a form of feudali-
zation of land relations’’ as a problem occurring in the entire peri-ur-
ban arena (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001: 44, 69-73).7 In contrast
with this crisis in customary land administration, current international
land policy witnesses a renewed interest in customary tenure systems
and Ghana’s current land policy resonates with this international trend.
This chapter aims to answer two questions: how can this crisis in cus-
tomary land administration be explained? And how can the knowledge
of this crisis be translated into national and international land policy?
With regard to the first question, the lack of tenure security for peri-
urban farmers and the problematic effects on farmers’ livelihoods are
well-known. However, there has been little in-depth research into the
struggles and negotiations over customary land tenure taking place in
the local arena. To acquire an insight into these processes, this chapter
studies the practices of land administration in nine villages on the
fringes of Kumasi.8 This will lead to a conclusion on the main factors
that explain how Ashanti chiefs are able to profit from communal land:
the erosion of traditional checks and balances; the government’s cur-
rent ‘policy of non-interference’ towards chiefs; and the fact that local
land tenure is characterized by a leading position for chiefs and a pro-
minence of customary law. Since these three factors are found to oper-
ate not only in other areas of Ghana, but also in other African coun-
tries, it is likely that the lessons from Ghana can be generalized, at
least for areas with a high demand for land.
This brings us to the second question. How can knowledge of this
crisis be translated into national and international land policy? So far,
information concerning inequity and problems of access and security
does not seem to have had much effect on present-day land policies.
This can partly be explained by the fact that there exist two quite sepa-
rate schools of land research. The first school focuses largely on eco-
nomic issues such as investment and productivity and often compares
these two issues under state programs and customary systems of land
tenure (Acock 1962; Atwood 1990; Ault and Rutman 1979; Bruce and
Migot-Adholla 1994; Feder and Noronha 1987; Gerschenberg 1971;
North 1990; Platteau 2000; Podedworny 1971; Sjaastad and Bromley
1997; Yudelman 1964). The second school studies land management
and land tenure mainly as social processes. These researchers mostly
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undertake long-term in-depth anthropological field research into land
administration and the social systems in which this takes place. They
focus on the local arena, emphasizing the ambiguity and pervasive ne-
gotiability of customary tenure systems (Berry 2001; Fred-Mensah
2000; Moore 1986; Rose 1992). Whereas the first school has been in
constant dialogue with national and international policy makers, the
second school originally shunned from making policy recommenda-
tions (Toulmin, Lavigne Delville, and Traore´ 2002b: 23). This second
school of research, with its thorough analysis of the functioning of te-
nure systems, is, however, indispensable for well-informed policy mak-
ing. Some m ore recent literature has, fortunately, tried to bridge the
gap by studying the constitutive relationships between negotiations for
land at the local level and legislation, policy and discourse at the na-
tional and even international level (Amanor 1999, 2001; Benjaminsen
and Lund 2003b; Berry 1997; Downs and Reyna 1988; Juul and Lund
2002a; Lund 2000; Moore 1998; Shipton and Goheen 1992; Toulmin
and Quan 2000c). This linking of local and supra-local arenas facili-
tates the daunting task of ‘translating’ research data into policy docu-
ments. The present research aims to contribute to this literature.
Before describing the case-study of peri-urban Kumasi, this chapter
starts in section two with a description of the wider debates in policy
and research circles with regard to the issues of tenure security, invest-
ment and productivity. This will show that the policy pendulum has
swung from a preference for state-controlled programs of individualiza-
tion of land to a renewed interest in customary tenure systems. Section
three briefly introduces Ghanaian national law and Ashanti customary
law with regard to land administration and the role of chiefs therein.
In section four the chapter shows how Ashanti chiefs try to legitimate
their actions with an appeal to customary law; how community mem-
bers try to resist their chiefs’ actions and claims; and that the success
of this resistance is often very limited through a combination of a lack
of traditional checks and balances and the government’s present ‘policy
of non-interference’ with regard to chieftaincy matters. The chapter
ends in section five with two conclusions: first, on the factors that ex-
plain the current crisis in land administration, demonstrating the mu-
tually constitutive relationships between government and chiefs and
between customary law and state law; and second, on why this infor-
mation on the crisis in land administration does not seem to feed into
the policy level. This chapter is based on data gathered through partici-
pant observation, semi-structured interviews and a survey, during
twelve months of fieldwork conducted between 2003 and 2005.
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Land tenure systems, security and productivity
Customary Law or State Law
For many years now scholars and policy makers have disputed whether
security of tenure,9 investment and agricultural production can best be
promoted through indigenous customary land use arrangements or
through state-imposed tenure aimed at creating private property
through titling and registration programs.10 During the decades after
decolonization, the deplorable state of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca kindled debate over the suitability of customary land use practices
for an agriculture that is capitalizing and adopting new technologies to
increase productivity. Many authors agreed that customary land tenure
was failing to provide the farmer with security of tenure and therefore
impeded agricultural progress (Acock 1962; Feder and Noronha 1987;
Podedworny 1971; Yudelman 1964).11 Resonating with the broader glo-
bal agenda to withdraw government from economic life, land reform
has been promoted that aimed at creating individual property rights to
increase agricultural productivity (Demsetz 1967; Feder et al. 1988;
North 1990; USAID 1986; World Bank 1975; cf. Platteau 1996; Toul-
min and Quan 2000a: 7-8). This was, however, done without rigorous
empirical analyses of the validity of the hypothesized causal relation-
ship between individual rights in land and improved tenure security
and agricultural outputs in the African context (Atwood 1990: 664-5;
Migot-Adholla and Bruce 1994: 2).
Let us start with the causal relationship between tenure security on
the one hand and investments and yields on the other. Research shows
that this causality depends on the fulfillment of a number of condi-
tions. First, enhanced tenure security will only lead to higher invest-
ment demands when the farmer has knowledge of and access to in-
puts, viable technologies and advice, and when investments are profit-
able and investment returns not too risky. Second, even when demand
for investment is enhanced, the absence of household labor and finan-
cial resources may prevent farmers from exercising this demand. Small
farmers, even when they have a clear and secure title to their land can
still have extreme difficulties in acquiring a loan. Third, land improve-
ments do not necessarily increase yields. Households may target their
investments towards reducing yield variance rather than increasing
mean yield, or they may prefer leisure or pursue off-farm opportunities
(Atwood 1990: 664-5; DFID 1999: 9; Shipton and Goheen 1992: 317-
8).
Now that we have seen that tenure security is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition to enhance investment and production, the follow-
ing paragraphs concentrate on the link between private property on the
one hand and tenure security, investment and production on the other.
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Whereas Feder et al. and Li et al. argue on the basis of data from Thai-
land and China that private property increased security, investment
and productivity, this link is not supported by African evidence (Feder
et al. 1988; Li, Rozelle, and Brandt 1998; Migot-Adholla and Bruce
1994: 2).12 In several countries in Africa no significant relationship
was found between tenure regime on the one hand and security, credit
use, and productivity on the other, suggesting that factors other than
land tenure are more constraining for agricultural development (At-
wood 1990; Bruce, Migot-Adholla, and Atherton 1994; DFID 1999: 11;
Gerschenberg 1971: 60; Migot-Adholla et al. 1993: 269; Oue´draogo et
al. 1996). Bruce et al. found no clear correlation between titling and
the danger of loss of access to the land, unless households had better
quality of land or good water access – the land most likely to have been
sought after by others – or unless the titles were needed to provide
greater protection against the arbitrariness on the part of the state itself
(Bruce, Migot-Adholla, and Atherton 1994: 257-9; cf. DFID 1999: 8).
When security was measured by the number of land disputes, the re-
sults were mixed: state-led individualization programs in some coun-
tries caused a decrease of disputes, in others an increase (Bruce, Mi-
got-Adholla, and Atherton 1994: 257). According to Sjaastad and Brom-
ley, investment is often necessary to obtain security instead of the
other way round (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; cf. Quisumbing et al.
2001). Platteau concludes from this that the incentive to invest might
be higher under a less secure customary tenure system than under a
freehold regime (Platteau 2000: 58).
Empirical evidence from several African case studies shows that land
titling and registration of private property can create rather than reduce
uncertainty and conflict over land rights (Atwood 1990: 663). Unsuc-
cessful attempts to substitute state titles for customary entitlements –
and according to Cousins not one attempt has been fully successful –
may even reduce security by creating normative confusion, of which
the powerful may take advantage (Cousins 2000: 171; cf. Atwood 1990:
663-5; Bruce, Migot-Adholla, and Atherton 1994: 260; Coldham 1979:
618-9; DFID 1999: 11). Several ex post evaluations of the state-imposed
tenure conversion program in Kenya have observed that individualiza-
tion has led to land concentration, increased marginalization and land-
lessness as people in positions of economic and political power take ad-
vantage of the less powerful, deepening tenure insecurity instead of
lessening it (Coldham 1979; Okoth-Ogendo 1976; Quan 2000: 35-7).
When talking about increasing tenure security, one should thus always
ask whose security is increasing. Increasing tenure security for one
usually correlates with decreasing tenure security for another, since
claims of subordinate right-holders to conditional, partial or common
access tend to be neglected in individual titling programs (Atwood
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1990: 661; Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse 2004: 2; Lund 2000: 16; Ship-
ton and Goheen 1992: 316).
This summary of the literature shows that evidence of the links be-
tween private property and tenure security is far from conclusive. On
account of this conclusion and of mounting evidence of the high eco-
nomic and social costs and negative consequences for the poor of indi-
vidual land registration and titling programs, ‘‘the old idea – that land
titling programs linked to the development of free land markets are a
necessary condition for African rural development – is now dead’’
(DFID 1999: 37; Fitzpatrick 2005; Platteau 1996: 74; Platteau 2000;
Toulmin and Quan 2000a: 2, 13-15). Policy makers no longer regard
land titling as the panacea for land tenure in Africa. On the contrary,
communal forms of tenure are regarded more favorably as mechan-
isms for land access and employment creation (Deininger and Bins-
wanger 1999; DFID 1999: 7; Quan 2000: 38; World Bank 2003b:
53).13 There is now widespread recognition that land policy must start
from existing realities and systems.14 A critical voice comes from Hel-
ler, who warns for the emergence of ‘anticommons property.’ In his
opinion, this will occur when governments model their property rights
regimes on customary tenure systems in which multiple owners of
land are each endowed with the right to exclude others and can there-
fore prevent the use or transfer of the land. This will hinder the opti-
mal utilization of the land and create a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’
(Heller 1998).15 Other authors claim that the social security function of
land and access to community mechanisms for coping with hard times
remain paramount, and that compliance with community mores there-
fore continues to be of great importance (Benjaminsen and Lund
2003a: 7; Bruce, Migot-Adholla, and Atherton 1994: 259; Lund 2000:
18; Mathieu, Zongo, and Pare´ 2003: 127). Bruce et al. conclude from
that that national legislation of tenure reform has a limited capacity to
change behavior. They recommend that programs of compulsory and
systematic titling and registration should be confined to areas in which
land has become valuable and is the subject of intense competition
and disputes, and the customary tenure system is unable to cope with
the conflicts (Bruce, Migot-Adholla, and Atherton 1994: 262).
In sum, the policy shift towards a renewed interest in customary te-
nure systems seems to a large extent inspired by two factors. The first
factor is disappointment with state programs of titling and registration,
leading to a renewed interest in alternative land tenure systems out of
a kind of ‘default reasoning.’ The second factor is the practical neces-
sity to start from existing realities and systems. Somewhat surprisingly,
the policy shift seems hardly informed by in-depth knowledge of the
functioning of customary land tenure systems.
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Research on Customary Land Tenure
A comparable reproach with regard to the lacking of a critical assess-
ment of customary land tenure can be made against a number of scho-
lars that seem to base their writings on ‘‘hypothetical models of how
land was managed in traditional systems’’ (Amanor 2001: 63). Their
studies emphasize that customary tenure regimes embody important
principles concerned with equity, social security and the maintenance
of ecological balance, and that they are built on core values of processes
of negotiation and consensus-building and contain checks and balances
to control abuse of authority by traditional leaders (Field-Juma 1996;
Kasanga 1994: 7-8; Kasanga 2002; Okoth-Ogendo 1994: 23-4; Platteau
2000: 72). Kasanga, for instance, speaks of ‘‘the egalitarian tenurial
systems’’ and claims that ‘‘customary land law offers the best security
of tenure to individuals, families and local communities’’ and that
‘‘there are reasonable checks at the local level on almost everybody’’
(Kasanga 2002: 29, 36). And Platteau, although claiming not to fall
‘‘into the snare of romanticism’’, but rather displaying ‘‘a pragmatic at-
titude grounded in a realistic assessment of Sub Saharan Africa’s pre-
sent predicament’’, makes the following statement about informal vil-
lage practices with regard to land: ‘‘(…) considerations of social security
and equity usually dominate pure efficiency concerns (…) customary
systems continue to generate a remarkable degree of consensus, in
particular on the norms and values justifying land claims’’ (Platteau
2000: 72).
These studies tend to assert the positive attributes of customary law
as ideal principles rather than show them to operate in practice. Ac-
cording to Amanor and Lavigne Delville, these studies fall back on a
pristine African custom, portrayed against a modern corrupt and in-
equitable state (Amanor 1999: 10; Lavigne Delville 2000: 114-5). It is
widely acknowledged that a romantic, idealized version of customary
law often exists parallel with the practically applied version of custom-
ary law. Researchers have been struggling with these differing versions
ever since the colonial period (Chanock 1998; Comaroff and Roberts
1981; Holleman 1973; Mamdani 1996). In interviews, local people –
especially traditional authorities such as chiefs and elders – often pre-
sent idealized notions of egalitarian and sustainable customary law, in-
stead of the actual practiced customary law, which may differ from case
to case. To study ‘locally practiced customary law’ thus requires thor-
ough local fieldwork.
Fortunately, there is a well-researched body of literature that does in
fact describe ‘lived customary law.’ Since Demsetz’s seminal 1967 pa-
per on the evolution of property rights regimes (Demsetz 1967), a
number of studies has observed how, over time, customary tenure sys-
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tems experience spontaneous simplification and individualization of
rights whereby households increasingly acquire broader rights of exclu-
sion and transfer as population pressure and levels of commercializa-
tion increase (Atwood 1990: 661; Ault and Rutman 1979; Bassett
1993; Benjaminsen and Lund 2003a: 8-9; Benjaminsen and Sjaastad
2003: 147; Bruce 1988: 23-25; Lund 2000: 2; Migot-Adholla and Bruce
1994: 3-4; Toulmin and Quan 2000a: 28; Platteau 1996; Quan 2000:
45, 49). Studies of the governing of common pool resources have pro-
vided insights into the circumstances in which local communities can
or cannot successfully regulate the management of their natural re-
sources without external interference (Ostrom 1990). Other studies
emphasize the pervasive negotiability, ambiguity and indeterminacy of
customary land law, and the room for manoeuvre this provides for
small farmers (Berry 1993; Berry 1997; Berry 2001; Moore 1973; Moore
1998). Recently, however, it is increasingly emphasized that ‘‘ambiguity
may be a cloak for privilege and class as much as a space for action by
the powerless,’’ as Peters (2002: 56) puts it. She also observes a re-
opening of the debate about ‘insecurity’ of customary land tenure, ‘‘not
only because it concerns the appropriate conditions for agricultural in-
vestment, but because of new worries about increasing inequity in face
of land shortage and competition’’ (Peters 2002: 48). Other authors
have also emphasized issues of unequal power relations within com-
munities and questioned the often glorified egalitarian qualities of cus-
tomary tenure systems. They point out that local institutions are vul-
nerable to the power plays of elites, as well as to politics of exclusion
(Amanor 2001: 11-20; Carney and Watts 1990; Cousins 2002: 77; La-
vigne Delville 1999; Moore 1998: 42; Oomen 2002; Rose 1992: 91;
Toulmin, Lavigne Delville, and Traore´ 2002b: 15). And that assertions
of a democratic principle of traditional land administration serve the
interests of the local ruling class as a means of ideologically justifying
their demand for the state to leave local land administration to tradi-
tional rulers.16
The present chapter stresses the importance that policy is also based
on customary tenure research that takes into account the social embed-
ding of land governance, and critically analyses relations of power and
aspects of equity within the local community. Struggles for land are
never merely a question of land, but a question of property, and of so-
cial and political relationships in a broad sense (Lund 2002: 12). Prop-
erty is not about things, but about relationships between and among
persons with regard to things (Bohannan 1963; Goody 1962: chapter
XIV; Moore 1998: 33; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann
1999: 21). Property can be seen as sets of rules governing people’s
rights to access, use and control resources. These rules are not fixed
and frozen in time but rather seen as ‘rules in use’, constantly made
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and remade through social action (Bassett 1993: 20-21; Berry 1993;
Berry 1997; Berry 2001; Bourdieu 1990; Lund 2002; Moore 1973;
Moore 1998; Shipton and Goheen 1992). It is only within the social,
political and historical-geographic contexts that one can understand the
forms and outcomes of land conflicts. A processual and institution-fo-
cused approach to land issues is therefore needed, with the notions of
flexibility and diversity as a starting point.
In the following paragraphs, this chapter analyzes customary land
management in peri-urban Kumasi: the negotiations about land, prop-
erty and authority between chiefs and people; the way these actors try
to use, create and negotiate notions of customary law; and the local
power structure within which these negotiations are carried out. These
local negotiations, however, cannot be disentangled from the discourse
and struggles over property, power and meaning taking place at various
levels of chieftaincy and government. Supra-local arenas influence local
processes of negotiation and adjudication, and the starting position
and scope for manoeuvre in these negotiations. An analysis of the mu-
tually constitutive relationship between government and chiefs and its
effect on the local arena, will thus be an essential component of any
study on the functioning of a customary tenure system. By linking the
local to the national, this chapter hopes to also contribute to narrowing
the gap between socio-legal field research and policy debates.
Customary tenure in Ghana and Ashanti
In Ghana, the customary sector holds a large proportion of the land
(Larbi, Odoi-Yemo, and Darko 1998).17 In the Ashanti Region this
‘stool land’ is managed by chiefs on the basis of customary law.18 The
Constitution recognizes the traditional authorities as custodians of the
land, and customary law as the regulating order.19 It furthermore guar-
antees the institution of chieftaincy and denies parliament power to en-
act any law which ‘‘confers on any person or authority the right to ac-
cord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose what-
soever.’’20
With this constitutional recognition of customary tenure and of the
independence of chiefs and their central position in local land manage-
ment, Ghana is – although not unique21 – quite exceptional in Africa.
Contempt of customary land tenure remains common in many coun-
tries (Toulmin and Quan 2000a: 10, 34, 126, 135-149, 211). Some coun-
tries, such as Uganda, Ivory Coast and Tanzania, have started to recog-
nize customary law recently. However, often governments regard the
registration of customary land rights as a first step of a process that
should ultimately lead to the establishment of private title (Okoth-
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Ogendo 2000: 126; Toulmin and Quan 2000b: 211).22 Despite the ob-
served ‘‘folklorization of African chieftaincy’’ (Van Rouveroy van Nieu-
waal 1987), chiefs in postcolonial Ghana have ‘‘been able to secure
most of their social, cultural and, most crucially, economic power
bases’’ (Von Trotha 1996: 89). This exceptional position with regard to
traditional authorities and customary law makes Ghana an appropriate
country to study customary tenure. Within Ghana, especially in the
Ashanti Region – with its strong chiefly hierarchy, and the Asantehene
as the king of all Asantes at the top – chiefs are still very powerful.
Formal representations of Ashanti customary law in case law, text-
books and articles in the Constitution of Ghana hold that the ultimate
title, also called the allodial title, of every piece of land is held in com-
mon by the members23 of a community, and that the chief is the custo-
dian of such land (Danquah 1928: 197-200; Ollennu 1962: 5-6; Ollen-
nu 1967: 252; Sarbah 1968: 64-66; Woodman 1996: 66).24 Chiefs are
customarily and constitutionally obliged to administer and develop the
land in the interests of the whole community.25 Stool lands, therefore,
are communal property.26
As long as there is vacant land, each member of a community has
the right to farm and build on part of it, which gives the member a
usufructuary title, also called customary freehold, to the land.27 The
usufructuary interest can be inherited, and is extinguished only
through abandonment, forfeiture28 or with the consent and concur-
rence of the interest holder. The usufructuary cannot be deprived of
any of the rights constituting the interest, and not even the chief can
make an adverse claim (Asante 1969: 105-106; Benneh 1971; Danquah
1928: 206, 221; Ollennu 1962: 10, 29, 55-56; Ollennu 1967: 254-5; Po-
gucki 1962: 180; Sarbah 1968: 67; Woodman 1996: 107).
As said, this is a description of the formal written representation of
Ashanti customary law. The task of judges, legislators and researchers
to adequately analyze and describe customary rules is, however, a diffi-
cult one (Mensa-Bonsu 2002-4; Von Benda-Beckmann 1985b; Wood-
man 1969; Woodman 1977). Customary law is not an unchanging, an-
tiquarian and immutable normative system. On the contrary, it is to a
certain extent negotiable and intimately tied to fluctuating social and
political relationships and it is constantly recreated and disputed (Berry
2001; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Gulliver 1979: 190-194; Mann and
Roberts 1991; Oomen 2002; Otto 1998; Ranger 1983; Roberts 1979:
182; Shipton and Goheen 1992: 308; Snyder 1981b; Starr and Collier
1989; Von Benda-Beckmann 1979). And colonial and national govern-
ments have played important roles in the constitution, definition and
perpetuation of customary law (Atwood 1990: 661; Glazier 1985: 156;
Moore 1986; Ranger 1983; Shipton and Goheen 1992: 308). There is
therefore often a gap between local and formal representations of cus-
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tomary law (Woodman 1969). Furthermore, various versions of
customary law can be found within one locality, both in normative
statements and in practice (Chanock 1989). In the following para-
graph, this chapter will describe the varying versions and representa-
tions of customary land law currently found ‘on the ground’ in peri-
urban Kumasi.29
Struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi
Chiefs’ Legitimizing Discourses
The large-scale leasing out of communal farmland by peri-urban chiefs
is diametrically opposed to Ashanti customary convention as sketched
above. This poses the question of how these chiefs try to legitimize
their actions. Within peri-urban Kumasi two different legitimizing dis-
courses are found.
Most chiefs claim that the customary rules of Ashanti land tenure
sketched above date from the days when communities were involved in
subsistence farming in land-abundant areas, when not land but people
were of value to the chief and the community. Now that market pro-
duction, population growth, and urbanization have enhanced the eco-
nomic value of land, these rules are outdated and need to be adjusted
to modern circumstances. They argue that the conversion of farmland
into residential land cannot be avoided30 and that communal land that
can be used in a more productive way should be brought under chiefly
administration.31 They therefore proclaim that ‘‘it is a law that when
the town is growing and it comes to your farm, you do not have any
land.’’32 According to this view, when the village expands and reaches
someone’s farmland, this land falls back into chiefly administration,
giving chiefs the right to allocate it to outsiders for more lucrative resi-
dential purposes. These claims have seriously weakened the value and
security of the usufructuary interest: when there is a demand to change
the use of land from agricultural to residential, individual farmers lose
the security of their usufructuary rights and the chief claims the power
to reallocate these lands.
Some chiefs, however, are taking the argument much further and
are venturing to manipulate and shift the meaning of communal land
ownership. They claim that their rights to administer stool land do not
derive from their function as caretakers on behalf of the community,
but instead assert that ‘‘land belongs to the royal family, since it was
members of the royal family who fought for the land’’ and the chief
has administrative powers over stool land as the leader of the royal fa-
mily.33 Such manipulation is facilitated by the varying ways in which
certain words, such as stool, stool land and ownership, are used in dif-
LAND POLICIES FOR TENURE SECURITY 83
ferent contexts. For instance, the term stool is alternately used to de-
note the whole indigenous community, the royal family, and the office
of the chief. According to these chiefs, the royal family had only given
the land out for farming purposes, to temporary caretakers, and can re-
claim it when its use is changed without any need for compensation.
‘‘The farmer does not lose any land since he did not own any land.
The farmer is only the caretaker for the chief. The land was given to
him free of charge, so how can he claim part of the money when it has
been sold?’’34 This reasoning degrades the nature of the customary
rights of usufruct. The freehold is transformed into a permissive right
of tenant-like character, based on the leniency of the chief instead of
on the communal ownership of the land. Obviously, this severely re-
duces the security of these usufructuary rights. The allodial title pro-
portionally gains in weight and shifts from the community as a whole
to the royal family, on whose behalf the chief claims outright owner-
ship.35 Here again, the ambiguity of certain words facilitates manipula-
tion. The fact that the allodial title holder is often defined as the owner,
without also referring to the usufructuary title holder as the owner of
certain rights, gives ample leeway for reinterpretation.
The argument of the first group of chiefs – that communal land
which can be used in a more productive way should be brought back
into chiefly administration – is only convincing if the proceeds of the
conversion are used for community development such as infrastruc-
ture, education and alternative livelihood projects, which might help in-
habitants of the village to make a living after the loss of their agricul-
tural land.36 Although all the chiefs interviewed – even the ones who
claim that land ownership lies with the royal family and not with the
whole community – acknowledged that they have at least a moral obli-
gation to use part of stool land revenue to compensate the farmer and/
or for community development, actual practice differs considerably.
The neighboring villages of Jachie and Tikrom offer two extreme ex-
amples. In Jachie, the chief demarcated a large part of the village farm-
land for residential plots and allowed members of the community to
buy this land at a very low price. The remaining plots were leased to
outsiders for residential purposes. All the revenue generated has been
used for community development. In the four years of his reign, the
Jachiehene has built a library, a school, and a palace, and has allocated
part of his land to a technical school in exchange for scholarships. The
neighboring Tikromhene provides the opposite example. He has con-
verted and leased most of the farmland in his village without giving
the community members any part of the demarcated land or any finan-
cial compensation. When a member wants a residential plot, he has to
pay the market price. Out of the revenue from stool land leases, almost
nothing has left the chief’s palace.37 As the above-mentioned examples
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of Tikrom and Jachie illustrate, practices regarding the division of land
and revenue differ enormously. On average, however, chiefs receive un-
satisfactory marks from most villagers for their administration of the
land.38 ‘‘So much money goes to the chief, and so little to develop-
ment’’39 and ‘‘Due to the greedy nature of landowners (i.e., chiefs)
there is not much development in this town’’40 are utterances heard
regularly in the villages.
Local Negotiations, Struggles, and Debates
The chiefs are not the only actors in stool land administration. Local
land administration practices result from continuing processes of nego-
tiation and are not only shaped by the ideology, claims, and actions of
the chief but also by the extent to which these are accepted or contested
locally and nationally. The chiefs’ actions in peri-urban Kumasi and
their severe effects on the livelihoods of the people are causing a great
deal of turmoil among community members. Individuals, families and
other groups of people are challenging the chiefs’ actions.41 In some
villages, people have tried to resist the reallocation of land by the chief
per se, while in other villages the reallocation itself has been accepted
but the way it was done was contested, especially the division of reven-
ue accrued after the conversion.
i. Resistance against the chiefs’ reallocation of land
Outsiders started to look for residential land in the village of Brofoye-
duru about fifteen years ago. ‘‘At first it was the chief selling these
plots, but the farmer did not get his right percentage,’’ i.e., the chief
paid no compensation to the farmer. 42 After a while, the chief’s sisters
went to talk to him and he allowed first one and then all of his siblings
to sell their own land. When word got out, other people also started
selling. ‘‘The chief is letting it go. He signs the papers after the sale for
some money.’’43 Although the people in Brofoyeduru thus successfully
resisted the actual sale of their land by the chief, they do not in general
deny the chief’s right to sell. Some villagers explained their behavior as
follows: ‘‘The right thing would be for the chief to sell it. But if the
chief does that, the farmer does not get much money. Since everyone
is poor here, the chief has to allow it.’’44
In Besease, unlike in Brofoyeduru, many people deny outright their
chief’s claim that he can reallocate their land. The majority of the villa-
gers acknowledged the chief’s right to be informed about a sale, to sign
the land allocation papers, and to receive a signing fee for this service
– although some said it should be the buyer who takes care of these is-
sues and not the seller – but they claimed the farmers were the only
ones to initiate a sale and to receive the money paid for the land:
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‘‘When the town reaches my land, I can sell it. The abusua panin (head
of the extended family) and the chief have no say in that’’45 ; ‘‘If the
chief wants a third of the money when I sell land, I will take the case
to court.’’46 Land transactions in Besease thus display ongoing strug-
gles between the four land-owning chiefs and their people. ‘‘If you are
very persistent, the chief cannot take your land away,’’ a farmer ex-
plains. ‘‘You can sell it and give part (of the money) to the chief. But if
you are unlucky, the chief will take the land, and if you don’t fight it,
you won’t get anything.’’47
Struggles over land can sometimes lead to violent incidents between
villagers and the chief. For instance, the Beseasehene sold land that
did not belong to his family. When the buyer started to develop the
land, the family that owned the land stopped him. After the buyer ap-
plied to the chief to recover his losses, the chief ‘‘went to the land-ow-
ing family to plead, but he nearly got beaten up.’’48 In some villages
there have even been large-scale violent uprisings of commoners
against the chief. For instance in Pekyi No. 2, where the chief sold a
large part of the village land to the Deeper Life Christian Ministry and
then pocketed the money, the commoners chased both the chief and
the church representatives out of the village, killing one of the latter in
the process.
Of the nine villages studied in-depth, only in Boankra – where there
has not been a chief for the last fourteen years – did the royal family
seem to acknowledge the families’ rights to initiate the sale of land:
‘‘When the new chief comes, the families can still sell their own land,
but with the consent of the chief, who will ‘take something’ for the
stool.’’49 However, it remains to be seen what position the royal family
will take in land negotiations when a new chief is enstooled.50
ii. Resistance against the way chiefs reallocate land
In a number of the case-study villages, people did generally accept the
fact that chiefs were reallocating community land but they vehemently
opposed the procedure and the division of revenues. The previously
mentioned village of Tikrom presents a worst-case scenario with regard
to community development. According to a Unit Committee member51,
‘‘the Tikromhene is selling land without consulting anyone, compen-
sating the farmer, or giving part of the revenue to the town,’’ and part
of the remaining land has been degraded or even destroyed as a result
of sandmining.52 Furthermore, the chief does not abide by the plan-
ning scheme and has, for instance, sold land that was reserved for the
school.
A long process of consultation took place between the chief and the
community. At a range of village meetings the people requested a sub-
stantial percentage of land revenues for community development, but
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to no avail. They then tried to involve the chief from their place of ori-
gin, but this chief did not want to come and talk to his ‘son.’ As the
Tikromhene comes directly under the Asantehene, the former assem-
blyman53 then wrote a petition to the Asantehene in May 2002. How-
ever, the case has never been called before the Asantehene and it is as-
sumed by some that the Tikromhene has encouraged the secretary of
the Asantehene to remove the petition from the files. In addition, the
former assemblyman has brought in the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to investigate the chief’s sandmining close to streams.
The EPA came, looked, and reproached the chief, but does not have
the power to prosecute. Such power lies with the District Assembly but
it is rarely used. A local radio station discussed the sandmining pro-
blem in Tikrom in one of its programmes, in which the assemblyman
appealed to the Asantehene for help, but there has been no response.
As the example of Tikrom shows, local assembly members and Unit
Committee members often play an important role in challenging mis-
administration by chiefs. One of their popular procedural solutions to
the misadministration of stool land is the establishment of a village
committee, usually called a Plot or Land Allocation Committee, to over-
see the proper allocation of village land. Such a committee usually con-
sists of representatives of the chief and his elders, and representatives
of the village, often Unit Committee members. The Plot Allocation
Committee checks that the site plan is in accordance with the planning
scheme and it has to sign the allocation papers. The existence of such
a committee usually coincides with the transfer of a fixed portion of
the revenue to the community for development. Although many chiefs
pay lip service to such committees, they usually work with a committee
made up solely of elders and the chief himself, and popular attempts
to set up committees with a broader representation have often been
frustrated by the chiefs (cf. Edusah and Simon 2001).
The kinds of activities undertaken in Tikrom to challenge the chief’s
style of stool land administration were also found in many other vil-
lages and appear to be a common response to misadministration by
chiefs. Their success is often limited, leaving the people with feelings
of desperation or resignation that they have been left to their own de-
vices. The following statements by two former assembly men aptly il-
lustrate these feelings: ‘‘In Europe, if a government is criticized three
times, the government goes. But here people come to beat you up in-
stead’’54 ;‘‘People who lose their land to the chief usually don’t go to a
chief or to court, normally they give up.’’55
Because of this lack of success in negotiations with the chief, many
people do not aim their anger and resistance at the chief who is selling
the land but at the buyer. Both my fieldwork and a study of pending
cases at the High Court of Kumasi show that the farmer, who is angry
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that his land has been sold by the chief, often tries to restrain the buyer
from going onto the land and building there. For instance in Adadeen-
tem, the former chief sold substantial parts of the community’s land.
This aroused a lot of dissatisfaction amongst the people but no con-
crete actions were taken against the chief. One of the villagers, how-
ever, sued the buyer of a vast tract of land in the High Court of Kuma-
si. Another example of the ‘buyer loses out’ principle is found in Be-
sease, where the Beseasehene sold two plots of the land belonging to
his subchief, the Kontihene. On finding out about the sale, the Konti-
hene first ‘‘caused trouble with the Beseasehene,’’ but ‘‘we enstooled
him, so (…) we don’t want to quarrel with him. But the buyer can’t
come and work on it. If you come to work you will meet the Konti.’’56
Power Configurations in the Villages
Practices of local land administration result from continuing struggles
and negotiations about land, property, and authority between the chief
and community members. A valid question to ask is why resistance is
more successful in some villages than in others.57 Obviously this has a
lot to do with the personalities of the chief and his opponents. But an-
other part of the answer lies in the power configuration of the local are-
na in which these struggles are taking place. For instance, does the vil-
lage have one, two, or more chiefs, or no chief at all? And if a village
has several chiefs, do these chiefs collaborate or compete with each
other? Other determining factors are whether there is strife or unity
within the royal family, whether the chief or his opponents have a good
relationship with the paramount chief or the Asantehene, and whether
powerful people, for instance members of parliament, come from the
village. A chief’s position within and outside the community and his
ability to build coalitions with his elders, his family, and other powerful
people within the community are crucial for creating room for man-
oeuvre with regard to land administration. Although the scope of this
contribution does not permit in-depth discussion of all these variables,
two examples are presented here as an illustration.
Besease has four land-owning chiefs and it is generally well known
which land falls under which chief. Nevertheless, villagers who wanted
to sell their farmland without involving their chief have occasionally
approached one of the other chiefs with a request to sign their land al-
location paper. For instance, the Aduana family in Besease had been gi-
ven land by the Kontihene, the head of the Agona family. But when
the Aduana wanted to sell their land, they asked a different chief, the
Beseasehene, to sign their allocation papers. Although the Beseasehene
had no right to do so, breaking the rules earned him a signing fee. The
Aduana also gained from this scheme since the Beseasehene, as a
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‘stand-in chief’, was in no position to demand a substantial part of the
revenue, and settled for a lower signing fee. On discovering the scam,
the Kontihene challenged the sales: ‘‘I wanted to take the Aduana to
court, but they are half-brothers and half-sisters so I couldn’t do that.
The Aduana apologized and are not selling anymore but all the plots
have been sold and the money squandered.’’58
The presence of several chiefs in one village offers opportunities to
play one off against another other but such a multi-chief configuration
can at the same time enlarge the challenge of getting the chiefs to ad-
minister land in the interests of the community. If several chiefs mis-
manage stool land, the conduct of one will be partly legitimized by the
similar conduct of another; amidst uncertainty about people’s rights,
the concerted behavior of chiefs can stake a claim to legitimacy.
A number of the earlier-mentioned characteristics are evident in
Boankra. This village has been without a chief or a regent for fourteen
years following a dispute between rival factions of the royal family.
One of these is supported by the paramount chief of the area, who en-
stooled the chief candidate of that faction as Boankrahene during a
ceremony at the palace. This enstoolment was challenged by the
queenmother and Boankra elders at the Regional House of Chiefs in
Kumasi. The House of Chiefs decided in favor of the queenmother,
stating that she should be the one to choose a new chief. By February
2004, a new chief had still not been installed but the paramount chief
has continued to countersign land allocation papers signed by his pre-
ferred chief candidate – on condition of the payment of a substantial
signing fee. This signature supposedly gives the sales a semblance of
legitimacy and makes it possible for the buyers to acquire a building
permit at the District Assembly.
Traditional Controls on Chiefly Administration
Chiefs often reject people’s suggestions and claims about adjusting
stool land administration and continue to rule as they have done. This
poses the question of how it is possible that these chiefs cannot be
steered clear from their devastating track. Are there no checks and bal-
ances on their administration? A literature survey of some of Ghana’s
‘grand old men’ in the field of customary land tenure yields the follow-
ing quotes: ‘‘(T)he occupant of the stool can only bind the stool, i.e.,
the town or community, if he acts with the consent and concurrence of
the whole town or community represented by the subchiefs, and the
principal councilors from the various sections’’ (Ollennu 1962: 130).
‘‘Hereditary59 councilors, or elders as they are called in the lower coun-
cils, and chiefs or subchiefs in the higher ones, are the heads of
houses, families, or towns who have been elected by members of a
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house, family, or town to be their respective head, patriarch, or chief.
(…) They hold their offices in the pleasure not of the Chief or head
Chief, but by the sufferance of the people who have elected them to
the Council. (…) It is of utmost importance, in view of our form of gov-
ernment, for the Chief, who is always the President of his Council, to
give due weight and make full allowance of the expressed opinion of
these councilors’’ (Danquah 1928: 57). ‘‘The chief was bound by his
oath to consult the elders on all matters, and to obey their advice’’
(Busia 1951: 14). To supplement these authoritative, but not too recent,
writers60 with an influential, contemporary voice, I turn to Kasanga
who, less specific but equally romantic, states that ‘‘there are reason-
able checks at the local level on almost everybody’’ (Kasanga 2000a:
72; cf. Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 31).
According to these writers traditional responsibility for village chiefs
thus rests on two pillars. The first pillar is made up of a council of el-
ders, selected by and representing all major factions of the community,
without whose consent the chief cannot make any decision. The sec-
ond pillar consists of the possibility of destooling seriously malfunc-
tioning chiefs. Leaving aside whether traditional rule was ever so equi-
table and well-balanced as these authors claim – which has been con-
vincingly refuted in the extensive oeuvre of McCaskie (including
McCaskie 1995; McCaskie 1992; McCaskie 2000a) – current perfor-
mance of chiefs in peri-urban Kumasi at least disabuses us of the idea
that the two pillars function effectively in present-day village practice.
To begin with, in a number of case study villages, the council elders
are primarily or even entirely selected from only the royal family and
not from the important families in the community, as in Kotwi. The
Kotwi stool was originally carved out of the Asampong stool, and the
Kotwihene was like a subchief to the Asamponghene and thus did not
have his own subchiefs. Later the Kotwihene was upgraded and he
now swears his oath directly to the Asantehene. Although he could
now have subchiefs, he has not installed any. He has continued to dis-
cuss village affairs with the elders from his family, and when there is a
public ceremony the Asamponghene and his subchiefs will join the
Kotwihene and his elders. The absence of a council representing the
whole community was encountered in a number of the other case
study villages as well. Furthermore, the rule that elders hold their of-
fices not in the pleasure of the chief but to serve the family that has
elected them also seems to be under strain. For instance in Nkoransa,
where the secretary of the chief explained that ‘‘it is not the rule that a
certain family always brings a subchief. It is the chief who picks them.
When one dies, he can choose a new one.’’61 This is underpinned by
the abundance of conflicts between elders and their own family, who
can no longer dismiss them when unsatisfied.62 Regardless of the
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composition of the council, the chief often co-opts his elders by sharing
the benefits from land administration with them, removing their in-
centives to effectively check the use of power and, if necessary, to stand
up against the chief (cf. Abudulai 2002: 83). According to a UC-mem-
ber of Tikrom, ‘‘the subchiefs support the chief because they get a
share of the money. If they argue with him, they won’t get anything.’’63
Even at the Asantehene’s Land Secretariat it is acknowledged that ‘‘in
many villages the elders connive with the chief.’’64 And those elders
that are not co-opted are often simply ignored by the chief, as is aptly
illustrated by the following statement: ‘‘Beseasehene is a new chief. He
doesn’t mind the rules,’’ says his Kontihene subchief, ‘‘I tried to talk to
him, but he didn’t take my advice. If I wasn’t educated, he would try to
cheat me as well.’’65
When the people of a community want to destool their chief, a case
has to be brought before the Traditional Council, which is made up of
the paramount chief and his subchiefs.66 A first hurdle is that destool-
ment charges cannot be brought by commoners but only by the ‘king-
makers’, i.e. those subchiefs and members of the royal family who can
also make or enstool a chief (Hayford 1970: 36). As discussed above,
these subchiefs are often co-opted and are therefore not likely to take
the lead in actions against the chief. And if they do dare to do so, ac-
cording to one of the subchiefs of the Ejisuhene, this is only ‘‘after
many years of wrongdoing, the chief will first be given the benefit of
the doubt’’; to explain why they have waited so long to start a destool-
ment case against the chief, he adds: ‘‘The kingmakers have deposed
the previous Ejisuhene and installed this one, of whom they had high
expectations. They now lose part of their legitimacy when they want to
destool the one they selected.’’67 If those years of waiting are added to
the years the destoolment procedure itself may take, it can be seen
how a chief can easily come to sell a considerable amount of stool land
and spend the proceeds as well. A second obstacle lies in the fact that
the paramount chief, who chairs the Traditional Council, often has a
direct interest in who occupies the village stool, mainly because of his
claims to a share in the villages’ land revenues. The paramount chief
of Ejisu for instance favored those chiefs who sold large amounts of
stool land and shared the proceeds with him. The fact that this did not
usually leave much land or revenue for the community did not seem to
bother him. Furthermore, to mention a third hindrance, the members
of the Traditional Council consist of direct colleagues of the chief-on-
trial. Many of the current destoolment charges are to do with land ad-
ministration in one way or another. And often the charges against the
chief-on-trial, such as selling farmland and not using enough stool
land revenue for community development, are also points of discussion
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in the villages of the judging chiefs. Clearly, their personal interests in
such cases may stand in the way of objective and impartial judgment.
The main customary checks and balances on chiefs – ruling in coun-
cil with subchiefs and the possibility of destoolment – are not therefore
very effective. One can add to this the fact that chiefly accountability is
extremely low. Most land administration is concealed due to a lack of
registration. A good chief may account for his administration of his
own accord but this is an exception rather than the rule. Some elders
and chiefs claim that ‘‘nobody has the right to ask the chief to ac-
count,’’68 and ‘‘if it goes wrong, there is nothing to do about it.’’69
They explain this by the fact that the chief also has his professional in-
come and it is impossible to know whether he is spending personal or
stool money. Or they say that ‘‘the chief does not receive any remunera-
tion but does have job-related expenses, to which the people do not
want to contribute’’70 and that the chief continues to have obligations
for which customary provisions have ceased.71 Others claim that to ask
a chief to account for his expenditures is considered a vote of no confi-
dence. ‘‘If a chief does his work well, no one will bring him to ac-
count.’’72 Most people will not dare to do this unless there are clear in-
dications of serious misconduct by the chief. And even then, ‘‘who is
to bell the cat’’? The chief is still a powerful figure in most villages and
one is certain to encounter his wrath by highlighting irregularities in
his actions. Moreover, taking action against a chief violates his tradi-
tional sanctity. Most people would consider it the task of the royal fa-
mily and if the royal family does not enact this task, how can com-
moners be expected to take it upon themselves? The only kind of func-
tioning accountability is what I call ‘end-term-accountability.’ During
destoolment procedures, a chief has to account for all stool revenue,
but by then most of the money has usually been spent and is very hard
to recover. Besides, as noted, starting a destoolment procedure brings
its own difficulties.
In sum, the current customary system lacks effective checks and bal-
ances and accountability, but in fact this is not surprising when the his-
torical development of the position of the chiefs is taken into account.
During the colonial period, local checks and balances and accountabil-
ity structures were severely distorted when the British government
overrode the traditional rules of investiture and reserved for itself the
right to appoint and dismiss chiefs (Annor 1985: 153; Busia 1951: 105-6;
Toulmin and Quan 2000a: 10; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987: 11).
With this ‘devolution’, as Von Trotha (1996: 81) calls it, the local attach-
ment of the chief to some extent gave way to his responsibilities and
loyalties towards the government. Where commoners tried to reassert
local checks and balances, a chief who was on friendly terms with the
British administrator was easily able to discredit the commoners by
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branding them as malcontents and troublemakers (Kumado 1990-
1992: 203; McCaskie 2000b).
The abolition of the position of Nkwankwahene, the elected repre-
sentative ‘chief’ of the commoners, by the Ashanti Confederacy Coun-
cil – supported by the British – in the 1940s also had a profound effect
on local checks and balances and accountability structures. Since the
subchiefs and elders were restrained in their criticism of the traditional
administration due to their proximity to the chief, the Nkwankwahene
served to infuse the views of the masses in the traditional government,
for instance in enstoolment and destoolment procedures, and as a
channel for common discontent (Busia 1951: 10, 215-6; Wilks 1998:
159). By abolishing this channel, the chiefs and the British government
hoped to put an end to the frequent actions by commoners against
chiefs who were abusing their position. They thus aimed to curb the
youth and stabilize traditional communities by removing the channel
of discontent, rather than by addressing its causes.
The British gave the chiefs strong rights in land, by accepting their
claims that according to customary law all land belonged to a custom-
ary community with the chief as the administrator. However, they did
not give the chiefs free reign in all aspects. They regularly held them
to account, monitored the by-laws they made, and intervened in local
conflicts, thereby to some extent compensating for the lack of local
checks and balances, at least in the field of land administration (Crook
1986: 88; Dennis 1957). Post-colonial governments in Ghana have
shown an ambivalent attitude to chieftaincy (Kofi-Sackey 1983; Kuma-
do 1990-1992; Nugent 1994; Ray 1996; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal
1987, 1996) and the pendulum has swung between devolution and the
prohibition of governmental interference. Although under the current
Constitution the Ghanaian state is not permitted to exercise its sover-
eignty over chiefs regarding their enstoolment and destoolment,73 the
pre-colonial local checks and balances and accountability structures
have not been rebuilt. A crucial question therefore is whether the cur-
rent government can also impose state constraints on the administra-
tion of chiefs to compensate for the lack of local checks and balances.
It is worth considering whether any regulation or change towards
more equity and community influence can be expected to come from
within the traditional system. Some chiefs distribute land and land rev-
enue fairly among community members and display a serious commit-
ment to developing their villages. Could these chiefs serve as role mod-
els, and can they be expected to advise or influence their fellow chiefs?
We have seen that at all levels of traditional leadership – from the vil-
lage level to the Asantehene – discourse and practice move away from
individual rights of community members in stool land to the unrest-
ricted rights of the chief to administer this land. There is no one-to-one
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relationship between development-oriented leadership and the willing-
ness to abide by certain principles of good governance, such as ac-
counting for administration and cooperating with a representative Plot
Allocation Committee. For instance, the earlier-mentioned Jachiehene,
who was enthusiastically developing his village, not only abolished the
local Plot Allocation Committee but stated outright that ‘‘land in Jachie
belongs solely to the royal family’’ and ‘‘a chief does not need to ac-
count to anyone, only if things go wrong.’’74 Most chiefs, including
those who are development oriented, have supported rather extreme le-
vels of chiefly discretionary powers. This has usually made them un-
willing to condemn any misadministration by chiefs in other villages,
let alone call such chiefs to account. In addition, chiefs are, in general,
unwilling to interfere in other chiefs’ business, with an appeal to the
sacrosanct ‘internal village affairs.’ They form a united front when it
comes to asserting their rights and are reluctant to check the bound-
aries of chiefly power. It is doubtful whether much can be expected of
them with regard to curbing any mismanagement of stool land.
Within the Ashanti Region, the Asantehene forms the apex of the
traditional hierarchy. Undoubtedly an impartial authority at the top of
the traditional system could check many abuses. The current Asante-
hene, installed in 1999, seems to be concerned with the development
of the area and the role chiefs can and should play in this respect.75 He
is actively trying to settle the numerous chieftaincy and land dis-
putes.76 In various dispute settlements the Asantehene has proclaimed
that land and land revenue should be divided between the chief, the el-
ders, the stool (for expenses), the farmer (for compensation) and the
community (for town development).77 But the need to keep his chiefs
satisfied restricts his room for manoeuvre on the sensitive issue of land
administration. Furthermore, the integrity of his land secretariat is
being challenged and his own rights to land are not going undis-
puted.78 The Asantehene’s readiness and capability to influence local
land management are, therefore, uncertain.
State involvement
We have seen that the 1992 Constitution vests all customary or stool
lands – which constitute approximately 80 per cent of the land in Gha-
na – in the appropriate stool on behalf of and in trust for their people,
and confirms that such lands be managed by traditional authorities.79
Notwithstanding these provisions, the state has sought to regulate cer-
tain aspects of stool land management. Over the years various govern-
ments have taken piecemeal measures in the areas of land use plan-
ning, land title registration, issuance of formally registered leases, stool
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land revenue collection, and adjudication of land disputes. This chapter
will first describe both the mandate and the actual functioning of one
of the state institutions involved in this field, the District Assembly, as
an example to show the checks and balances it is able to place on
chiefly administration. Then it will emphasize some of the political
constraints state institutions face by looking at state discourse with re-
gard to chieftaincy in general, and land administration in particular.
District Assembly
The Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) designates District Assem-
blies (DA), which have been created since 1986, as the main planning
authority charged with the overall development of the district. With re-
gard to land administration, they have legislative powers to make by-
laws with respect to building, sanitation, and the environment. The
preparation and approval of planning schemes, the granting of build-
ing permits, and the enforcement of regulations and sanctions for non-
compliance all rest with the DA (Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 9). Villages
and towns are supposed to draw up a land use planning scheme, with
help from the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) of the
DA. Such a planning scheme designates the uses of the various areas,
and shows the boundaries of the individual plots. When a prospective
developer applies for a building permit, the TCPD checks whether the
site plan conforms with the planning scheme, and whether the alloca-
tion paper is signed by the local chief.
Ammissah et al. argue that ‘‘Since the main aim of the chiefs is to
maximize financial returns within the shortest possible time, impor-
tant land uses such as open spaces, playgrounds, schools, markets, re-
fuse dumps, roads, etc. are sacrificed, in order to augment the supply
of building plots. This is a major cause of haphazard and unauthorized
development in all statutory planning areas.’’80 By means of the land
use planning process, the DA could provide some checks on the land
administration by chiefs, preventing double allocations,81 and reserving
land for public purposes or even for agriculture. Chiefs can, however,
prevent the drawing up of a planning scheme, for ‘‘if a chief does not
cooperate, you cannot make a planning scheme,’’ explains the director
of the TCPD in Ejisu.82 ‘‘It is in the benefit of the chief not to have an
approved planning scheme,’’ he continues, ‘‘therefore the co-operation
of chiefs is not very high. Most have their own unapproved planning
scheme.’’83 Furthermore, although knowledge of planning schemes
and building permits is increasing, most people still do not comply
with the demand for a building permit, or the building precedes the
formal planning process, due to the lengthy84 bureaucratic procedures
and the costs involved in obtaining a building permit (Edusah and Si-
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mon 2001: section 4.4; Hueber and de Veer 2001: 191; Toulmin and
Longbottom 2001: 29-30).85 Finally, fieldwork showed that the imple-
mentation of planning regulation is often lacking, due to a lack of per-
sonnel, funds and logistics (cf. DFID 2004: 12; Hueber and de Veer
2001: 188-189; Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 9-10) and mismanagement
and corruption (cf. Kasanga 1996: 99; Kasanga and Kotey 2001: iii).
And even when violations are found, severe sanctions such as demoli-
tion of unauthorized structures are avoided (cf. Hueber and de Veer
2001: 191).
Every electoral area has its own representative at the DA. In many
villages, these local assembly members and the members of the Unit
Committee (UC) are public figures, who are widely known, easily ac-
cessible, and often most actively involved in development of the com-
munity. They are aware of the fact that a lot of money for town devel-
opment could come from allocations of stool land. It is therefore not
surprising that in those communities where the chief is unwilling to
share the wealth from land allocations, it is often the UC-members
and the assembly member who are in direct confrontation with him,
or who lead the public actions against him. While these local govern-
ment representatives are thus a local force to be reckoned with, they
are often not backed by the district authorities. The District Chief Ex-
ecutive (DCE) of Ejisu, for instance, although he acknowledged and re-
sented the negative effects of chiefly land conversions in his district,
did not go any further than to occasionally make a public statement
that chiefs should spend part of the land revenues on community de-
velopment. When we proposed the idea to back up local Plot Allocation
Committees (PACs) – which are usually installed and co-managed by
members of UCs – by providing building permits only when allocation
papers carry the PACs signature, he rejected the proposal because land
revenue would then be spent by the UC, and not fall under his respon-
sibility.86 It thus seems that when the DA does not have a financial in-
terest, it tries not to get involved in what they call ‘internal village af-
fairs.’ More generally, during their inauguration ceremony UC-mem-
bers and assembly members are explicitly told to refrain from
interfering in chieftaincy and land matters.87
Governmental Discourse
Due to the above, the DA does not in reality exercise effective control
upon chiefly administration of land. That is also the case with most
other governmental institutions created with the mandate to act as a
check on stool land management. This is not only caused by lack of
funds, staff, and material, and by mismanagement and corruption but
also by a lack of political support, which manifests itself in governmen-
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tal discourse. In the media, government officials at all levels regularly
and vehemently proclaim that they will not ‘meddle in chieftaincy af-
fairs.’88 According to Boafo-Arthur president Kufuor himself ‘‘has
made it clear that the current ruling party is not interested in meddling
in chieftaincy affairs’’ (Boafo-Arthur 2003: 138). These ‘non-interfer-
ence’ statements are sometimes made in reaction to chieftaincy dis-
putes, over which the law explicitly declares the government has no jur-
isdiction,89 but also in general, expressing that the government will
not interfere in chiefly administration, such as in the field of land
management. For instance, an official at the Ministry of Lands and For-
estry asked in an interview: ‘‘Is it the business of the government to ad-
dress the accountability of chiefs? Within the local system there exists
accountability, they can destool a chief. We do not want to impose ac-
countability on the chiefs, since land is essentially a chief’s thing.’’90
And the former Minister of Lands and Forestry, prof Kasanga, argued
that ‘‘The state should not attempt to enforce local checks and bal-
ances. This should be done by the citizens themselves.’’91 Obviously,
such governmental statements communicate little fear of stately con-
trol and allow chiefs ample room for manoeuvre.
These statements form an element of a wider ‘policy of non-interfer-
ence’, which can also be witnessed in certain actions, such as the fact
that at the inauguration of DAs and UCs their members are invariably
told to abstain from chieftaincy affairs, and by the refusal of the DCE
of Ejisu to check allocation papers for a signature of the Plot Allocation
Committee, if such a committee exists in the locality. A last salient ex-
ample can be found in the wording, drafting, and content of the Na-
tional Land Policy – the first comprehensive land policy ever formu-
lated by the Ghanaian government – and its implementing program,
the Land Administration Program.92 Although program and policy
aim to tackle the current problems in land administration, both the
role of chiefs in the administration of stool land – including the ten-
dency of chiefs to adopt landlord-like positions – and the possible
checks and balances the state could put in place regarding stool land
administration, are not critically examined. On the contrary, the role of
chiefs as caretakers of stool land is taken as a fixed point of departure
for all changes with regard to customary land administration. One
might say that the policy of non-interference is currently so pervasive
that some problems and possible solutions are not even open to public
discussion.
Chiefs are trying to capitalize on the positive stance of the current
government towards them by rekindling discussions on a number of
subjects, such as: the creation of a second chamber of parliament made
up of chiefs; the representation of chiefs on DAs; the divesting of lands
vested in the government, to be placed in the hands of the chiefs; and
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an increase of the percentage of stool land revenue to be disbursed by
the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to the chiefs.93 The fact
that chiefly statements on these issues at workshops and policy meet-
ings often go unchallenged gives another indication of the affirmative
attitude of the current government towards chiefs and chieftaincy is-
sues.
The policy of non-interference can be explained partly by the political
power of the chiefs, who are still regarded as very influential and vote-
brokers, especially in the rural areas. In addition, the current tendency
to fill chieftaincy positions with highly educated professionals blurs the
traditional distinction between the state elite and chiefs, and creates
new alliances between these two groups (Ray 1992: 109-113). The elite
of the party presently in power, the NPP, is especially closely connected
to the chiefs. Not only does it have its stronghold in the Ashanti Re-
gion, with its powerful chiefs, but president Kufuor himself is through
marriage connected to the royal family of the Asantehene. Many mem-
bers of the current government, up to high levels, are royal family
members in their hometown. Furthermore it could be argued that the
rampant irregularities and mismanagement by state institutions in pro-
cedures of compulsory acquisition of land do not give the state a strong
moral position from which to judge the quality of chiefly land adminis-
tration (Kotey 1996).94 Moreover, when the state wants to acquire land
itself, a good relationship with the chiefs involved is useful. Neverthe-
less, there is an internal debate between modernizers and neo-tradi-
tionalists within government, which is quite intense and highly sensi-
tive. The modernizers, particularly in the land agencies and the Land
Administration Program Unit, are trying to break the silence surround-
ing the misadministration by the chiefs, but their efforts are being
thwarted by their superiors. Altogether, it seems that there is currently
no political party willing to enter into any real battle with the chiefs, of
the sort that land reform would cause.
Conclusion
Customary Law Manipulated?
This chapter presents a multi-level analysis of customary land manage-
ment in peri-urban Kumasi and the relations of power and issues of
equity involved. It has described how the new value of peri-urban land
has triggered a multitude of struggles and negotiations. Although ac-
tions, statements, and beliefs as to what is just vary between villages,
families, and individuals, one main tug-of-war can be outlined: the
struggle between chiefs on the one hand and villagers on the other for
the rights to allocate land and share in the revenue. Despite high local
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resistance, the chiefs in a number of case study villages persisted in
their style of land management, which was highly lucrative for them-
selves and sometimes for other selected members of the community –
such as elders or royal family members – but extremely detrimental to
the livelihoods of the poor majority. For indigenous farmers in peri-ur-
ban Kumasi customary tenure offers very little security. This raises the
question of how chiefs are able to continue acting contrary to the
wishes of the majority of the villagers. Although many of the chiefs’
current practices in the research area are diametrically opposed to de-
scriptions of customary law in authoritative literature, case law, and ar-
ticles of the Ghanaian Constitution, the chiefs still claim to act accord-
ing to customary law, but a different kind of customary law. Not the
old version found in literature, legislation, and case law, but a new one
adapted to changing peri-urban circumstances. How can the chiefs
make such bold claims – that practices diametrically opposed to author-
itative descriptions of customary law are in accordance with ‘adapted’
customary law – and at least in part get away with it? We have come
across three explanatory factors.
A first factor was found in the erosion of customary checks and bal-
ances on chiefly functioning. Theoretically, these checks and balances
are supposed to constrain the chief in his administration of land. But,
as we have seen, in many localities the customary notion of ruling in
councils with elders or subchiefs has been severely eroded, destool-
ment procedures are prone to difficulties, and accountability structures
are lacking. As a result, commoners are often unable to organize suc-
cessful resistance. In general, chiefly discourse shows that not much
change in the direction of more equity and community influence can
be expected to come from within the traditional system in the near fu-
ture. Limited commitment to principles of good governance and the ex-
treme reluctance of chiefs to interfere in other villages’ internal affairs
mean that even development-minded chiefs will not engage in at-
tempts to curb the mismanagement of stool land by other chiefs.
The government’s attitude towards chieftaincy is the second factor
influencing the behavior of the chiefs. The government is currently
providing hardly any checks and balances on local land administra-
tion.95 Its policy of non-interference in chieftaincy affairs – with an em-
phasis on the sovereignty of the chiefs and on the fact that land admin-
istration rests exclusively in their hands – gives additional legitimacy to
the chiefs, provides them with ample leeway to administer land the
way they please, and places the power to define customary law squarely
in their hands. The National Land Policy and the Land Administration
Program do not seem to predict any change in this respect in the near
future. So while the British colonial government kept chiefly landlord-
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ism in check, the present government is not effectively controlling
chiefs’ dealings with land.
A third factor to be taken into account is the fact that stool land ad-
ministration is characterized by a leading position for chiefs and the
prominence of customary law. Customary law does not consist of static
norms. With the notion of an unchanging customary law as a myth of
the colonial era, it has to be recognized that norms and rules them-
selves are sources of power, manipulated and used selectively by parties
in disputes (Chanock 1998; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Mann and Ro-
berts 1991; Moore 1986; Oomen 2002; Otto 1998; Ranger 1983; Ro-
berts 1979: 182; Von Benda-Beckmann 1979). On account of the pro-
minence of customary law in the field of land administration, all actors
in land struggles have to legitimize their actions and claims largely
with appeals to customary law.96 When circumstances change and new
opportunities arise, they will try to use the unwritten and somewhat
pliable nature of customary law to construct norms in their own inter-
ests. Struggles over land will thus often take the form of interpretative
struggles over meaning in which ‘‘the power to name’’ can be a highly
political issue (Bassett 1993: 21; Shipton and Goheen 1992: 309-311).
The critical question is, which actor or group of actors has the power
to issue definitions and is able to mobilize support – from community
members, the traditional system and the state – for its version of cus-
tomary law? Since chiefs are generally regarded as authorities in the
field of customary law and as guardians of stool land, they are able to
point to custom to acquire and legitimate power over land in the local
arena and to resist interference by the state.97
This chapter shows that the assumed positive attributes of customary
law, such as the embodiment of principles of equity, social security for
all, consensus building, and checks and balances to control abuses by
chiefs, exist as ideal principles rather than as real life situations in
peri-urban Kumasi. Without clinging to a pristine view of traditional
rule in preceding periods, it seems safe to state that the democratic
and participatory level of traditional rule are currently low. The absence
of checks and balances on chiefs in both the traditional and the state
system has seriously disrupted the fragile balance between chiefs and
people. This has given chiefs the power to abuse their prominent posi-
tions as experts of customary law and guardians of stool land and to
overstretch the somewhat dynamic nature of customary law by manip-
ulating it to suit their needs and legitimize their claims.
Land Policy
It is dangerous to generalize about African land tenure systems, since
they have been diverse in space and time, dynamic in their response to
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new economic conditions, and often reshaped by colonial and national
government laws and policies (Atwood 1990: 661; Cotula, Toulmin,
and Hesse 2004: 1). Nevertheless, evidence seems to support the claim
that the events in peri-urban Kumasi do not stand alone. Many other
areas in Africa with a high pressure on land – whether due to popula-
tion growth, urbanization, immigration, high quality agricultural land,
or possibilities for mining or logging – show a severely reduced secur-
ity of customary tenure, with often a negative role for chiefs, elders
and heads of families. In these cases often one or more of the above-
mentioned explaining factors are found: traditional checks and bal-
ances have been more or less eroded; the state gives free rein to chiefs,
elders and heads of families; and these traditional authorities can ma-
nipulate the negotiability of customary law to serve their own interests
(Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Alden Wily 2003:
20; Amanor 2001: 32-40; Atwood 1990: 665; Berry 1997: 1235; Broken-
sha and Glazier 1973; Bruce 1988; Fisiy 1992; Hammond 2005; Goody
1979-80; Kasanga et al. 1996; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Lund and Hes-
seling 1999: 143, 149; Maxwell et al. 1998; Shipton and Goheen 1992:
315; Swindell and Mamman 1990). In the face of land competition and
the lack of both traditional and state checks and balances, the negotia-
bility and ambiguity of customary law mainly serve certain privileged
classes and increase inequity. And this is not a new process either. Si-
milar events have been described since the colonial period (Addo-Fe-
ning 1990; Fallers 1955; Hill 1963: chapter V; Rathbone 1993). The
large amount of literature allows us to conclude that, when the econo-
my rapidly changes and land becomes a high-priced commodity, cus-
tomary systems are often unable to evolve equitably and the tenure po-
sition of local farmers is increasingly precarious.
Despite this crisis in customary land administration, at present the
policy pendulum is swinging towards a more positive view of custom-
ary tenure systems. This trend seems to a large extent inspired by the
practical necessity to start from existing systems and by default reason-
ing: disappointment with state programs of titling and registration –
fed by mainly economic research on the negative effects and the lack
of positive results of such programs – turned the attention of policy
makers towards customary tenure systems. A positive stance towards
customary tenure systems should, however, not be born out of weari-
ness with the state. Neither should it be based on idealized notions of
customary law – often brought forth by traditional authorities them-
selves – or stem from research in areas with abundant land only. Not
everything customary is by definition good. Concerns of equity and
power have to be brought back into the discussion. Without assuming
that registration is the solution, this chapter urges policy makers to be
more cautious with their optimism about the functioning of customary
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systems, at least in areas with high pressure on land. Policy responses
and strategies need to be differentiated, based on analyses whether cer-
tain communities do or do not possess the characteristics and institu-
tions to manage their land effectively and equitably.98 If the commu-
nities are capable of self-regulation, the recognition of local arrange-
ments in land policies will suffice.99 If, however, certain groups or
actors experience serious negative consequences for their livelihoods,
land policy should not – as in the case of Ghana – give free rein to local
leaders, but voice its concern with local developments and seriously
consider a governmental intervention.
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Ashanti Region – the Asantehene, king of Asanteman. The term Asanteman is used to
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20 Article 270. Article 277 of the 1992 Constitution defines a chief as ‘‘a person, who, hail-
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nifies that a person has to be a member of the group to qualify for an allocation of land
for residence and cropping and rights of access to common pool resources. Generally,
individual families enjoyed fairly clearly defined spatial and temporal rights of use over
different parcels of land. Such family rights were transmitted to succeeding generations
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cant communal land, has been eroded by the increased use of land, resulting in a need
to expressly apportion remaining vacant land. (Ollennu 1962: 32; Woodman 1996: 91).
28 Forfeiture results from the denial of the landlord’s title.
29 See for a comparison of customary land law in the Ghanaian courts and local customary
land practices and an explanation of the gap between these two Ubink 2002-2004.
30 This also seemed to be the point of view in most of the District Assemblies, the highest
political authorities at district level (section 3, Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462)).
However, with the coming of an inland port in the district, the Ejisu-Juaben District As-
sembly intended for the first time to preserve some land in the area for agriculture.
31 These assertions are corroborated by the findings of the Kumasi Natural Resources Pro-
gramme. This study, carried out in 66 villages in peri-urban Kumasi, widely encoun-
tered the norm that chiefs consider themselves to have the right to allocate land in
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High Court Accra in Amatei v. Hammond ([1981] G.L.R. 300). According to Woodman,
however, the weight of the authorities seems to support the indefeasibility of the usu-
fruct. Notwithstanding that, he concludes that ‘‘(t)he ususfruct may move into decline’’
(Woodman 1981-2: 202-4).
32 Interview Beseasehene, 11 May 2003.
33 Interview former Akyeamehene subchief of Tikromhene, 7 January 2004.
34 Interview former Akyeamehene subchief of Tikromhene, 7 January 2004. Since article
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the 1890s (Amanor 1999: 45-51). This debate is currently being employed by chiefs
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lier times. This is leading to a highly tense situation in many agricultural areas with
high migrant populations (Amanor 2006; Boni 2006; Lentz 2006). In peri-urban areas,
however, the question whether the allocations of residential land to outsiders are perma-
nent sales or 99-year leases, makes no difference for the indigenous farmers who, in
both cases, lose their agricultural land. In peri-urban Kumasi, this issue was therefore
not under discussion.
35 Although the claim that the allodial title to stool land lies with the royal family has been
pushed by royal families in Ashanti since the dynastic civil wars of the 1880s, the argu-
ment that the indigenous farmers therefore have no rights in the land is not supported
by history. For instance, when cocoa became a valuable cash crop in Ghana, many chiefs
started to levy immigrant cocoa growers with taxes, but refrained from or were unsuc-
cessful in imposing such a tax on indigenous farmers, because these were considered to
have an inherent right to farm the land. See for literature on Ghanaian history e.g. Fir-
min-Sellers 1995; Hill 1963; McCaskie 1995, 2000a, 2000b; Rathbone 1996; Wilks
1966, 1975, 1993.
36 According to Danquah’s classical treatise of 1928, it is generally assumed that a chief
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found that all of the revenue is squandered in undertakings that do not benefit the peo-
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of Amatei v. Hammond (see note 55) also implies that the High Court in this decision
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1981-2: 204).
37 When confronted with the many development projects in the neighbouring village of Ja-
chie, the Tikromhene pointed out that he was building a primary school in his village.
On further enquiry in the village, however, it turned out that this project was being fi-
nanced by the EU.
38 See chapter 5.
39 Interview youngster Besease, 15 June 2003.
40 Interview Unit Committee Ahenema Kokoben, 11 November 2003.
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ment in Ghana and is made up of 5-15 people per village.
52 Interview, 15 April 2003.
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sembly member is the representative of an electoral area in the assembly.
54 Interview former assemblyman Tikrom, 15 April 2003.
55 Interview former assemblyman Feyiase, 8 April 2003.
56 Interview Kontihene subchief of Beseasehene and one of the Konti elders, 20 May and 1
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58 Interview Kontihene subchief of Beseasehene, 1 July 2003.
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be brought to the Traditional Council for settlement. Although this is an understandable
and sensible appeal, considering the enormous backlog in state courts, the move is also
highly political as the Asantehene reclaims the traditional trias politica of legislator, ad-
ministrator and judge.
77 A committee consisting of the heads of the thirteen divisions of the Kumasi Traditional
Area has made a proposal to legislate land revenue sharing. This proposal, which was
awaiting approval by the Asantehene when I left the research area in February 2004,
proposes that the revenue from land allocations be divided as follows: a third to the
Asantehene and two-thirds to the locality. This two-thirds would be further divided as
follows: a quarter to the chief; a quarter to the stool; a quarter to the town; an eighth to
the elders; and a further eighth to community members who lose land. Under this sys-
tem, both the farmer and the town receive a part of the land revenues and the codifica-
tion will probably enhance the accountability of chiefs: statements by the Asantehene on
this issue are already being used as a resource in local struggles. The proposed legisla-
tion would be an improvement for some villages. On the other hand, in this system
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members receive only a twelfth and the town a meagre sixth. One could wonder
whether this is a fair distribution of revenue from communal land. When land revenue
is distributed in such a way, the traditional system becomes a very expensive institution
for villages.
78 For example, according to the Asantehene’s secretariat, the Asantehene is supposed to
get a third of the revenue from stool land allocations in the Kumasi Traditional Area.
However, since most chiefs do not register their land sales, the secretariat has no way of
knowing how much land the various chiefs have allocated. The Asantehene cannot
therefore enforce this ‘rule’ and does not receive his share. The secretariat is trying to
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79 Articles 267 (1) and 36 (8), 1992 Constitution.
80 S.B. Amissah, R.K. Kasanga and A.R. Edmundson, Report on Land Management in Gha-
na, Prepared for the Environmental Protection Council (1990): 34, quoted in Hueber and
de Veer 2001: 191.
81 Multiple sales of the same plot of land to several persons is a large and growing problem
in peri-urban Accra, and is also described for peri-urban Kumasi (Edusah and Simon
2001; Oduro-Kwarteng 2003).
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82 Interview, 27 May 2003, confirmed by planning officer TCPD Kuntanase district, inter-
view 7 April 2003.
83 Chiefs can have their land demarcated by unofficial surveyors who do not interfere with
planning and which leaves open the possibility of later changes in the plan. Such
amendments were frequently encountered during fieldwork. In a DFID-sponsored pro-
ject 34 of the 37 villages in peri-urban Kumasi possessed village layout plans, but the
majority of these plans was prepared without reference to the statutory agencies respon-
sible for planning (DFID 2001: D8, E13).
84 According to the law, the whole process of acquiring a building permit should not take
longer than three months. But in 2003 the Ejisu-Juaben district had not seen a meeting
of the Planning Committee in over two years (interview Director TCPD Ejisu-Juaben dis-
trict, 27 May 2003).
85 Of 242 people surveyed in peri-urban Kumasi, 115 (47.5%) had never heard of a building
permit. The other 127 (52.5%) had heard of it, but only 75 of them (31.0% of the total)
could actually explain what it is. When these same 242 people were asked whether they
possessed any documents on the house, 85 answered yes, 83 no, and the other 74 said
that they did not know. Of the 85 that answered yes, 48 did not know what kind of docu-
ments, 29 said they did not have a building permit and 8 said they did have a building
permit. According to the deputy Regional Lands Officer of Kumasi, 87% of the people
has no building permit and only 10% of the people tries to get a formal lease (interview,
20 September 2005).
86 Interviews District Chief Executive Ejisu-Juaben district, 9 September 2003 and 12 Janu-
ary 2004.
87 Interview District Chief Executive Ejisu-Juaben district, 9 September 2003.
88 See for instance Daily Graphic 25 August 2003: 3; Ghanaian Times 5 August, 2003: 1, 25
August, 2003: 3.
89 Section 15 (1), Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).
90 Interview co-ordinator of Land Administration Programme, 19 august 2003.
91 Interview, 3 December 2005.
92 A long-term programme with multi-donor support, which started in 2003 with the ob-
jective ‘‘to develop a sustainable and well functioning land administration system that is
fair, efficient, cost effective, decentralized and that enhances land tenure security’’ (Min-
istry of Lands and Forestry 2003: 12). See also Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999: 99;
World Bank 2003a. See chapter 2.
93 This includes revenue accruing from timber and mining concessions. See for instance
Asante 2003: 9; Odeneho Gyapong Ababio II 2003: 3.
94 Daily Graphic 22 August, 2002: 17.
95 1Aside from the courts that protect the usufructuary rights of community members in
individual cases, see Ubink 2002-2004.
96 To some extent, state legislation and statements by state officials are also used as a local
resource but in general claims are legitimized by referring to customary law.
97 According to a land official, ‘‘Chiefs coat their actions in custom’’ (Interview OASL Ku-
masi, 27 June 2003). Dr Adinkrah, a legal scholar and a chief himself, calls this ‘‘the
prostitution of customary law by the chief’’ (Interview, 4 September 2003).
98 Ostrom, in her studies of such characteristics and institutions with regard to the man-
agement of common pool resources, mentions for instance collective choice arrange-
ments – whether most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in
modifying them – accountable monitors, and the existence of powerful actors who can
change the rules of the game to the detriment of the less powerful or block efforts by
the latter to change the rules to facilitate more equitable outcomes (Ostrom 1990: 90).
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99 As said above, Heller warns for the creation by governments of anticommons property
through the recognition of multiple owners of land who are each endowed with the
right to exclude others (Heller 1998).
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Introduction: the negotiability of customary tenure
Issues of equity and security in the governance of land and natural re-
sources are of growing concern to scholars and policy makers, and the
suitability of customary and state tenure systems to provide rights of
access to land for the poor have been debated for many years.1 Whereas
historically land tenure reforms in Africa have attempted to replace ex-
isting customary structures, a more pragmatic adaptive strategy of
building on and reconfiguring customary law is now emerging (Bruce
and Migot-Adholla 1994; Cotula, Toulmin, and Hesse 2004: 5, 7; DFID
1999: 7; Platteau 1996: 76; Quan 2000: 38; World Bank 2003b). No-
tions of customary tenure as a pre-colonial code of fixed rules have re-
cently been abandoned, in recognition of the evolution and flexibility of
customary systems (Juul and Lund 2002b: 3; Shipton and Goheen
1992: 308-11; Toulmin, Lavigne Delville, and Traore´ 2002a; Woodhouse
2003: 1712). Customary land tenure is now seen as a field where social
and political relationships are diverse, overlapping and competing.
Property regimes are thus often analyzed in terms of processes of ne-
gotiation, in which people’s social and political identities are central
elements that also become contested terrain (Berry 2002b; Juul and
Lund 2002b).
Peters (2002: 46-7) identifies three basic positions in the literature
with regard to the negotiability of customary tenure. The first argues
that the ambiguity and negotiability of customary tenure leads to a per-
vasive insecurity of rights of producers and to a lack of investment and
inefficient uses. The second position identifies the negotiability and
ambiguity of relations over land as a reflection of defining features of
African societies, such as the hold social relations have over economic
action, the dependence of individual actors on social networks to gain
access to resources, and malfunctioning states. The fact that people’s
access to land is closely linked to membership of social networks and
participation in political processes is seen to open up possibilities of ac-
cess to land for the poor and not as necessarily engendering insecurity
and increasing inequality (cf. Berry 1993: 104). The third view holds
that the ambiguity and negotiability of customary tenure do not neces-
sarily inhibit investment but lead to increasing inequality, because
some people are in a better bargaining position than others and there
are limits to negotiability and ambiguity (cf. Berry 2002b: 219; Wood-
house 2003: 1705-6).
The first view was dominant from the 1960s to the 1980s (Acock
1962; Feder and Noronha 1987; Yudelman 1964) but it has now been
largely abandoned. Scholars such as Platteau (2000), Toulmin and
Quan (2000), and Toulmin, Lavigne Delville and Traore´ (2002) now
appear to favor the second position, although ‘‘with sufficient unan-
swered questions to leave open the possibility of accepting the third’’
(Woodhouse 2003: 1706). Others such as Cousins (2002), Daley and
Hobley (2005), Juul and Lund (2002), Lund (2000), Peters (2002),
Shipton (2002) and Woodhouse (2003) support the third position
based on mounting evidence of land appropriation by influential elites
and increasingly restricted and insecure access to land (see, for in-
stance, Abudulai 1996; Downs and Reyna 1988: 18; Simo 1996: 49;
Swindell and Mamman 1990: 177). They point to the fact that negotia-
tors or contestants in customary land matters seldom operate on level
playing fields. Some have more negotiating power and more defining
and contesting powers than others (Shipton 2002: X). When competi-
tion for land intensifies, the inclusive flexibility offered by customary
rights can quickly become uncharted terrain where the less powerful
are vulnerable to exclusion as a result of the manipulation of ambiguity
by the more powerful (Woodhouse 2003: 1715). Ambiguity offers room
for manoeuvre to small farmers and modest rural producers, but at the
same time is exploited by the privileged in order to obtain advantage
(Peters 2002: 53). These studies also show that not everything is nego-
tiable: ‘‘porous boundaries and fluid, malleable identities too have their
limits. There are some groupings and roles to which humans get as-
cribed and from which they have no escape’’ (Shipton 2002: X).
This chapter studies the negotiability of customary tenure in peri-ur-
ban Ghana where land is at the centre of intense and unequal competi-
tion and closely tied to struggles over authority. The peri-urban village
of Besease provides a grassroots view of processes of contestation of
customary rights to land. The analysis of how local actors in this village
deal with, negotiate, and struggle for land rights, confirms that these
contestants always face an unequal fight. Postulating the social in-
equalities of local communities, the chapter analyses whether it is use-
ful to place all local dealings about land under the term ‘negotiations’ –
which signifies a mutual interest of the parties, as well as an opt-out
option if negotiations prove unsatisfactory2 – or whether such a charac-
terization extends beyond the boundaries of the term and risks under-
cutting the significance of local stratification and ignoring the winners
and losers of uncertain rules.
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Land tenure in an Ashanti village
Ghana
The evolution of customary tenure in Ghana has been described by
scholars such as Alden Wily and Hammond (2001), Amanor (1999,
2001), Berry (1993, 2001, 2002), Boni (2006), Lentz (2006) and Lund
(2006), who all differ in their terminology. While Berry, for instance,
invariably stresses the flexibility and negotiability of customary tenure,
Amanor (2001: 16) cautions that ‘‘defining the customary as flexible,
adaptive, dynamic and hybrid creates problems for examining pro-
cesses of change, since change has now become an intrinsic feature of
institutions rather than a product of struggle between different social
forces.’’ They do agree, however, that property relations are subject to
intense contestation in cases where access to wealth and authority are
undergoing rapid change. In line with this observation, the current
chapter focuses on a peri-urban area of Ghana where such changes are
salient. Due to urbanization and population growth, peri-urban areas
are witnessing a high demand for residential land, which is triggering
struggles over the rights to allocate village land that has been cultivated
by community members for residential purposes. In Ghana, the ‘cus-
tomary’ dominates both property rights and allocational authority: 80%
of land is regulated by customary law,3 signifying a decisive role for tra-
ditional authorities.4 In peri-urban areas this role is described as shift-
ing ‘‘from stewardship to ownership’’ (Alden Wily and Hammond
2001: 96). Although stool5 land administration is largely the domain
of the traditional authorities, the government is to a certain extent also
involved in stool land administration, for instance through the collec-
tion and distribution of stool land revenue, the requirement to provide
consent and concurrence for allocations of stool land, and through land
use planning.6 However, in 2003 Ghana started a Land Administration
Project, a long-term program with multi-donor support, under which
the government would pass its responsibility for the management of
stool lands to customary land secretariats under the aegis of the tradi-
tional authorities (DFID 2004; Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003:
12).7 This project is expected to enhance the pivotal position of tradi-
tional leaders in Ghanaian land management. The lowest level of local
government in Ghana, the Unit Committee,8 has no formal role in
land management, but its members and the local representative at the
District Assembly9 are often actively involved in development of the
community and are, as such, in dialogue with the chiefs about issues
of land-use planning and land revenue expenditures.
The peri-urban village this chapter focuses on is in the vicinity of Ku-
masi. Besease used to be a village of subsistence farmers but with the
growth of Kumasi it has become a popular residential area where land
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is a valuable asset, now selling10 for more than Cedis 10 million (al-
most E 1000) per (residential) plot. Various actors – farmers, families,
family heads, chiefs, the paramount chief, local government represen-
tatives, and ‘foreign’ or local buyers of residential land – are all strug-
gling for land on the outskirts, and the revenues this can bring. Some-
times actors team up, in other struggles former allies become new ene-
mies. The story of Besease opens small but meaningful windows onto
local contestations for rights to land and serves to illuminate the capa-
city and opportunity of various local actors to negotiate their positions.
It is based on fieldwork undertaken in 2003 and 2004. While the re-
search displays narratives from only one village, it was part of a broad-
er study in peri-urban Kumasi that has unveiled the same kinds of pro-
cesses in other villages, and which is also confirmed in the literature
on other peri-urban areas of Ghana (Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily and
Hammond 2001; Berry 2002a; Gough and Yankson 2000; Kasanga
and Kotey 2001; Maxwell et al. 1998).11
Besease
Besease – whose name literally means ‘under (ase) the Cola tree (Bese)’
– is situated on the outskirts of Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Re-
gion of Ghana. The village is about 23 km from Kumasi on the main
road to Accra, just after the town of Ejisu, which is home to both the
District Assembly and the paramount chief, the Ejisuhene (ohene:
chief). Besease is famous as the hometown of Yaa Asantewaa – the
queenmother of Ejisu who led the fight against the British in 1900 in
what was later called the Yaa Asantewaa War – and infamous as the
place with the worse rumble strips on Accra Road. The royal family of
Ejisu comes from Besease, which therefore is home not only to the Be-
seasehene (who serves the Ejisuhene as his Akwamuhene and Baamu-
hene subchief) and his Kontihene subchief but also to three other sub-
chiefs of Ejisuhene: Kontihene, Kyidomhene, and Gyaasehene. The
term ‘chief’ can be confusing as it is used to describe various levels of
traditional leaders. This chapter features the Asantehene, the chief or
king of all Asantes; the Ejisuhene, a paramount chief; the Beseasehene,
a village chief; and a range of subchiefs of the paramount chief or the
Beseasehene. All are referred to by the term ‘chief.’ The titles of sub-
chiefs are not based on the names of their residence, as we saw for the
Beseasehene and the Ejisuhene, but on their function. They either re-
fer to the subchiefs’ original position in the chief’s army – for example,
the Kyidomhene is the leader of the rear flank (Akyi: back, behind) – or
their administrative function in the locality – for instance, the Baamu-
hene takes care of the royal cemetery (Baamu: mausoleum). Subchiefs
function as the chiefs’ councilors. The councilors of lower chiefs are
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called elders. Four of the five residing chiefs ‘own’ land in Besease,
with the fifth12 ‘owning’ land in Ejisu (see figure 1). Ownership of land
is a complicated concept since the ultimate title of stool land lies with
the community, usufructuary interests with individuals or families, and
the role of custodian is allocated to the chief. This multi-layered cus-
tomary set-up allows considerable space for struggles to capture the
new value of land in peri-urban Kumasi. At the centre of these strug-
gles lie issues of authority about allocating village land to outsiders for
residential purposes and entitlements to the proceeds from such alloca-
tions. A related issue is whether allocation papers need to be signed by
a chief and, if so, by whom and for what signing fee. These debates are
taking place within communities and between the various levels of
chieftaincy.
Beseasehene 
Akwamuhene
& Baamuhene 
Subchief of 
Ejisuhene
Kyidomhene 
Subchief of 
Ejisuhene
Kontihene
Subchief of 
Beseasehene
Gyaasehene 
Subchief of 
Ejisuhene
Gyaasehene
S bchief of 
Ejisuhene
Beseasehene 
Akwamuhene
& Baamuhene 
Subchief of 
Ejisuhene
Kyidomhene
Subchief of 
Ejisuhene
Kontihene 
Subchief of 
Beseasehene
Figure 1: Land-owning chiefs in Besease
The paramount chief in the area of study is infamous for his style of
land management, which lacks equity and pro-poor development. Ac-
cording to the assemblyman of Besease, ‘‘the Ejisuhene is a greedy
man, therefore almost no one goes to him to sign the allocation papers,
because he asks too much money.’’13 The area’s District Chief Executive
describes what he regards as the Ejisuhene’s ‘‘autocratic way of ruling’’:
‘‘The Ejisuhene is leasing out land in the villages, bypassing the village
chief. Therefore he tries to get subservient chiefs [in the villages]. Ejisu
traditional area is notorious for its rampant chieftaincy disputes. The
Ejisuhene is at the centre of those.’’14 The Ejisuhene has also interfered
with the selection of candidates for village stools in his traditional area.
‘‘The omanhene [paramount chief ] is no good,’’ says his Kontihene,
‘‘most of the chiefs he has planted in these towns are not liked.’’15 He
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has, for example, interfered in the enstoolment of the current Besease-
hene: ‘‘The Ejisuhene selected this person for the Besease stool. The
kingmakers were not involved and the abusua panin [head of family]
was even sent away at the enstoolment.’’16 Similar practices were
found in Boankra, Onwe, and Adadeentem, other villages in Ejisu para-
mountcy. The Ejisuhene also tried to destool a number of his own sub-
chiefs, including the Kyidomhene, Gyaasehene, and Kontihene, be-
cause they did not agree with his land management. These depositions
were not accepted by the families concerned, whose consent the Ejisu-
hene had failed to seek before taking action. The subchiefs for their
part are bringing charges against the Ejisuhene on account of how
much land he has sold, how little he has given to the Unit Committee
during his ten-year reign and his unwillingness to account for his ac-
tions. The case is now before the Asantehene.17 ‘‘When this case has
been settled, the local chiefs can also be dealt with,’’ explains his Konti-
hene. ‘‘most of the village chiefs gave significant amounts of their rev-
enue to the Ejisuhene, so it is actually the same case.’’18 In the mean-
time, the subchiefs are not going to the Traditional Council in Ejisu
but are still carrying on with most of their functions in Besease. The
relationship between the parties seems to have been soured. At a cer-
tain point, the Ejisuhene even reported his Kyidomhene, Gyaasehene,
and Kontihene to the Regional Security Council for planning to assas-
sinate him. However the council sent them home when they explained
that they only wanted the Ejisuhene to account for his actions. ‘‘The
Ejisuhene is now so afraid,’’ sniggered the Kontihene subchief of the
Beseasehene, ‘‘that even when he goes over the rumble strips in Be-
sease his car goes at full speed because his Kontihene lives on the
main road.’’19 The ruined relationship means that the Ejisuhene can-
not ‘‘come here and tell all the chiefs their different roles’’, as one of
the villagers in Besease had hoped.20 Although there are doubts about
the usefulness of his interference for community development because
of his style of land administration, this villager justifiably wonders how
local disputes involving chiefs can be solved when the paramount chief
– who has the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with destoolment charges –
is unable or unwilling to discipline his subchiefs.21
Due to its unusual set-up with four land-owning chiefs and a para-
mount chief who frequently interferes with village affairs, Besease of-
fers four cases for studying agency and resistance in land struggles at
various levels and in different arenas. These struggles can be grouped
in three categories: struggles over the right to sell village land for resi-
dential purposes; over the right to sign allocation papers; and over the
right to cash the revenue accruing from land sales. This division has
been made to structure the land struggles in Besease but should not be
interpreted as meaning that these rights are unrelated. For instance,
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the right to sign allocation papers entails a right to a negotiated signing
fee and enhances the possibility of initiating sales.
The right to sell
The right to sell village land under cultivation by community members
to outsiders for residential purposes is a highly contested issue in Be-
sease. Does it belong to the farmers and families who have been culti-
vating the land for generations and passing it on to family members
through gifts and succession? Or does it devolve to the chiefs who also
have the right to allocate unused land to outsiders? According to the Be-
seasehene, ‘‘It is a law that when the town is growing and it comes to
your farm, you do not have any land. Because the land is for the
chief.’’22 The Kontihene of the Ejisuhene agrees: ‘‘When the town
reaches the farm, people lose their rights.’’23 ‘‘Only the chief can sell,’’
says the Kontihene of the Beseasehene. However he takes a more mod-
erate point of view: ‘‘you must compensate the farmer for his loss of li-
velihood if he approaches you with respect. How much? That depends
on when the farmer is satisfied. You don’t want trouble in the family.
It’s a process of negotiation.’’24 Other villagers’ views vary widely, from
acknowledging the chief’s right to sell the land to a full denial of any
such right. ‘‘The chief decides to sell land. Farmers can’t say no, but
they can negotiate a price. But the bulk of the money goes to the chief,
since he has full power’’25 is one view. While others feel that: ‘‘the chief
cannot sell land without the family’s consent because someone is farm-
ing there now. The money will go to the farmer, the chief only gets
some of it.’’26
In accordance with the conflicting statements described above, ac-
tions by both chiefs and the people demonstrate similar disagreements
regarding land rights.27 The first case features the former Beseasehene
who, at some point, demarcated a piece of farmland, which was being
cultivated by a farmer from another family, into eight residential plots.
The chief sold seven of these plots and gave the last one to the family
concerned. The current Beseasehene recently sold the last eighth plot
and the family was first aware of this when the buyer started to develop
the land. A quarrel broke out between the chief and the family but the
chief refused to give the family another plot, and ‘‘brought macho peo-
ple in’’28 to restrain them. In contrast to this, the Beseasehene did not
get his own way in a different case in which he sold a plot of land be-
longing to yet another family. As soon as the buyer started building on
this piece of land, he was restrained by the infuriated family. The buyer
then went back to the chief who approached the family to plead with
them to settle the conflict, but they were adamant and the chief almost
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got beaten up. The chief then had to compensate the buyer. These two
cases suggest that the power and actions of a family – depending on its
size, connections, economic capital and willingness to act and use force
– can influence the outcome of a chief’s attempts to appropriate rights
in family land. A last case involving a former Beseasehene dates back
to 1973, when Mr O. approached the Beseasehene about buying a piece
of land on the other side of the road, near the station. After he had
bought it, the land turned out to belong to the Kyidomhene. The two
chiefs reached an understanding but Mr O. ended up with only a small
part of the land he had bought, an outcome he felt unable to challenge.
In this case, as well as in a number of other cases discussed below, it
was the buyer who lost out.
A different chief, the Gyaasehene, wanted to sell some land, which
in this case belonged to his own family. One of his predecessors had gi-
ven a large tract of land to the Catholic church on the understanding
that it would start a school on part of the land. When the Catholics
failed to honor their promise, the current Gyaasehene approached the
Bishop who returned part of the land to the chief. The Gyaasehene, in-
stead of giving it back to his family, sold the land to outsiders and
pocketed the proceeds. When the chief’s family discovered his action,
they initially wanted to destool him but this would have involved the
Ejisuhene, with whom the family was still angry for his attempt to des-
tool the Gyaasehene without their consent. Besides, the elder leading
the charges was not on speaking terms with the Ejisuhene. This elder,
a lawyer, had been the Gyaasehene-elect at the last installation, but the
Ejisuhene had refused to enstool him, probably because in the past he
had been involved in – and won – a court case against the Ejisuhene
over land. After extensive deliberations, therefore, the family decided to
keep the Gyaasehene on the stool but sent him away from Besease to
avoid his meddling in land matters. This case demonstrates the danger
a chief faces if he sells land that belongs to his own family, which has
more direct power in disciplining the chief.
The next case shows that it is not only the chiefs who are selling
land. A.D., a Kyidomhene elder, recently sold some plots of family
land. According to him, he sold the land to raise revenue to renovate
the family house, but his nephews claim that he sold more plots than
was necessary for this purpose alone. When asked whether the chief’s
permission was required to sell land, A.D. replied that things were
changing. ‘‘It depends on the animosity between the seller and the
chief. The chief has to sign the land allocation paper and the site plan.
But we first sell and then we go to the chief.’’29 He later explained that
his family has three houses or ‘gates’ from which the Kyidomhene is
selected, and the people from these three houses can sell their own
land, whereas others cannot.30 When the Kyidomhene heard this, he
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stated angrily: ‘‘A.D. was wrong when he said that members of the
three gates can sell their own land. He said that because he has sold se-
ven plots.’’31 A.D. does not have a bad relationship with the Kyidom-
hene, however, because when the Ejisuhene tried to destool the latter,
A.D., who is next in line to the Kyidomstool, refused the position. A.D.
is thus not just any member of the family and he fully acknowledges
that it ‘‘depends on your importance in the family’’ as to whether you
can get away with selling your own land or can negotiate a fair price
when the chief is selling it.32
The following cases show that commoners can also find ways to sell
their land, although with some involvement by the Beseasehene. These
cases centre on the interpretation of history. When the town started to
expand during the reign of the former Beseasehene at the beginning of
the 1990s, the chief announced that anybody could sell the land he
was farming. According to some, the Beseasehene’s statement only re-
ferred to land belonging to his own family, while others took it to have
a much wider meaning and to cover all the land in Besease. The Adua-
na family in Besease, who had been given farmland by the Kontihene
subchief of the Beseasehene when they arrived in the village, seized
the opportunity to sell their lands and went to the Beseasehene to sign
the allocation papers, thus bypassing the Kontihene. The deal was of
mutual benefit to the Aduana and the Beseasehene, since the first
could sell their land without involving the Kontihene, while the latter
could receive a 10% signing fee on land that was not his. When the
Kontihene discovered the sales, he wanted to take the Aduana to court
but felt he could not do so because they were half-brothers and sisters.
Besides this, ‘‘all the plots have been sold and the money squan-
dered.’’33 A similar story was told by the Kyidomhene:
‘‘People with Kyidomland knew that I would not agree [to selling
the land] and sign their allocation papers, so they went to the
Beseasehene for a signature. When I heard about it, I could not
do much about it. I called the people with a letter and sent a
copy to the Beseasehene and Ejisuhene but I did not pursue it. I
did not want to take my own family to court.’’34
These cases illustrate how, when chiefs are confronted with established
sales, they do not always see the chance of reversing them to claim part
of the revenue or to discipline the sellers in any other way, especially if
the sale involves a larger group of people or the chief’s own relatives.
Both the Aduana family members collectively and a number of indivi-
dual commoners with Kyidomland were able to sell their own land, with
the signature of the former Beseasehene on their allocation papers.
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The right to sign
Whether the chief is the one to sell the land, or merely the one who
signs the allocation papers, many people think that the chief has to be
involved at a certain point. If a buyer wants to obtain a building permit
from the District Assembly, his allocation paper will need to be signed
by the chief, who will demand a signing fee for this service. A much
debated question in Besease, however, is which chief needs to be in-
volved. The Beseasehene posits that all allocation papers in Besease
need his signature, whereas the other land-owning chiefs claim they
can sign their own allocation papers.
‘‘The king of Besease has overall power of the land,’’ says the
Beseasehene. ‘‘My uncle, the former chief, told the subchiefs
they could sell their own land. But when I came, I cancelled
that. I have to be consulted first. They are not happy about my
decision. Some subchiefs sign their own allocation papers but it
is risky to buy land without the chief’s signature.’’35
The other chiefs protest this usurpation of power. ‘‘This chief pretends
the other chiefs do not exist. He wants to own the whole town, which
is not right,’’ says one of them. ‘‘He is a small, new chief, he was only
elevated to Akwamuhene in 1975. His business is to mind the ceme-
tery.’’ According to the Gyaasehene, a purchase of land by the Besease-
hene, before he became chief, supports this argument. This land was
bought from the Kyidomhene who provided all the transaction docu-
ments without any involvement of the then Beseasehene. This is
clearly not a struggle for signatures alone but for the power to control
land sales and the revenue from them. ‘‘If we allow the Beseasehene to
sign our allocation papers,’’ says a Kontihene elder, ‘‘he will also try to
initiate sales of our land and take the revenue.’’36
This dispute is tied up with the issue of authority. The Beseasehene
claims that since he is the chief of Besease, he is superior to the other
chiefs, at least regarding Besease lands. But according to the Kyidom-
hene and Gyaasehene, there is no hierarchical relationship. ‘‘Each chief
pours libation on festive occasions,’’ explains an elder of the Kyidom-
hene.37 Both claims are grounded in their own versions of history. In
Beseasehene’s version, two brothers named Asutwuma and Acheam-
pong migrated to Besease from Denkyira. Later Asutwuma left for Eji-
su, but since he originally came from Besease, he chose his subchiefs
from there and asked his brother, the Beseasehene, to allocate land to
these subchiefs and their families. As the Ejisuhene wanted to be bur-
ied in Besease, he created a royal cemetery there, which comes under
the responsibility of the Beseasehene. This has earned him the addi-
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tional title of Baamuhene. Later, the Ejisuhene also made the Besease-
hene his Akwamuhene, the divisional chief that speaks after the para-
mount chief. According to the other chiefs, the Ejisuhene, when he
was still living in Besease as Beseasehene, divided land among his sub-
chiefs as a reward for good service. The Gyaasehene, Kyidomhene, and
Baamuhene received land in Besease, and the Kontihene in Ejisu. La-
ter, when the chief left for Ejisu, he made the Baamuhene caretaker of
Besease, while his higher divisional chiefs served him in Ejisu. The Be-
seasehene thus used to be only the Baamuhene, a ‘service chief’, of the
Ejisuhene, and was elevated to Akwamuhene in the 1970s, thereby
gaining the same status as the Kyidomhene, Kontihene, and Gyaase-
hene. Even the Beseasehene’s own subchief, the Kontihene, claims the
right to sign his own allocation papers, and is in fact selling his land.
‘‘I am also the occupant of a black stool. I am next to him, not a sub-
ject. If the Beseasehene were cooperative, I would have advised the
buyers to go to the Beseasehene with some drinks, but now he is trying
to use power to take it.’’38
Mirroring the conflicting statements above, actual dealings with land
demonstrate various struggles as to who has the right to sign allocation
papers. Two examples, in which the previous Beseasehene signed the
allocation papers of land that fell under the jurisdiction of the Kyidom-
hene and the Kontihene subchief of the Beseasehene, respectively, have
already been discussed. In both cases, the family members who were
selling were reproached, but in the end the family members as well as
the Beseasehene escaped unharmed. Even when the Beseasehene him-
self sold two plots of land belonging to his Kontihene in 2002, he did
not run into trouble. ‘‘We, as the rulers of Besease, do not want to
quarrel with him,’’ explains an elder of the Kontihene, ‘‘but the buyer
cannot come and work on it. If you come to work, you will meet the
Konti.’’39 The Kontihene later added that he hoped that the buyer
would take the case to court. As seen before, in the case of Mr. O., the
buyer seems to suffer as a result of the malpractices of the selling
chief. One should not conclude from the previous cases that the Konti-
hene recognizes any Beseasehene claims over his land or the revenue
accruing from land sales. When the Kontihene recently sold thirty-two
plots of land, the Beseasehene, as self-proclaimed overlord of the land,
claimed Cedis 40 million (approximately E 4000) of the revenue, but
the Kontihene refused to pay even after the Beseasehene reduced his
demand to Cedis 28 million.
Another inventive attempt by the Beseasehene to capitalize on his
position proved equally unsuccessful. He personally went to the homes
of all the people who had bought residential land from previous Besea-
sehenes, claiming that he should renew the signature on their alloca-
tion papers, a service for which he demanded a substantial signing fee.
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He went, for instance, to the house of Mrs O., who bought a tract of
land twenty years ago from the then Beseasehene. He ordered Mrs O.’s
mother, who lives in the house while her daughter lives in the Brong-
Ahafo Region, to come to his house to get a new signature. But after
consulting Mrs O. and her husband, she decided not to go. The chief
also went to the house next door, where eighty-four-year-old Mrs A. told
him that the papers were with her children in South Africa and that he
had no right to see or sign them. A fight developed and insults were
thrown by both sides. To another lady, Mrs S., he said that at the time
of the sale, the land had been sold too cheaply and that he now had to
sign the papers again. It was rumored that she had gone to the chief’s
house for his signature, and was made to pay Cedis 1.2 million (ap-
proximately E 120), but during the interview she denied the story. ‘‘He
is cheating us. I am not taking my papers there’’ was her firm re-
sponse.40 Tellingly, the Beseasehene took no further steps to enforce
‘his right’ in these cases.
A comparison of the cases described in this section – where the
house owners resisted the Beseasehene’s claims for a renewed signa-
ture and his subchief, the Kontihene, refused to share revenue from
land sales with him – with the cases in the last section shows that it is
much easier to resist claims for money or a renewed signature than to
fight an established sale. This demonstrates the crucial significance of
the power to initiate sales. Whether this initiative is taken by com-
moners or chiefs, the other contestants are often unable or need a lot
of force to undo any established sales or to claim part of the revenue.
The right to cash
In Besease, land struggles centre not only around the rights to sell and
sign. Even when a chief has already sold land, the struggle continues
for the right to cash or the obligation of the chief to set aside a certain
part of the land revenue for community development. According to the
Unit Committee (UC), the Beseasehene has sold many plots since his
enstoolment at the beginning of 2002, but only in a few of these cases
has he informed the UC of the sale and contributed Cedis 100,000 for
community development. The other land-owning chiefs in Besease
have neither disclosed sales nor contributed any money for community
development. Since 2003, the UC and the assembly member have
pressed for more transparency and funds for community development.
After having been raised unsuccessfully in conversations with the Be-
seasehene, the issue featured prominently on the agenda of the 2003
Easter Convention: ‘‘We are going to tell the chief point blank to give
money to the community’’, said the assemblyman a few days before
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the event.41 This convention is a two-day homecoming event when
everyone who comes from Besease, including the chiefs, get together
for a celebration and a discussion of the town’s affairs. To everyone’s
surprise, the Beseasehene and the queenmother did not attend this
year. The general feeling was that they did not show up because the Be-
seasehene did not want to be questioned about his land administration
policy. According to the Kontihene subchief of the Ejisuhene, ‘‘He did
not come to the Easter Convention because I would bring him to ac-
count, and he has squandered all the money.’’42 The people were so
angry that they wanted to destool the Beseasehene, but when the
queenmother apologized on his behalf they decided to give him one
last chance. Their reluctance to destool him also seems to be based on
fear because it is said that he uses juju and witchcraft. The other chiefs
are also unable to introduce destoolment charges because of the dis-
pute with the paramount chief regarding their own potential destool-
ment.
A few weeks after Easter, the UC and the assembly member called a
village meeting at which they proposed to install a Plot Allocation
Committee (PAC) that would sign all land allocation papers and secure
a certain percentage of the revenue for community development. This
provoked a heated debate between the Beseasehene, who denied all
land sales, and the people who did not believe him and wanted him to
account for his land administration. In the end, the Beseasehene reluc-
tantly agreed to appoint two of his confidants to the PAC. The Besease-
hene was the only chief present at this village meeting. The absence of
the other chiefs was explained as being due to the animosity between
the chiefs of Besease: ‘‘Every time they see the Beseasehene, they
fight.’’43 ‘‘Last meeting, a fight nearly broke out.’’44 ‘‘They have not
been coming to public meetings because of their litigation with the Eji-
suhene.’’45 Since this meeting, the UC and the assemblyman have
been trying to get all the chiefs together to agree to the PAC receiving
a third of the revenue of all land allocations in Besease. According to
the chairman of the UC, the Gyaasehene had already agreed but he
had not yet spoken to the Kyidomhene. One of his elders did not think
the Kyidomhene would agree ‘‘because a third is big money. But we
will make him agree to a sizeable amount when we all meet. We have
to convince them that the money will be used for the development of
the town.’’46 Later interviews proved them right: the Gyaasehene stated
that ‘‘The law that a percentage of land revenues should go to the town
already existed, even if the chief didn’t agree.’’47 But the Kyidomhene
said: ‘‘It is too much because the farmer, chief, elders and stool also
need money. Besides, the UC usually misuses the money. A quarter
would be a better idea.’’48
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During the following months, the Beseasehene proved to be the
most uncooperative chief and tried to thwart any discussion on the to-
pic. He seemed enraged by the refusal of the UC chairman and the as-
sembly member to tell the other chiefs that all allocation papers should
be signed by the Beseasehene. In an encounter shortly after the village
meeting, the Beseasehene told the assemblyman and the UC chairman
that since the community collects a third, they also had to take care of
this issue. If they would not talk to the other chiefs, he would not com-
ply with their laws to give a third of the revenue to the Unit Commit-
tee. But the assemblyman thought that the chief should give a third to
the community because ‘‘the law is the law.’’49 At the end of August
2003, the PAC and all the chiefs finally met. The PAC explained that
they wanted a third of all land proceeds for town development but the
chiefs disagreed. ‘‘If your forefathers did not have land, you can’t claim
it now just because you are on the committee. The chiefs already pay
more on certain occasions such as at the Easter Convention. And they
pay a lot of expenses for their own families, such as education and fun-
erals,’’ the Kontihene of the Beseasehene later explained.50 They pro-
mised to come up with a different proposal after discussing it amongst
themselves. The PAC, however, never heard from them again. In Janu-
ary 2004 they sent all Besease chiefs a letter to ask them to account
for their land administration, but this was also ignored. Even by Sep-
tember 2005, the PAC had still not started in Besease.
The configuration of Besease makes the coercion of chiefs in accoun-
table land management and revenue sharing a complicated issue. None
of the land-owning chiefs is eager to see a third of his revenue go to
the community. As long as they can blame the failure on a third party,
there is no incentive for them to try to reach an agreement. The Besea-
sehene is trying to use the installation of the PAC to initiate the prac-
tice of him signing all allocation papers in Besease. He blames the UC
and the assemblyman for not cooperating with him and is therefore
withholding his support for the PAC. The other chiefs are reluctant be-
cause of the same issue: they do not want to accept the Beseasehene as
overall landlord and are unclear of the UC’s position on the issue. Even
farmers are taking an ambiguous stance towards the sharing of reven-
ue from land sales. On the one hand, they would rather that revenues
from land sales be used for community development than end up in
the chiefs’ coffers. But when they see the chance to sell their own land,
they are not keen to hand over any of the purchase price to the UC.
This constellation of bickering chiefs and wavering farmers makes it al-
most impossible for the UC and the PAC to take measures against re-
luctant chiefs. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the para-
mount chief cannot be appealed to in a mediating role. In an attempt
to break the deadlock, the PAC and UC members have turned to state
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law and statements by officials to underpin their claims. For instance,
when the UC told the queenmother about the PAC, they said that the
government had informed them that the community would get a third
of any revenue from land sales.51 And one of the PAC members
claimed that ‘‘the subchiefs are all legally obliged to obey the law. It is
a constitutional provision that the town receives thirty per cent of rev-
enues. Even the MP when he came to the Easter Convention an-
nounced that.’’52 While the truth about official statements remains un-
clear, no such legislative provisions are to be found in the Constitution
or elsewhere.
Conclusion
Conclusions from the Cases
This chapter has considered struggles for land regarding the right to
sell, to sign, and to receive cash payments. The first conclusion that
can be drawn from these cases is that selling land – sometimes in-
itiated by farmers but more often by chiefs – is often profitable and
does not entail many risks for the seller. Even if the land did not be-
long to the seller, sales were rarely reversed. And if they were, the seller
was usually only made to return money to the buyer, which in the
worst case sent the former back to square one, though without incur-
ring additional costs. Even in the case of the Gyaasehene, who sold
land belonging to his own family, the punishment was no more severe
than his relocation from the village. The sale of land for residential
purposes automatically implies the loss of farmland for a local farmer,
which often severely affects the person’s livelihood. Such effects are dif-
ficult to cope with or turn around if the sale of land provides good
start-up capital for a new livelihood but become almost impossible to
combat when the chief is the seller and provides limited or no compen-
sation. Whenever a sale leads to a dispute between chief and farmer,
the position of the buyer is also endangered.53 When a buyer acquires
land from someone whose authority is questioned, which in Besease is
more often the case than not, he runs the real risk of losing part or all
of the land, of being threatened or assaulted by the aggrieved party, or
of having to pay an additional sum either to acquire the same plot of
land or as a signing fee for the allocation papers.54 The Beseasehene
has even tried to make buyers from twenty years ago pay a new fee for
their papers but due to their long-term uninterrupted possession of the
land and the homes they had built on it, they withstood his pressure.
In the triangle of chief, farmer and buyer, the chief usually benefits
from land sales at the cost of the latter two which, over time, would ap-
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pear to result in reduced access to land for the poor and increased so-
cio-economic inequality, a result confirmed by other research.55
Since selling land is profitable and those wishing to undo estab-
lished sales are often unable to do so, gains largely depend on the op-
portunity or ability to initiate sales. Although we saw cases where com-
moners had been able to sell their land, the prime actors in selling
land were usually the chiefs. Bruce (Bruce 1988: 43) explains their
strong position as follows:
‘‘in many indigenous tenure systems a traditional leader who
administers community land is viewed as holding a tenure in
that land. This is best described as an estate of administration,
held in trust, but where the land is unoccupied and rights to
land are becoming increasingly individualized, the traditional
leader is sometimes able to convert the administrative estate to a
personal right.’’
In Besease, where there is no unoccupied land left, chiefs are even at-
tempting to acquire personal rights over occupied land under cultiva-
tion by community members. The customary system of land allocation,
with the chief as the administrator of land, is thus clearly dominated
by the traditional elite. The chiefs’ strong position is enhanced by their
capacity to draw up planning schemes and demarcate village land into
residential plots – actions frequently supported by local government –
which provides the administrative tools to allocate land.
Even though those who want land do not have equal opportunities,
this does not mean that the powerful can deal with land as they please.
Three cases described above showed how the Beseasehene over-
stretched his authority and was resisted. In the first case a family re-
strained a buyer from coming on to the land he had purchased from
the Beseasehene and steadfastly refused to come to an agreement with
the chief. The second case described how the Kontihene subchief re-
fused to share land revenue with the Beseasehene. In the third case,
the fierce resistance of various villagers against Beseasehene’s scheme
to ‘renew’ the signatures on old allocation papers was discussed. This
chapter demonstrates that the stratification in Besease is more compli-
cated than a simple opposition of chief-commoners. Just as there are
various levels of chiefs, commoners do not form a homogeneous group
but should be differentiated on the basis of their ‘capital’, such as their
property, power, connections, and knowledge. It is likely that the
chief’s room for manoeuvre and the success of resistance against his
actions depend among other things on the contestants’ membership of
social and political networks, their economic capital, the number of
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people they can mobilize, and the degree of physical force they are will-
ing and able to use.
Among themselves, the chiefs of Besease constantly struggle for the
spoils of land allocations. Besease, with its four land-owning chiefs,
does not fit the typical model of an Ashanti village with respect to tradi-
tional leadership. The multi-chief configuration of Besease on the one
hand offers opportunities for individuals and families to benefit from
the animosity and rivalry between the chiefs, by playing them off
against each other. On the other hand, it complicates the process of
bringing about accountable land management and equitable revenue
sharing, as was seen in the case of the establishment of a Plot Alloca-
tion Committee.56 Disagreements between the various chiefs in Be-
sease and the interference of the paramount chief furthermore show
how the local and the supra-local are intertwined, and illustrate how
contestations over land are intimately tied up with struggles over politi-
cal power and authority. Claims by an institution to define property are
also claims about the institution’s legitimacy itself (cf. Berry 2002b;
Lund 2002). The Besease case furthermore shows that struggles both
for land and political power, are intimately tied up with contestations
of history.
In conclusion, this account of land struggles in Besease shows how
sales of residential land have disproportionately benefited the tradi-
tional elite at the cost of small-scale farmers and stranger buyers. Cus-
tomary tenure in Besease does not constitute a guarantee of security
for the poor. This case therefore does not support recognition of cus-
tomary rights at the community level per se as a means of protecting
the poor. Since local communities are themselves ‘‘the sites of inequal-
ities and the instigators of exclusions’’ (Moore 1998: 42), measures to
strengthen customary institutions and local control to access to land
without regulating checks and balances on local power holders may ac-
tually reinforce inequality. Although this chapter covers only one vil-
lage with its own peculiar composition, and other localities could well
have different power configurations, the general trends described in
Besease are confirmed by mounting evidence that, due to rising land
values, processes of commodification and individualization of land are
restricting access to land for the poor, increasing the appropriation of
land by influential elites and exacerbating socio-economic inequalities
(cf. Berry 1988: 58-60; Downs and Reyna 1988: 13-19; Peters 2004;
Woodhouse 2003: 1717).
A Conclusion on the Negotiability of Customary Tenure
The third position described in the introduction to this chapter im-
putes the increased inequality under customary tenure to the differen-
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tiated bargaining positions within a community and the limits of ne-
gotiability and ambiguity. Although the Besease case endorses both
these aspects, I agree with Peters (2004) and Amanor (1999) who
warn that too much emphasis on negotiability results in an overestima-
tion of people’s agency and that the image of relatively open, negotiable
and adaptive customary systems of landholding and land use obscures
processes of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation.
Peters, in a critical assessment of the literature stressing the negotiable
and adaptive nature of customary tenure systems, simultaneously re-
cognizes the valuable contribution of these studies to policy debates
and points to a neglect in asking who benefits and who loses or, even
when social inequalities are identified, to an undercutting of their sig-
nificance by insisting on social agency:
‘‘Critics who mounted successful challenges to simplistic and
economistic models that posited customary landholding to lack
security of title and, hence, to fail to provide incentives for in-
vestment and modernization, were able to reveal the fallacy of
this conventional development thinking, and, recently, to achieve
a dramatic reversal of position among World Bank researchers
and some aid agencies. But in so doing, they also have over-em-
phasized negotiability and indeterminacy, This, in combination
with a parallel shift in social theory influenced by postmodern
and postcolonial writing that privileges ambiguity, multiplicity
and indeterminacy, has resulted in a proliferation of studies cele-
brating agency and manoeuvres at the cost, I claim, of identify-
ing winners and losers.’’ (Peters 2004: 271)
In her opinion, more emphasis on who benefits and who loses in in-
stances of ‘negotiability’ in access to land requires ‘‘a theoretical move
away from privileging contingency, flexibility and negotiability that,
willy-nilly, ends by suggesting an open field, to one that is able to iden-
tify those situations and processes (including commodification, struc-
tural adjustment, market liberalization and globalization) that limit or
end negotiation and flexibility for certain groups or categories’’ (Peters
2004: 270) (emphasis added).
In line with, but perhaps surpassing Peters’ observation, I wish to
caution against misuse of the term ‘negotiability.’ As said earlier, the
term ‘negotiation’ denotes a mutual interest by the parties as well as an
opt-out option if negotiations prove unsatisfactory.57 Where neither of
these characteristics are found in struggles and contestations for land
because one party has the power to fully negate the other party’s rights
or to unilaterally impose a new constellation of rights, it is overstretch-
ing the term to continue to speak of negotiations. We cannot say that it
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is the result of a negotiation serving their mutual interest when a farm-
er finds out that a chief has sold his farmland. Nor can we speak of an
opt-out option for this farmer when he goes to the chief to plead for
part of the revenue. The Besease case shows a range of interactions on
a continuum from 1) negotiations where parties have more or less
equal power, such as between chiefs, and 2) negotiations between par-
ties with severely unbalanced power relations, such as between chiefs
and poor farmers, to 3) unilateral actions where one party is presented
with a fait accompli regarding an alteration in his/her rights to land but
where resistance changes the outcome to a certain extent, and 4) uni-
lateral actions where acts of resistance remain ineffective and the stron-
gest party imposes a new constellation of rights or even negates all the
rights of the other party. When Juul and Lund state that ‘‘just as poor
and disadvantaged people may sometimes negotiate improvements to
their lives, these may just as swiftly be negotiated away again’’, by
using the word negotiation they present an incomplete and skewed pic-
ture that ignores a whole array of actions in which a powerful party
one-sidedly abrogates or diminishes the other party’s rights (Juul and
Lund 2002b: 6). An overstretching of the term negotiation – or rather
a continued use of the term when in fact negotiations have ended – is
not only incorrect but also dangerous as it obscures the stratification of
the local communities in which these processes take place, overempha-
sizing the positive aspects of customary tenure, while neglecting its in-
justices. This also sends a wrong signal to policy makers, who have
mainly shifted from favoring the abolition of customary tenure systems
(USAID 1986; World Bank 1975) to a greater role for customary land
tenure (De Soto 2001; DFID 1999; EU 2004; World Bank 2003b) but
often still lack an eye for issues of social differentiation and inequality
(cf. Daley and Hobley 2005: 4, 35). Overstretching the negotiability of
customary tenure will sustain this gap between empirical realities of
customary land tenure and its characterization in policy debates.
This research does not conclude that the increasing economic in-
equalities are solely or predominantly a consequence of customary te-
nure and negotiable land rights. Rather, these should be attributed to
Ghana’s political economy, with the internalization of the market-dri-
ven inequalities of the global economy and the strengthened position
of chiefs that is discernable since the overthrow of President Nkrumah
in 1966, but especially pronounced during the current reign of Presi-
dent Kufuor. This research also does not mean to suggest that national
legislation will necessarily make land management more equitable. It
recognizes customary tenure as a fact of contemporary political life but
warns about treating it as a panacea. The current strategy in interna-
tional policy circles to build on customary law for the regulation of
land tenure wrongfully assumes that customary law in practice pro-
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vides guidelines to ensure equity and security in the governance of
land. We should ‘‘engage with ‘‘customary‘‘ tenure with open eyes’’
(Daley and Hobley 2005: 4, 35), and this warrants continued study and
open debate into its functioning.
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1 A literature review can be found in Ubink 2007.
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Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, all accessed 14 November 2006.
3 Land ownership in Ghana is classified in two categories: private land and public land.
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7 See chapter 2.
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government position that dominates district level government – and the other 30% of
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10 Although the Constitution (article 267 (5)) prohibits the sale of customary land and only
allows leases, nearly everyone talks about the ‘selling’ of land and many people, ‘sellers’
as well as ‘buyers’, seem to regard land allocations for residential purposes as definitive
transfers. The allocation papers that I saw during my field research merely stated that
plot x was allocated to person y, and did not mention the word lease or specify how long
the allocation would be valid for.
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fuor’s NPP supporting subchiefs. Second, the Besease chiefs have a particular historical
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hene in 1888.
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27 According to authoritative interpretations in case law, the usufructuary interests of indi-
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ment, forfeiture or with consent and concurrence of the interest holder. The usufructu-
ary cannot be deprived of any of the rights constituting the interest, not even by the
chief. This would seem to exclude the possibility of chiefs converting and selling sub-
jects’ farmland without their consent. It is less clear whether the usufructuary him/her-
self could convert his/her own farmland to residential land. It is thought that he/she
needs to ‘inform’ the chief of any intentions to do so but it remains ambiguous as to
whether it should be done before or after the conversion, whether this merely means in-
forming the chief or whether it involves the chief’s consent and, if so, on what grounds
a chief could withhold his consent. Obviously these issues determine a chief’s bargain-
ing position regarding revenue from the land involved. See for an analysis of customary
land law in the Ghanaian courts and a comparison with peri-urban practices, Ubink
2002-2004.
28 Assemblyman, 14 April 2003.
29 7 May 2003.
30 7 May 2003.
31 19 June 2003.
32 22 May 2003.
33 1 July 2003.
34 19 June 2003.
35 11 May 2003.
36 WK, elder Kontihene subchief of Beseasehene, 20 May 2003.
37 AD, 7 May 2003.
38 1 July 2003.
39 WK, 20 May 2003.
40 29 May 2003.
41 14 April 2003.
42 27 May 2003.
43 Assemblyman, 12 May 2003.
44 UC member JB, 19 May 2003.
45 AD, elder Kyidomhene, 22 May 2003.
46 Id.
47 1 June 2003.
48 19 June 2003.
49 12 May 2003. Despite this confident statement, such legislative provision does not exist.
NEGOTIATED OR NEGATED? 133
50 21 October 2003.
51 Queenmother, 29 May 2003.
52 KK, 29 May 2003.
53 Buyers are also in a vulnerable position due to the many illegal double or multiple sales
of plots of land to different buyers.
54 Due to a number of factors in the wider political arena, buyers often do not see many
possibilities to stand up for their rights: court cases are expensive and take many years;
there are no other state institutions that offer any redress; and they often do not want to
anger the chief since they are dependent on him if they still want land in the same local-
ity.
55 This was confirmed during field research in eight other villages in peri-urban Kumasi,
see Ubink 2008, forthcoming and by literature on peri-urban Ghana (Abudulai 2002;
Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Bassett 1993: 17; Berry 2002a; Edusah and Simon
2001; Hammond 2005; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Kasanga and Woodman 2004; Max-
well et al. 1998).
56 According to Edusah and Simon (2001) attempts to install a PAC are thwarted by the
chief in many other localities.
57 See note 123.
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5. Traditional authority revisited: popular
perceptions of chiefs and chieftaincy in
peri-urban Kumasi, Ghana1
Introduction: maladministration of land and popular perceptions
of chieftaincy
In Ghana, a large proportion of the land is so-called ‘stool land’, land
vested in a stool2 – a customary community – on behalf of and in trust
for the subjects of a stool in accordance with customary law and usage
(articles 36 (8) and 267 (1), 1992 Constitution). Traditional authorities
are regarded as custodians of such land. In peri-urban Ghana, however,
chiefs are displaying a tendency to adopt landlord-like positions with
regard to customary land. They are rapidly converting farmland into re-
sidential land, displacing poor and marginalized families from their
land. Along with their land, these families are losing their jobs and in-
come base (Abudulai 2002: 72; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001: 44,
69-73; Berry 2002a: 124; Kasanga and Woodman 2004: 204-212; Ken-
ton 1999: 31; Maxwell et al. 1998; Toulmin and Longbottom 2001: ii-
iii, 30; Ubink 2008, forthcoming). These occurrences cause consider-
able unrest and distress in the communities. Since claims of an institu-
tion to define property are also claims to the institution’s legitimacy it-
self (Lund 2002: 14; Shipton 2002: xi), the often criticized role of
chiefs in the conversion of farmland can be expected to affect popular
perceptions of chiefs and their various functions and as a consequence
have a bearing on the institution of chieftaincy.
A renewed interest in chieftaincy
Popular views on chiefs and chieftaincy are acutely relevant since Afri-
can governments, international institutions, and donor countries are
displaying a renewed interest in chieftaincy. Whereas many post-inde-
pendence African governments saw chiefs as impediments to moderni-
zation and nation-building and tried to curtail their role in local gov-
ernment and national politics (Kyed and Buur 2005: 1; Sharma 1997:
40),3 since the 1990’s a large number of African countries have en-
hanced or formalized the position of their chiefs (Englebert 2002; Kyed
and Buur 2005: 1; Ray 2003b: 11; Sklar 1999), including Mozambi-
que,4 Uganda5 and South Africa.6 In Ghana the Constitution 1992
guarantees the institution of chieftaincy (article 270) and recognizes
the role of chiefs in customary land management (article 267). The po-
sition of the chiefs is currently being strengthened by the Land Admin-
istration Project, a donor sponsored, long-term program which aims to
enhance land management in Ghana through the strengthening of
customary land secretariats (Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Ministry
of Lands and Forestry 2003; World Bank 2003a). Traditional authorities
also feature high on the agenda of international organizations and fora.
A case in point is the World Bank’s ‘Promoting Partnerships with Tra-
ditional Authorities Project’ in Ghana. Under this project the World
Bank provides a US$ 5 million grant directly to two traditional authori-
ties in Ghana, the Asanteman Council and the Akyem Abuakwa Tradi-
tional Council, bypassing the Ghanaian government. The project aims
to enhance the standards of health and education in the traditional
areas, and includes the goals of strengthening the capacities of tradi-
tional authorities and upgrading the financial and management cap-
abilities of the traditional councils and their secretariats (World Bank
2003c). Many African conferences also deal elaborately with the issue
of traditional authorities,7 and delegations of traditional authorities are
regularly received by foreign governments or politicians on their travels
abroad. (Otumfuo Osei Tutu II Education Fund n.d. lists recent visits
by the Asantehene).
Some authors explain the renewed interest in chieftaincy from the
functioning or malfunctioning of post-colonial states. One of these ex-
planations is connected to notions of ‘failed states’, unsuccessful na-
tion-building and internal conflicts and civil wars, and poses the idea
that chiefs have filled the gap of collapsed states (Kyed and Buur 2005:
2). Englebert (Englebert 2002: 57) however shows that the African con-
tinent displays a surprising lack of resurgence of tradition in collapsed
or failed states. Rather, the revival of traditional authorities takes place
in countries with a functioning state apparatus, alongside the establish-
ment of competing local institutions in the form of democratically
elected councils.8 The adoption of multi-party democracy and demo-
cratic decentralization, and the trend to consider the state as just an-
other actor in an increasingly complex and interwoven global order,
seem to have opened new public spaces for traditional leaders (Engle-
bert 2002: 59; Kyed and Buur 2005: 3; National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs 1995; Oomen 2002: 8). In a comparable way,
the liberalization policies of the 1990s and donor calls for structural
adjustment, emphasizing a smaller state, cuts in public expenditure, a
strengthening of civil society, and alternative dispute resolution, created
an increased space for the involvement of traditional authorities in law
enforcement, dispute resolution, service provision, and the implemen-
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tation of development projects. Added to this the enlarged distance be-
tween people and the state facilitated the resurgence of tradition as an
alternative mode of identification (Dan˜ino 2005: 1; Englebert 2002:
60; Kyed and Buur 2005: 3-4; National Democratic Institute for Inter-
national Affairs 1995; Ntsebeza 2005: 21-22).9 An enduring theme in
chieftaincy literature is how chiefs have over time tried to secure and
strengthen their position vis-a`-vis the state, and have tried to capture
public spaces opened up by new political constellations at the national
or international level (Mamdani 1996; Oomen 2002; Rathbone 2000;
Ray and Reddy 2003; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996; Van Rouveroy
van Nieuwaal and Van Dijk 1999; Vaughan 2000).
Other explanations for the renewed interest in chieftaincy are rather
linked to the realization of the various functions traditional authorities
can perform and have been successfully performing in their areas. Pro-
minent among these tasks are law enforcement and dispute resolution.
Customary courts are said to be popular and often resorted to as they
are easily accessible, cheap, fast, and comprehensible (Boafo-Arthur
2001; Boafo-Arthur 2003: 147; Dan˜ino 2005; Lowy 1978; Lutz and Lin-
der 2004: 38; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
1995: 4-6; Ray and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 32; Sharma
1997: 41; Sharma 2003: 261; Von Trotha 1996: 84). For instance, in
1997 customary courts in Botswana tried about 75 or 80% of the crim-
inal and civil cases in the country (Sharma 1997: 41). Another task of-
ten mentioned is the promotion of community development programs.
Traditional authorities are often seen as having the capacity to mobilize
their people behind development initiatives and to be able to use the
authority and respect from their people for community education and
awareness creation. Combined with the intimate knowledge they pos-
sess of their areas, this pleads for the inclusion of chiefs in community
development processes, with the chief as a middle-man between the
people and the government, bridging the often noted gap between state
and society. Donors, aid agencies, and governments often look upon
traditional authorities as the missing link between rural citizens and
the state. On the one hand they are able to implement governmental
law and policy and to facilitate, explain, and attain popular support for
development projects in their traditional area, on the other hand they
can provide information from the locality.
More generally, traditional leadership is seen as a channel that can
articulate the needs and priorities of communities which it represents,
and this can lead to genuine democratization and development and the
assertion of local autonomy against the globalizing and modernizing
power of the state. It is even claimed that reliance on chiefs in govern-
ance will reduce transaction costs and facilitate collective action (Bako-
Arifari 1999: 21; Englebert 2002: 60; Hagan 2003; d’Engelbronner-
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Kolff, Hinz, and Sindano 1998: XII-XIII; Keulder 1998; Kyed and Buur
2005: 4; Lutz and Linder 2004: 38-9; National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs 1995: 7, 15; Omoding-Okwalinga 1984; Ray, Shar-
ma, and May-Parker 1997; Ray and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996:
1, 7; Sharma 1997: 42; Sharma 2003: 261; Thornton 2003: 127; Vaugh-
an 2003: 172-4; Von Trotha 1996). Many African governments also try
to bridge the gap between government and civil society and strengthen
the position of national government by integrating the sphere of tradi-
tion into the space of governmental power as a symbolic, legitimizing
resource. Governmental leaders for instance frequently use external
traditional features such as traditional regalia, titles, symbols, and
myths (Lentz 1998; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 43-4, 54; Von
Trotha 1996: 87-88). Traditional authorities also have a role to play in
the field of natural resource management. They are thought to be able
to ensure nature conservation and environmental equilibrium and to
manage customary land in such a way as to ensure general and equita-
ble access to land and to guarantee the social security function of land
(Appiah-Opoku and Mulamoottil 1997; Daneel 1996; Hinz 2003: 104-
6; Lutz and Linder 2004: 38-9; Sharma 1997: 42; Van Dijk and Van
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1999: 6).
In performing all these functions, traditional leadership is also ex-
pected to protect local culture, tradition, identity, and religion (Boafo-
Arthur 2003: 127; Ray 2003a: 92; Thornton 2003: 127; Von Trotha
1996: 86). In general, however, the more symbolic – religious, spiri-
tual, and ritual – elements of traditional authorities are rarely con-
nected to the renewed interest in chieftaincy from African govern-
ments, donor countries and international organizations.
Investigating popular perceptions of chieftaincy
Both explanations for the renewed interest in chieftaincy – the opening
up of new public spaces and the successful performance of various
functions – pay hardly any attention to how the people feel about the
chiefs, their performance, and the institution of chieftaincy. In fact,
such data are hardly found in any research on chieftaincy. Oomen’s
study is a positive exception to this rule (Oomen 2002); a first ap-
proach towards such a study is also found in Crothers (Crothers 2003).
This lack of data does not, however, hinder some academics and policy
makers from making assumptions about popular views on chieftaincy,
ranging from continued uncontested allegiance to the institution of tra-
ditional leadership to a complete loss of legitimacy by the chiefs (Lutz
and Linder 2004: 3; Ray 2003b: 5; cf. Oomen 2002: 182). Empirical re-
search on people’s perceptions could make a valuable contribution to a
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more grounded and probably more nuanced picture of the role and po-
sition of chiefs and the institution of chieftaincy, and thus serve as use-
ful input for national and international policy makers.
The present chapter hopes to contribute to chieftaincy literature by
combining a critical discussion of chiefly rule with empirical data on
popular perceptions on chiefs and chieftaincy. It is based on extensive
qualitative and quantitative field research10 conducted from 2002 to
2005 in nine peri-urban11 communities around Kumasi, Ghana. It also
makes use of survey data collected by Crook et al. on dispute settle-
ment institutions in the same area (Crook et al. 2005). Based on these
data, it will demonstrate that people’s support for the institution of
chieftaincy does not need to imply their satisfaction with chiefly perfor-
mance. Formal recognition of chiefs by African governments and co-
operation of international institutions and donor countries with chiefs
should therefore be preceded by a critical assessment of chiefly rule.
And if the assessment shows that certain functions are not performed
satisfactorily according to the people the recognition should be com-
bined with the imposition of checks and balances on the functioning
of chiefs in general or with the regulation of certain fields in particular.
Kumasi is the second largest town in Ghana and the capital of the
Ashanti Region. Chiefs are a prominent feature of Ghanaian society.
The Constitution 1992 guarantees the ‘‘institution of chieftaincy, to-
gether with its traditional councils as established by customary law and
usage’’ (article 270 (1)). Article 270 (2) stipulates that parliament can-
not interfere in the recognition process of chiefs. This power lies exclu-
sively with the Traditional Councils and Houses of Chiefs, aside from
the possibility of a final appeal to the Supreme Court (articles 273–74
of the 1992 Constitution and sections 15, 22, 23 of the Chieftaincy Act
1971, Act 370). The National and Regional Houses of Chiefs further-
more act as advisory bodies to the state, discuss traditional social prac-
tices, and give official recognition to chiefs. According to Toulmin and
Longbottom (Toulmin and Longbottom 2001: 11-18) chiefs have re-
mained of much greater importance in Ghana than elsewhere in West
Africa.12 The traditional leadership position in Ghana is becoming
more competitive than ever before and is attracting academics, civil ser-
vants, business leaders, and teachers (Brempong 2001: 59, 60; Toul-
min and Longbottom 2001: 12; Otumfuo Osei Tutu II 2004; Ray 1992:
111-3). In the Ashanti Region chiefs are highly visible and organized
strongly hierarchically, from the Asantehene, king of Asante, at the top
through the paramount chief (omanhene), divisional chief (ohene) and
local village chief (odikro) to the clan or family head (abusua panin).
This chapter is structured around the main functions of the chief ac-
cording to the 242 people surveyed in peri-urban Kumasi (Table 1).
These functions are categorized under four headings: 1) land manage-
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ment; 2) local development projects, encompassing ensuring commu-
nity participation in development, looking after the physical develop-
ment of the town and organizing communal labor; 3) law and order,
comprising dispute settlement and ensuring peace in the community;
and 4) traditional religion. In the section on land management people’s
opinions on and resistance to chiefly land conversions will be pre-
sented. In the three following sections chiefly rule and popular percep-
tions on it will be analyzed in the fields of local development projects,
law and order, and traditional religion.
The functions mentioned under local development projects also fall
within the realm of local government. In Ghana, District Assemblies
(DAs) are the political and administrative authorities in the district:
they exercise deliberative, legislative, and executive functions and
supervise all other administrative authorities in the district. The legisla-
tive instruments setting up each DA provide a very specific list of up to
86 particular duties. Elections to DAs have been held since 1988.13
With regard to land management, the making of by-laws with respect
to building, sanitation and the environment, the preparation and ap-
proval of planning schemes, the granting of building permits, and the
enforcement of regulations and sanctions for non-compliance all rest
with the DA (Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 9).
Quite recently the DA structures have been supplemented by Unit
Committees (UCs), which are to function as the base structure of Gha-
na’s local government system. They perform roles such as public edu-
cation, organization of communal labor, revenue generation, and regis-
tration of marriages, births, and deaths. They have no official role with
regard to land management. UCs consist of not more than 15 persons,
of whom 10 are elected in non-partisan elections and five are govern-
ment appointees. The appointments are made after consultation with
traditional authorities and other interest groups. The UC’s viability has
been questioned on the basis of lack of financial and administrative
backup (Ayee 1999; Crook 1991; National Commission for Civic Educa-
Table 1 What are the main functions of the chief?
Main functions of chief %
Dispute settlement 78.1
Ensuring community participation in development 59.1
Ensuring peace in the community 53.0
Looking after the physical development of the town 50.0
Land management 43.8
Organizing communal labor 27.7
Celebrating traditional festivals 8.3
(Note Most people in the peri-urban communities studied referred to their villages as
towns.)
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tion 1998; USAID 2003: 30-1). The first UC elections were held in
1998. Villages in peri-urban Kumasi thus each have their own UC, and
every one to three villages elect a representative for the DA. In the sec-
tion on local development projects the relationship between the activ-
ities of chiefs and local government will be taken into account.
In the final section people’s assessments of the institution of chief-
taincy will be discussed and a conclusion drawn on the correlation be-
tween the performance of chiefs and popular perceptions of the institu-
tion of chieftaincy.
Land management
In peri-urban Kumasi farming is still a major occupation. In the eight
villages surveyed, farming was the main occupation of 31.8% of the
people, and an additional 25.6% farmed besides carrying on another
occupation. The number of people still depending wholly or partly on
farming varied widely between the villages, depending mainly on the
distance to Kumasi. This is illustrated in Table 2, which displays four
of the surveyed villages that lie quite close to each other on the road
from Kumasi to Bekwai, with the nearest one approximately ten kilo-
meters out of the city centre. This table reveals that in the village clo-
sest to Kumasi, Ahenema Kokoben, farming has lost its importance.
As said above, the peri-urban interface is characterized by a rapid
conversion of farmland into mainly residential and some industrial or
commercial land. In response to a question asked to the 171 people that
were either still farming themselves, or whose family members in the
village were still farming 58.5% stated that they or their farming family
members had less farmland than ten years ago. In Ahenema Kokoben
the population has increased from 302 in 1984 to 3400 in 2000 (GSS
2002). It is the chiefs who are the main actors in the conversion pro-
cess. They claim the right to convert land which is being farmed by
community members – and often has been farmed by the same family
for generations – to residential land and to allocate this land to outsi-
Table 2 Percentage of farmers compared to distance to Kumasi
Name of village Rank in distance
to Kumasi
(1 = close, 4 = far)
People who farm
as their main
occupation (%)
People who
farm besides
other job (%)
Ahenema Kokoben 1 3.3 6.6
Brofoyeduru 2 23.3 26.7
Kotwi 3 23.3 40.0
Nkoranza 4 50.0 16.6
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ders.14 From the chiefs’ perspective, it is understandable that they
make an inroad into people’s usufructuary rights. Since there is almost
no vacant communal land left in peri-urban Kumasi, it is the only way
to make money from the land. But the consequences of the conversion
are drastic for most people. There are clear links between land conver-
sion and increasing insecurity and poverty: some people become weal-
thier, but farmers and families who lose their land without appropriate
compensation become poorer and in time lose the basis of their liveli-
hood strategies. They are no longer able to grow their own food and
generate some income by selling the surplus at the market. Many of
the poorly educated farmers become jobless or resort to petty trading.
This description of chiefs’ dealings with land, and the local conse-
quences, brings us to the question of how people in the villages regard
these actions. It has been put forward that people in the villages gener-
ally accept that the development of residential plots is primarily the
chief’s concern (NRI (Natural Resources Institute) and UST (Univer-
sity of Science and Technology) 1997: 23). Others claim the opposite,
i.e., that most people in peri-urban Kumasi want to minimalize the role
of the chief in land administration (Van Leeuwen and Van Steekelen-
burg 1995: 59). In the current research, the chiefs’ claim that they can
allocate farmland to strangers for residential purposes was accepted by
56.1% of the surveyed population (Table 3).
Acceptance was high in the villages of Jachie, Tikrom, and Ahenema
Kokoben. One might expect that this acceptance stems from the fact
that in these villages the chiefs are using the land and the revenue ac-
cruing from the conversions in the best interest of the community. In-
deed, the Jachiehene15 for instance allowed members of the community
to buy residential land at a very low price. And the revenue generated
by leasing the remaining residential plots to outsiders was used for
community development. In the first four years of his reign, the Jachie-
Table 3 Who can allocate farmland to strangers for residential development?
Name of village Village chief (%) Head of family (%) Farmer (%)
Jachie 100.0 0.0 0.0
Tikrom 91.3 4.3 4.3
Ahenema Kokoben 72.7 4.5 13.6
Adadeentem 53.8 15.4 26.9
Nkoranza 47.6 28.6 14.3
Kotwi 33.3 13.3 40.0
Boankra 33.3 40.7 22.2
Brofoyeduru 20.0 15.0 50.0
Total 56.1 13.5 24.0
(Note: Only the three most quoted categories are represented
144 JANINE M. UBINK
hene has built a library, a school, and a palace, and has allocated part
of his land to a Technical School in exchange for scholarships.
However, same cannot be said for the chiefs of Tikrom and Ahene-
ma Kokoben. In these villages chiefs reallocated large amounts of
farmland without proper compensation and hardly any revenue was
utilized for community development. The high percentage of people
accepting the power of the chief to reallocate their farmland in the
three villages can perhaps be understood rather as an acceptance of the
reality of daily life. For in all three villages the chiefs not only claimed
the right to allocate their farmland to strangers, but have also effectu-
ated this right. Although most people in these villages accepted that
the chief converted farmland, his right to spend the revenues at will
was challenged. There was a lot of individual and communal resistance
against the way chiefs used the revenues and against non-compliance
of chiefs with planning schemes and environmental rules. Thus in Tik-
rom a long process of talks and consultations took place between chief
and community. First, at a range of village meetings the people re-
quested a substantial percentage of land revenues for community de-
velopment. When this proved unsuccessful, the people tried to involve
the chief of Asomenya, their place of origin, who refused to get in-
volved. As the Tikromhene directly comes under the Asantehene, the
former assemblyman (the member of the DA who represented the vil-
lage) wrote a petition to the Asantehene in May 2002, but the case has
not been called before the Asantehene so far. The same assemblyman
has also brought in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to in-
vestigate the chief’s sand mining close to streams. The EPA criticized
the chief’s actions, but the power to prosecute lies with the DA, which
did not act upon it. The assemblyman furthermore discussed the pro-
blems at a local radiostation and again appealed to the Asantehene for
help, but this also has had no effect.
In the other villages studied, either not so much land was converted
yet, or the people were themselves highly involved in land allocations.
For instance in Boankra, the stool has been vacant for many years due
to a chieftaincy dispute, and families have been allocating their land to
outsiders independently of the chief’s family. And in Brofoyeduru, lo-
cal farmers are converting and selling their own land, after which they
direct the buyer to the chief who will sign the allocation papers for a
moderate signing fee. Although the Constitution prohibits the outright
sale of stool land, which can thus officially only be leased, nearly every-
one speaks of the selling of land and many people, ‘sellers’ as well as
‘buyers’, seem to regard the allocations as definitive transfers.
Considering the severe effects on their livelihoods, it is understand-
able that people undertook various actions to influence the way reven-
ues are spent or even to prevent the reallocation of their farmlands al-
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together. All villages studied witnessed various kinds of ongoing strug-
gles and negotiations between the land-owning chiefs and their people.
Acts of resistance ranged from direct interactions with the chief – to
plead, convince or strike a deal with him – to actions circumventing
the chief. Examples of this last strategy are: selling your own land be-
fore the chief does it, or restraining a buyer, who purchased land from
the chief, from entering the land or building on it.16 Some struggles
over land lead to violent incidents between villagers and buyers or be-
tween villagers and the chief.17 And there have even been reports of
large-scale violent uprisings of villagers against the chief.
An example of such violence occurred in Pekyi nº 2, where the chief
sold a big part of village land to the Deeper Life Christian Ministry and
pocketed the money. The commoners chased both the chief and the
church representatives out of the village, killing one of the latter in the
action. Another well-known strategy is to install a Plot Allocation Com-
mittee (PAC), as was tried in Besease. One May afternoon, the gong-
gong was beaten in Besease to announce a village meeting. Two hours
later the Beseasehene, the UC, and two dozen villagers had gathered
on the crossroads in the middle of the village. One of the members of
the UC addressed the meeting. He explained that they had called this
meeting to install a PAC, that would from that moment on sign all
land allocation papers and secure a certain percentage of the revenue
for community development. He claimed that the chief had sold a lot
of land in his two years reign and whereas ‘‘we use the money for de-
velopment of the town, he uses it to buy a big cloth.’’ When the chief
responded by denying any land allocations, the villagers were incredu-
lous and astonished. While the sun went down, more and more people
kept flocking towards the meeting place, and the tension rose. After
some time of uncoordinated discussion, the chairman of the UC inter-
vened. The people silenced to hear his soft voice stating that approxi-
mately twenty plots had been sold in the last two years, but the chief
had allowed the UC to sign the papers of only five of these plots. The
chief was now openly irritated and again denied these facts, which eli-
cited vehement reactions of the gathered crowd. Many villagers, men
and women, young and old, were by now shouting outright and swear-
ing at the chief. After some more time of heated debate, the chairman
again calmed the people and announced that the chief had agreed to
install a PAC. They proceeded to appoint the committee members. The
chief selected two of his confidants, the UC brought forward two repre-
sentatives, and the villagers appointed two leaders of the commoners.18
The example above shows that tempers can rise high when land is con-
cerned and that the traditional respect of the people for the chief can suf-
fer from his maladministration of land. According to the assemblyman
of Esereso, ‘‘now that the chief does not supply the families with land
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they can speak disrespectfully of him in the village’’ (Interview, 10 April
2003). Along the same lines, the Kontihene subchief of the Beseasehene
states that because of the maladministration of land by the Besease-
hene ‘‘no one recognizes him as the chief. No one goes to him for dis-
pute settlement’’ (Interview, 1 July 2003). As said before, this poses the
question to what extent and how chiefs’ dealings with land affect peo-
ple’s views on the other tasks and activities of chiefs, as well as people’s
attitude towards chiefs and chieftaincy in general. This same issue has
been raised in other countries. Claassens (2006: 26), analyzing local
land administration in South Africa, states that ‘‘(s)elling land under-
mines the legitimacy and support base of traditional leaders among
community members.’’ And Fisiy (Fisiy 1992) says of Cameroon: ‘‘The
rampant alienation of land by sale, especially to strangers (Fulani gra-
ziers), is seen as egoistic and potentially ruinous to the institution.’’
We will now consider this question for peri-urban Kumasi.
Local development projects
Some of the other tasks of chiefs mentioned in the survey are: looking
after the physical development of the town (50%), ensuring community
participation in development (59.1%), and organizing communal labor
(27.7%). We analyze these three tasks together under the heading of
‘organizing local development projects.’ When such projects are in-
itiated in villages the chief is often involved in some way or other. He
is often considered as the line to the civil authorities. He might also be
asked to supply land for the project, to deploy his public function for
fundraising activities at the local level, to mobilize his people for com-
munal labor or education campaigns, and to function as a guest of
honor at opening ceremonies. Because of his function as representative
of the people, the chief is often regarded as the focal point for govern-
ment, NGOs, developers, and investors.19
Besides chiefs, local government representatives are often also in-
volved. This poses some questions with regard to the relationship be-
tween these actors. Two main themes in the literature on this issue are
the co-optation of local government by traditional elites (see for in-
stance Abudulai 2002; Moore 1973) and the tensions between local
government and traditional authorities (Ntsebeza 2003; Ntshona and
Lahiff 2003; Vaughan 2003: 146, 170). Although it sometimes happens
that local government representatives are allied to the chief – for in-
stance in Nkoranza the assemblyman was also the Ankobeahene sub-
chief and in Jachie he was the chief’s maternal nephew – in peri-urban
Kumasi local government is largely unconnected20 to the traditional
elite and this elite does not seem to make much of an effort to change
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that. The lack of interest by the traditional elite in co-opting local gov-
ernment can be understood by the fact that the positions of UC and
DA member do not offer much opportunity for personal gain. They re-
ceive hardly any remuneration and their jobs can be strenuous and
frustrating because of high expectations and demands for development
projects from the locality, with a lack of funds to meet these demands.
This analysis is supported by the rapid turnover of representatives:
most of them hold their positions for only one or two terms.
In peri-urban Kumasi the relationships between chiefs and local gov-
ernment representatives are highly varied, ranging from co-operation to
high-rising tensions. In the villages where chiefs use a substantial part
of the revenue from land conversions or from other sources for projects
in the village, such as electrification, building of schools, libraries,
KVIPs (Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit Latrines), sanitation projects,
local government representatives often take an active role in supporting
such projects; they organize and oversee communal labor and help with
local fundraising, etc. However, in other villages, where little of the lo-
cal revenue is used for development purposes, tensions between chiefs
and representatives of local government can rise high. The latter often
play an important role in challenging maladministration by chiefs. Ac-
cording to the planning officer of Ejisu-Juaben DA, many conflicts in
villages are between UCs and chiefs (Interview, 2 April 2003). The ex-
ample of Tikrom, discussed above, is a case in point.
The involvement of chiefs in formal occasions such as opening cere-
monies, and their speeches at such happenings, are often chronicled in
local and national newspapers. Both Ray and Eizlini (2004)21 and
Owusu-Sarpong (2003: 41, 43) conclude from such newspaper reports
that not only is there a vivid interest in Ghana in traditional matters,
but also that local government representatives and traditional rulers
work hand-in-hand for the benefit of the people. The latter, however, is
a debatable conclusion, as the following case shows. In Besease, the
UC and assembly members organized an Easter Convention to raise
funds for building a library in the village. Every villager was obliged to
pay a fixed amount, and many people originating in Besease but now
residing elsewhere had also come and brought their donations. It was
a true village festival, with most adults of the village present, the
churches involved, a number of chiefs22 and subchiefs of Besease pre-
sent, and the local member of parliament and the District Chief Execu-
tive invited as special guests. The Beseasehene, however, was absent,
as was the Beseasehemaa (queenmother). They sent a letter to the as-
semblyman, which was read out loud at the convention, which ex-
plained their absence with reference to a dispute with the village over a
piece of land. A few months later, the library was built, the book cases
piled high with secondhand books, and flowers planted in front of the
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building. Time for an official opening. Again a big ceremony was orga-
nized, with students from the three local schools performing pedagogi-
cally sound plays, reciting sweet poems, and singing many-voiced
songs. All Besease chiefs and subchiefs joined in full regalia, each with
their Okyeame and their Kyiniyehene – their spokesman and umbrella-
bearer. The Beseasehene was also present this time and gave a speech,
in which he, the chief of Besease, emphasized the importance of edu-
cation and reading in general for his people. It is not difficult to ima-
gine newspaper headlines such as: ‘‘Beseasehene stresses importance
of education during opening of new library’’ or ‘‘Beseasehene advises
parents to avoid engaging children in economic activities at the ex-
pense of their education.’’ It is from similar rhetoric that Ray and Eizli-
ni conclude that ‘‘chiefs are actively involved in supporting the educa-
tion system in Ghana’’ (Ray and Eizlini 2004: 14). The Besease case,
however, shows that a representational role for the chief in an opening
ceremony does not necessarily mean an active involvement or financial
input at any stage in the project. It does not even signify a cordial rela-
tionship between chief and local government representatives.
A disturbed relationship between chief and local government repre-
sentatives can have various consequences. For instance in Tikrom, de-
spite harsh confrontations between local government representatives
and the chief, the UC has been unsuccessful in obtaining for commu-
nity development any part of the money from land conversions. This
has disillusioned UC members, who have also been unable to obtain
revenue for development projects from other sources. Combined with
the chief’s unwillingness to co-operate with the UC, this has under-
mined the UC’s functioning. As a result the UC hardly exists, with
only a few of the initial members still active in the village. In Besease
on the other hand, the lack of development by the chief has stimulated
local government representatives to take the initiative in development
projects, as in the case of the library, or in solving other local problems.
A parent in the village explains: ‘‘Once I went to talk to the Besease-
hene about one of the school buildings. But he said that he did not
have any children at that school so it was not his problem.’’ The parent
then turned to the UC (Interview villager Besease, 26 August 2003).
Oomen (2002: 200) shows that one of the reasons why people support
traditional leadership is because of a lack of alternatives. This argu-
ment can also be turned around: where the chief no longer functions,
many people turn to local government. According to a subchief, ‘‘If the
chief has squandered money and refuses to account to the people, if he
is rude or not paying what is due to the town, the UC will run the
town’’ (Interview Kontihene of Ejisumanhene, Besease 27 May 2003).
It should be mentioned, however, that two years after the successful li-
brary project, the UC members of Besease were so disillusioned that
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the Plot Allocation Committee had still not started functioning and the
UC therefore was still not receiving any part of the revenue from land
conversions in the town, that no new projects were initiated, and even
communal labor was no longer carried out.
All this leads us to ask how the people in peri-urban Kumasi feel
about these issues. Whom do they regard as the most appropriate ac-
tors for various tasks? Do they take an active interest in issues of local
government? And how do they assess the performance of the various
actors? Table 4 shows whom the surveyed people consider the most ap-
propriate actors to perform certain tasks. For all five tasks in Table 4
the chief is only considered the third or fourth most appropriate actor.
It is striking that for three of the main tasks of the chief mentioned in
Table 1 – ensuring community participation (59.1%), physical develop-
ment of the town (50.0%), and organization of communal labor
(27.7%) – both the UC and the local assembly member are considered
more appropriate actors than the chief. ‘‘Communal labor in Besease
used to be arranged by the chief,’’ says the queenmother of Besease,
‘‘but because of the dissatisfaction with the chief’s land administration,
nowadays when the gonggong is beaten, they use the names of the UC
and the assemblyman, not the chief’’ (Interview Besease, 29 May
2003). These data qualify Brempong’s (2001: 109) statement that ‘‘in
spite of local agencies … traditional rulers are regarded and are ex-
pected to act as development agents.’’ The current research shows that
people do consider development a task of the chief, but at the same
time do not regard him as the most appropriate actor for it.
Many villagers take an active interest in local government. 81% of
the surveyed people said they had voted in the last elections for the DA
and the UC (compared to 89.3% in the last national elections). 85.5%
of the surveyed people knew their assembly member and 94.2% knew
Table 4 Which actor(s) should perform certain tasks?
Tasks UC Assembly
member
DA Chief Central
govt
Ensuring community
participation
59.1 (1) 36.0 (2) 1.2 (4) 15.7 (3) 0.4 (5)
Physical development
of the town
24.8 (2) 58.3 (1) 5.0 (5) 16.9 (3) 16.9 (3)
Organization of
communal labor
87.6 (1) 18.6 (2) 0.4 (5) 7.0 (3) 0.8 (4)
Check concurrence with
building regulations and
planning schemes
33.9 (1) 25.2 (3) 31.4 (2) 7.0 (4) 1.7 (5)
Promotion of economic
development
27.3 (2) 43.0 (1) 12.4 (4) 20.7 (3) 9.9 (5)0
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at least some of the UC members.23 90.5% of the people felt that they
had a say in community affairs. In the survey, people were also asked
to score the performance of their chief, assembly member and UC on
a 5-scale (1 = very bad, 5 = very good): see Table 5.
The assembly members score significantly lower (2.85) than both
the chiefs (3.52) and UCs (3.57). This reflects the difficulty of their jobs.
Despite the lack of remuneration assembly members are expected to
serve not only in their own village but in one or two other villages as
well. In these villages people often complain that the assembly mem-
ber never visits them, or even that they don’t know him/her, and that
these members only care about their own villages. In the four survey
villages (N=120) where the assembly member lived in the village,
98.35% of the people knew their assembly member, compared to
72.93% in the four villages where the assembly member did not live
(N=122). In the first set of villages the performance of the assembly
members is assessed with an average of 3.37, whereas in the latter vil-
lages they score only 2.27. Furthermore the assembly members are
mainly judged on their success in obtaining development projects from
the DA, which itself is low on funds. The higher score of UCs might
imply that the UCs have lost the bad image resulting from their history
as revolutionary councils.24
The average score for chiefs is 3.52, which signifies something in be-
tween average and good. In three villages the chiefs score under aver-
age, in four villages above. There is a strong correlation between their
score and their ‘style’ of land management and its effects in the local-
ity. In Ahenema Kokoben (2.59) and Tikrom (2.62) the chief has sold
much land, with little revenue for the community. In Adadeentem
(2.97) the former chief sold a large tract of land very much against the
wishes of the people, which sharply contrasts with the new chief who
has not sold any land yet, but has already started building a primary
Table 5 Performance Assessments: Chief, UC and DA member
Village Chief UC DA member
Jachie 4.72 4.07*** 3.65***
Nkoranza 4.17 3.54* 3.93
Kotwi 4.04 3.58 3.09*
Brofoyeduru 3.54 4.12* 1.96***
Adadeentem 2.97 4.00** 2.15
Tikrom 2.62 2.92 2.00*
Ahenema Kokoben 2.59 2.83 2.50
Boankra No chief 3.56 3.50
All villages 3.52 3.57 2.85*
* Difference with assessment performance chief is significant at the 0.05 level.
** Difference with assessment performance chief is significant at the 0.01 level.
*** Difference with assessment performance chief is significant at the 0.001 level.
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school from his own money.25 In Brofoyeduru (3.54) it is mainly the
people who are profiting from the land conversions by selling their
own land, a process which is being condoned by the chief. In Kotwi
(4.04) many farmers had already sold their land to commercial farmers
in the last decade. The current conversion of these lands therefore does
not take away local people’s livelihoods. Nkoranza (4.17) still has more
than sufficient agricultural land, as a result of which the people hardly
feel the effect of land sales by the chief. The Jachiehene (4.72) has con-
verted much farmland into residential land, but he shared both the
land and the profits with the community.
Despite this strong correlation, when asked about their overall per-
formance chiefs do not receive very bad assessments, even when in in-
terviews people expressed outright criticism of the way they managed
the land. It has been suggested that the traditional respect for chief-
taincy makes it difficult to grade chiefs with an unsatisfactory mark.
This argument seems to be brought down, however, by the fact that
during interviews and participant observations severe criticism of the
chiefs was freely and frequently voiced. Should the relatively favorable
assessment of chiefs then be attributed to their performance in other
fields? We have now discussed four of the main tasks of the chief men-
tioned in Table 1. With regard to land administration, many villagers
do not consider the chiefs to play a very positive role. With regard to
physical development of the town, organizing communal labor, and en-
suring community participation, we have seen that for these tasks, lo-
cal government is now preferred over chiefly rule. The next sections
will therefore discuss the last three tasks mentioned: dispute settle-
ment, ensuring peace in the community, and celebrating traditional
festivals.
Law and order: dispute settlement and ensuring peace
‘‘Dispute settlement’’ ranks first as main task of the chief (78.1%), and
is closely connected to the third ranking ‘‘ensuring peace in the com-
munity’’ (53%) (Table 1).26 When asked the hypothetical question,
whether they would go to the chief if they had a land problem, 76.4%
of the surveyed people answered in the affirmative. In-depth inter-
views, however, showed that in cases where the chief is one of the par-
ties to the conflict - as is often the case when farmland is converted to
residential land - people do not consider the chief’s court an acceptable
forum for settlement of the dispute.
Of the people surveyed 10.4% had at some date taken a dispute to
the chief;27 25.6% had been witnesses in such a case. These figures are
difficult to read without knowledge of how many people were involved
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in disputes, and how many went to other dispute settlers. Crook et al.
seem to be the only researchers providing empirical data on such ques-
tions regarding the use of various dispute settlement systems in Ghana
(Crook et al. 2005). In a survey, they asked 677 people who they would
most trust to settle any problem they might have concerning their land.
The people most frequently mentioned as ‘trusted a lot’ were, firstly,
village chiefs (62.1%), second family heads (61.4%) and third court
judges (35.4%), with UC chairmen coming a close fourth (34.2%). In
peri-urban Kumasi, the UC chairmen ranked third (37.8%), paramount
chiefs fourth (28.4%) and court judges fifth (20.9%). The general trust
rankings showed very little difference in levels of trust between men
and women, between various age groups, or between people with dif-
ferent levels of education. Only the origin of respondents produced
some interesting differences: migrants from a different district or re-
gion showed much less propensity to trust a paramount chief and were
more likely to trust a judge (Crook et al. 2005: 73-77).28
A widely shared belief is put into words by Boafo-Arthur when he
states that ‘‘there are many instances, at the rural level, where societal
conflicts are referred, first and foremost, to the traditional ruler for ar-
bitration. In most cases, it is where the parties are not satisfied by the
judgment of the traditional arbitration system that the case is taken to
court’’ (Boafo-Arthur 2001: 10; cf. Schott 1980: 125-6). Crook et al.,
however, come to a different conclusion. They show that, out of 153 re-
spondents that said they had personally experienced a land dispute,
only 26.1% had turned in the first instance to the chief, while 73.9%
had initially taken other roads to settle the issue: they turned to their
family or to the court, used arbitration by respected persons, or had the
issue sorted out through negotiation with the other party (Crook et al.
2005: 72).29 A division of respondents according to origin demon-
strated that non-locals were only half as likely as locals to have used a
chief’s court (16.3% and 31.1% respectively: Crook et al. 2005: 78). Ad-
ditionally, they demonstrate that out of 168 land case litigants in Ku-
masi High Court, 52.2% went straight to court, without first employing
any other dispute settlement mechanism (Crook et al. 2005: 30; cf.
Crook 2005).
It is clear from the data from Crook et al. and from the current re-
search that chiefs remain an important source of dispute settlement at
the local level and enjoy high levels of trust in that area, albeit more
among locals than among migrants. They may or may not get satisfac-
tion for their problem at the chief’s court, but at least villagers usually
get easier, cheaper, and faster access to their chief than to state courts.
The position of Ashanti chiefs in dispute settlement has even been
somewhat enhanced by – and the role of state courts has equally suf-
fered from – an appeal by the Asantehene at his inaugural meeting
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with the Kumasi Traditional Council in 1999 to the chiefs to withdraw
cases pending in the state courts and in the Houses of Chiefs and
bring them to his court for settlement. Since this appeal – which was
followed by quite a number of people, although numerous cases were
also not withdrawn from state courts – over 500 land, chieftaincy, crim-
inal and civil cases have been settled in the Asantehene’s traditional
court (Boafo-Arthur 2003: 147; Otumfuo Osei Tutu II 2004).30 Crook
et al., however, also demonstrate an ambiguity. Whereas village chiefs
are still cited by the general population as most trusted persons for re-
solving a dispute, actual personal experiences of dealings with a dis-
pute showed a rather more varied picture. Chiefs accounted for only a
minority of dispute settlement institutions resorted to, others being fa-
mily heads, respected persons, and opinion leaders including elected
local government representatives (Crook et al. 2005: 89). Furthermore,
Crook et al. confirm the finding from our qualitative research that the
continuing conflict in peri-urban areas over the role which chiefs play
in the appropriation of village lands for sale as urban plots, is an im-
portant difficulty surrounding the chiefs’ role. In such circumstances,
Crook et al. conclude, the chief may be regarded as having too much
personal interest to be trusted as an impartial judge of a local land case
(Crook et al. 2005: 74-5).
Traditional religion
In the literature, the person and function of the chief are very much
connected to traditional religion (Busia 1951; Hagan 2003; Rattray
1969, first published 1929; Ray 2003b). Busia wrote in 1951 that ances-
tor-worship was the basis of the chief’s authority as well as the sanc-
tion for morality in the community. The belief that the ancestors were
the custodians of the laws and customs and that they punished those
who infringed them with sickness or misfortune acted as a check on
commoners and chiefs alike (Busia 1951: 24, 136; Fortes 1962: 78. Cf.
Nukunya 1992: 128). According to Ray,
‘‘the basis of the respect accorded to the chief is not only that the
chief derives his power from the people, but also that the stools,
skins and other symbols of office have a spiritual significance –
the chief deriving his power from the ancestors and mediating
between the people and the ancestors’’. (Ray 2003b: 7)
In Daneel’s analysis it is due to the religious base of chiefly authority
that chiefs are able to mobilize people to protect the environment (Da-
neel 1996: 348).
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Of the people surveyed only 0.8% claimed traditional religion as
their faith, with 45.6% orthodox Christians, 37.8% charismatic Chris-
tians, and 6.6% Muslims (see Table 6). Despite the variety of ‘new’ re-
ligions, some researchers claim that the chief’s role is ‘‘well-defined
and is embedded in local cosmological views, norms and values which
are respected by everyone in the particular society’’ (emphasis added, Ray
and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 25). Others assume that in a so-
ciety in which political and religious office are combined in the chief,
new religions are regarded as a challenge to traditional leadership.
These researchers look more critically at the effects of changing reli-
gions and worldviews on chiefly rule. Asiama for instance thinks that:
‘‘the effect of education and European acculturation, coupled
with the departure of a majority of the people from the tradi-
tional African religion built on ancestral worship, have made
people believe less in the divinity of the chiefs and the strength
of their connections with the departed ancestors.’’ (Asiama
2003: 13)
According to Hagan divergent faiths and world views not consonant
with traditional beliefs will lead either to the secularization of the insti-
tution or to the narrowing of faith allegiance to the stool (Hagan 2003:
7). Historical evidence shows that in many places and for many years
people have been using conversion to free themselves of service to
their chiefs, justifying their behavior by claiming that they do not want
to take part in ‘‘fetish observances’’ (Brempong 2001: 58; Busia 1951:
134; Hagan 2003: 7).
Only 8.3% of the people surveyed mentioned the celebration of tradi-
tional festivals such as Akwasidae as a main task of the chief (Table 1).
Some Christian charismatic churches agitate against such traditional
religious practices. The pastor of the ‘Assemblies of God’ in Besease ex-
plains his church’s stance towards chieftaincy and traditional religion
thus:
Table 6 Religion of interviewees
Religion %
Christian, orthodox 45.6
Christian, charismatic 37.8
Muslim 6.6
Traditional religion 0.8
Other religion 0.4
No religion 8.7
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‘‘We teach that pouring libation and praying to dead people is
against the law of God. We preach against it in church. Chiefs
and heads of families (abusua panin) who are born again refuse
to pour libation. They let one of their elders do it for them. That
is accepted by the church. The church does not agree with the
celebration of Akwasidae. But we can’t say they should abolish
it, everyone has its freedom of worship. We just don’t want any-
thing to do with that, but we don’t fight against it. We teach our
members not to get involved. But some of the members are not
properly committed, these might still pour libation. Chieftaincy
is still important for the people. Even in the bible there are
kings. They are very important to the nation, if there is no chief,
people will behave unruly. If there is a chief, people will fear for
punishment. We therefore do not preach against chieftaincy as a
function. Although the chief has a role to play in dispute settle-
ment, we teach the people not to go to non-Christians. We will
settle all issues in the church amicably. In that sense, the church
takes over part of the role of the chief.’’ (Interview, 12 September
2003)31
The orthodox churches, on the other hand, see no harm in traditional
practices such as pouring libation and celebrating Akwasidae. Many
Christians condone or partake in them.32 According to one elder, ‘‘Al-
most anybody will pour libation, to remember the ancestors. To know
they are remembered, you mention their names’’ (Interview elder of
the Kontihene of Ejisumanhene, Besease, 7 May 2003). Some people,
however, refuse to actively partake in traditional religious practices. A
chief recollects: ‘‘when my father and mother opted to be catholics,
they cherished the church so much that anything relating to custom
was taboo for them’’ (Interview Kontihene of Ejisumanhene, Besease,
27 May 2003) This has also led certain people to decline an offer to be-
come chief, because of the inherent necessity to pour libation and ‘feed
the stools’ (Personal communication, researcher Institute for Land
Management and Development, Kumasi, 15 April 2003). Some years
back, a chief declared in a radio interview that he no longer believed in
the sacred rituals of the stool room. He refused to pour libation to the
ancestors, which he considered to be demonic. Because of these state-
ments, the chief was destooled before the Asantehene, the late Opoku
Ware II (Hagan 2003: 7). Celebration of the traditional festival of Ak-
wasidae has changed a lot over the last decades. ‘‘Akwasidae used to be
celebrated by the whole town in the open, first in Ejisu and then in Be-
sease,’’ a Besease chief narrates. ‘‘Libation would be poured, a sheep or
goat killed, and no one would go to the farm that day. Now it is a
closed ceremony, with only the chief and the linguist present. This year
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one Akwasidae was not celebrated because it fell on Easter Sunday’’
(Interview Kontihene of Ejisumanhene, Besease, 27 May 2003). The
fetish priest used to dance and drum on festive days. But since the
priest died, they have been unable to find a new one. ‘‘Christianity has
made the shrine so low,’’ explained one of the villagers (Personal com-
munication villager Besease, 12 May 2003). At the same time, when
asked whether they would mind if the celebration of the traditional fes-
tival of Akwasidae were to be cancelled 54.5 percent of the people - and
60.6% of the people that originated from the survey villages - said
yes.33 Two villagers’ views on traditional religion are worth quoting:
‘‘People think that pouring libation is praying, but they don’t pray to
the real God,’’ says a female charismatic Christian from Besease.
‘‘They call on God with alcohol, but the real God does not like alcohol.
These are evil spirits.’’ With regard to Akwasidae she says: ‘‘If it were a
public ceremony I would not go because it is not the calling of the su-
preme God. It is fetish. But it should not be cancelled. We met our par-
ents and grandparents doing that’’ (Interview villager Besease, 27 Au-
gust 2003). A woman from a different charismatic church in Besease
says: ‘‘Everyone goes to church, so only the chief and the houses who
have stools pour libation. I go to the Baptist church, my mother to the
Bethany church. These churches preach against such practices. But Ak-
wasidae should not be taken out. It is custom (amanne). It should be
there for the ones who want it.’’ (Interview villager Besease, 26 August
2003)
These data again do not present an unambiguous picture. Only
0.8% of the surveyed people claimed traditional religion as their faith.
We may conclude, in line with Hagan (2003: 7), that this trend most
likely leads to the narrowing of faith allegiance to the stool. It might
also have its effect on other functions of the chief, such as dispute set-
tlement. It cannot be interpreted, however, as a rejection of all aspects
of traditional religion. Many Christians and Muslims still condone or
adhere to facets of traditional religion and ancestor worship. And while
only a small minority (8.3%) of the people mention the celebration of
traditional festivals as a main task of the chief, a majority attaches im-
portance to their continuation.
Perceptions of chiefs and chieftaincy
In this chapter, we have discussed chiefly rule and popular perceptions
in four fields, structured around the seven main functions of the chief
as listed by the people (Table 1). We started with a description of deal-
ings with land in peri-urban Kumasi and saw that many people are
highly critical with regard to this aspect of chiefly rule. We furthermore
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saw that in the field of local development projects the chief was re-
garded as only the third or fourth most appropriate actor, behind the
UC and the local assembly member. The field of law and order showed
a stronger but ambiguous role for chiefs. Whereas village chiefs are
considered the most trusted persons for resolving a dispute, chiefs ac-
counted for only a minority of dispute settlement institutions resorted
to, and the continuing conflict over the role which chiefs play in the
appropriation of village lands for sale as urban plots sometimes affects
their ability to judge local land cases. With regard to the field of tradi-
tional religion the data showed that most people surveyed were Chris-
tians and Muslims. Although this most likely leads to the narrowing of
faith allegiance to the stool, we saw that it does not imply a total rejec-
tion of all aspects of traditional religion or the role of chiefs in its per-
formance.
The survey data showed that the assessment of village chiefs is corre-
lated to their ‘style’ of land management. But despite very negative
judgments on chiefly performance in that area, chiefs’ overall perfor-
mance assessments are not overly negative; they range from a bit un-
der average to good.34 We have posed the question whether this could
be attributed to the performance of chiefs in other fields. If that were
so, however, variation in chiefly performance in these other fields
would influence their assessment, which does not square with the clear
correlation between style of land management and performance assess-
ment that we found for peri-urban Kumasi. For an answer to this ques-
tion of relative positive assessments of chiefly functioning we should
therefore look in another direction, for which we need to make a dis-
tinction between the person of the chief and the institution of chief-
taincy.
In Table 7 the assessment of village chiefs is compared to the assess-
ment of the Asantehene and of the institution of chieftaincy. These
data display firstly that the assessment of chieftaincy shows a low cor-
relation35 to the assessment of the village chief and, secondly, that the
Table 7 Performance assessments village chief, Asantehene and chieftaincy
Village Chief Asantehene Chieftaincy
Jachie 4.72 4.81 3.72
Nkoranza 4.17 4.82 3.33
Kotwi 4.04 4.93 3.80
Brofoyeduru 3.54 4.88 3.45
Adadeentem 2.97 4.93 3.57
Tikrom 2.62 4.66 3.30
Ahenema Kokoben 2.59 4.69 3.22
Boankra No chief 4.93 3.56
All villages 3.52 4.81 3.49
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assessment of chieftaincy does not differ significantly per village. This
clearly shows that people’s opinions about chieftaincy hardly depend
on the performance of current village chiefs or, to put it differently, that
the way a chief governs barely reflects on the institution. A distinction
between the institution of chieftaincy and its incumbent has also been
described in political oratory among the Barolong boo Ratshidi on the
South Africa-Botswana borderland (Comaroff 1975)36 and for Sesotho
culture in South Africa (Oomen 2002: 205). Unlike the data presented
here, Oomen’s information led to the conclusion that this ‘delinking’ of
chieftaincy from individual chiefs in local political debate did not take
place in people’s assessments of chiefs and chieftaincy. Quite the re-
verse, she shows a clear causal relationship between the way people
feel about their chief and their opinions on chieftaincy. As said earlier,
in peri-urban Kumasi this causal relationship is missing: the way peo-
ple feel about their chief seems not to influence their opinion on the
institution of chieftaincy. Perhaps we could even turn the argument
around and suggest that respect for the institution of chieftaincy car-
ries weight in and contributes to the assessment of individual chiefs,
which could explain the fact that individual chiefs are assessed rather
better than was to be expected on the basis of their land practices.
This dissimilarity between the Ashantis and the Sotho matches with
the fact that the institution of chieftaincy is highly debated in contem-
porary South Africa, whereas it is almost a fact of nature in Ashanti. In
peri-urban Kumasi dissatisfaction with local land administration and
anger towards a particular chief hardly seem to lead to discussions of
the desirability of the institution of chieftaincy. For the majority, chief-
taincy is a fact. According to a youngster: ‘‘The youth don’t respect the
chief as they used to. When they have a dispute they would sooner go
to the police or to court than to the chief. But chieftaincy has to be
there. It is not old fashioned.’’ (Interview youngster Besease, 15 June
2003) It is almost unthinkable for a village not to have a chief. Without
a chief there is no village, for who will represent the community at tra-
ditional and cultural festivals and ceremonies? ‘‘Chieftaincy is the cul-
ture of the people,’’ explains the District Chief Executive. ‘‘They feel an
emptiness if there is no chief. They think leadership is lacking, author-
ity is no longer there. Especially on festive occasions, people want to
belong to a chief.’’ (Interview District Chief Executive, Ejisu, 9 Septem-
ber 2003)
Table 7 also shows a significant difference between the assessment
of the village chiefs and of the Asantehene.37 The assessment of the
Asantehene is strikingly high in all villages. This is understandable,
since it is felt that the prestige of the Asantehene reflects on the status
of Asante and the Ashantis. This has its bearing on the same issue of
representation. For you need a village chief to communicate with high-
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er chiefs and with the Asantehene, who is highly revered and whose
position is unquestionable.
Respect for the institution of chieftaincy, however, should not be con-
fused with respect for the person on the stool. As we have seen from
the villagers in Besease swearing and shouting at the chief during the
village meeting to install a Plot Allocation Committee, the latter does
not always prevail. In general, it was quite common during the field-
work to hear villagers talk in derogatory terms of their chiefs.
Conclusions
In the introduction, we demonstrated that in the literature the resur-
gence of chieftaincy is often explained by either pointing to how inter-
national trends of multi-party democracy, decentralization, liberaliza-
tion policies, and structural adjustment have opened up new public
spaces for traditional leaders, on which they have aptly and skillfully
capitalized, or by pointing to the functions performed – successfully in
the authors’ opinion – by chiefs. Both explanations pay hardly any at-
tention to how people feel about chiefs, the way they rule and the institu-
tion of chieftaincy. Chieftaincy literature in general hardly provides any
data on people’s perceptions. This is reflected in the fact that national
and international policies on chieftaincy often do not seem to take into
account people’s perceptions. The cases in peri-urban Kumasi show
that the support for chieftaincy is not based on high satisfaction with
the way chiefs perform their tasks. Reasons are rather found in the
realms of culture and identity, as the quotes above make clear (cf. Oo-
men 2002: 223).38 This is an important lesson for African govern-
ments and international policy makers, since it demonstrates that peo-
ple’s support for the institution of chieftaincy does not necessarily go
hand in hand with satisfaction regarding chiefly performance. People
can simultaneously support the institution of chieftaincy and be highly
critical of the performance of certain chiefs or certain tasks. Whereas
governments’ moves towards more formal recognition of chieftaincy
are sensible in countries where chieftaincy is regarded as a naturalness
by most people, this should not lead to uncritical acceptance of the way
chiefs perform all their functions. Policy makers should critically as-
sess chiefly rule – and popular perceptions of it – in various fields, tak-
ing into account the performance of other actors in these fields, includ-
ing local government representatives. Based on such assessments, gov-
ernments should determine the desirability to recognize, formalize, or
enhance, in a ceremonial or more material form, the various functions
of the chiefs. And if necessary they should place checks and balances
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on the functioning of chiefs in general and regulate or control certain
fields in particular.
Notes
1 Field work in Ghana on which this research is based was supported by the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO/WOTRO), the Leiden University Fund
(LUF), Mordenate College, and the Adatrechtstichting.
2 The customary community is called a ‘stool’ in reference to the carved wooden stool
which is believed to contain the souls of the ancestors and is a traditional symbol of
chieftainship.
3 Exceptions cover Botswana, Malawi and Nigeria (Englebert 2002: 51; Kyed and Buur
2005: 1). Despite these attempts, in many countries chieftaincy survived, although some-
times merely as a folklorized apology (Englebert 2002: 58; Van Binsbergen 1996; Van
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996: 43; Von Trotha 1996: 87).
4 The socialist Frelimo government banned chiefs at independence in 1975 and set up
new governance structures. Despite this, the chiefs continued to play an important role
in the rural areas both during and after the war. In response, the government in 2000
decreed the chiefs a role as state assistants and community representatives. In 2002 a
little over one thousand chiefs were formally recognized as rural ‘community authorities’
and delegated an extensive list of state administrative tasks and civic-educative functions
(Buur and Kyed 2005; University of Sussex : MZ01; Kyed and Buur 2005).
5 The powerful kingdom of Buganda, abolished in Uganda’s 1967 Constitution after the
Buganda king had been exiled in 1966, was restored to a certain extent in 1993 by Presi-
dent Museveni. In 1995 the Constitution was redrawn to recognize the institution of tra-
ditional leaders (Englebert 2002: 53; Herbst 2000: 177; Ray 2003b: 11).
6 Claassens (2006), Ntsebeza (2003), Ntshona and Lahiff (2003) and Oomen (Oomen
1999: 73; 2002) describe a surprising continuation and even strengthening of tradi-
tional leaders’ formal position in post-apartheid South Africa.
7 See for instance the fourth African Development Forum 2004, Addis Ababa, where the
Asantehene – the highest traditional leader or king of Ashanti, Ghana – was invited for
the keynote address (Otumfuo Osei Tutu II 2004); the conference on ‘Leadership dialo-
gue with traditional authorities’, Kumasi, where a speech was held by the senior vice
president of the World Bank (Dan˜ino 2005); the Commonwealth Local Government For-
um on ‘Traditional leadership and local government’, Gaberone (Ray, Sharma, and May-
Parker 1997); and the conference on ‘African traditional leaders. Partners in the develop-
ment of Africa and the realization of the African Union’, Kumasi, 2003.
8 This can for instance be witnessed in South Africa (Ntsebeza 2003; Ntshona and Lahiff
2003; Oomen 2002) and Ghana (Crook 2005; Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003).
9 Chiefs and government elite should not be regarded as clearly separate and discernible
entities. In many African countries, the distinction between traditional and state elite is
fading. Both because chiefs are now often highly educated and involved in business ac-
tivities, and because chiefs have in most countries become to a certain extent integrated
in state bureaucracy (Bierschenk 1993: 220; Ubink 2008, forthcoming; Van Rouveroy
van Nieuwaal 1996: 46, 60). To explain why certain states have witnessed a resurgence
of traditional authorities while other states have not Englebert adds the following factors:
1) the cultural profile of the resurgent groups; 2) the colonial culture of the state; 3) the
strength of states – in the sense that strong states that are more confident in their own
institutions and stability might be more likely than weak states to tolerate the rise of al-
ternative sources of authority, at least in the cultural sphere or in areas of local land
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management and dispute settlement; 4) the failure of nation-building rather than state-
building (Englebert 2002: 57-8).
10 The research combined qualitative research methods such as semi-structured interviews
and participant observation with a survey among 242 villagers. To protect the identity of
local informants, names of interviewees are not given. They are identified as villager,
Unit Committee member, elder etc.
11 The peri-urban area is most appropriately thought of as approximating a continuum
from rural to urban. It is characterized by strong urban influences, easy access to mar-
kets, services and other inputs, ready supplies of labor but relative shortages of land and
risks from pollution and urban growth (Edusah and Simon 2001; Simon et al. 2001).
Five villages were situated on or near the road from Kumasi to Accra – Jachie, Tikrom,
Besease, Adadeentem, and Boankra – and four villages on the road to Obuasi – Ahene-
ma Kokoben, Kotwi, Brofoyeduru, and Nkoransa. All villages lie within a range of ten to
forty kilometres from Kumasi.
12 This accords with Crook et al. (2005: 89) who claim that chieftaincy in Ghana is much
stronger than in Cote d’Ivoire.
13 Through general elections 70% of the members of the DA are chosen on a non-partisan
basis, but the District Chief Executive – the single most powerful local government posi-
tion that dominates district level government – and the other 30% of the DA members
are appointed by the President in consultation with traditional authorities and other in-
terest groups. It is claimed that the DAs lack sufficient authority and fiscal resources to
initiate and implement policies and programs. Most DAs continue to rely on the na-
tional government for revenue and have not developed any significant local sources of
revenue (USAID 2003: 31). Chiefs in Ghana are not allowed to take part in active party
politics or election to parliament (article 276, 1992 Constitution), but they do have re-
presentatives at a number of local and national government bodies, such as the Council
of State, Regional Coordinating Councils and certain local government agencies.
14 See for an elaborate description of struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi Ubink 2008,
forthcoming.
15 As ohene is the Twi word for king or chief, the chief of Jachie is called Jachiehene.
16 Because of lack of success in negotiations with the chief, many people do not aim their
anger at the selling chief, but at the buyer. Both my fieldwork and a study of pending
cases at the High Court of Kumasi show that the farmer – angry that his land has been
sold by the chief – often tries to restrain the buyer from entering and building on the
land. For instance in Adadeentem, the former chief has sold substantial parts of the land
of the community. This brought a lot of dissatisfaction amongst the people, but no con-
crete actions were taken against the chief. One of the villagers, however, sued the buyer
of a vast tract of land in the High Court of Kumasi. Another example of the ‘buyer loses
out’ principle is found in Besease, where the Beseasehene sold two plots of the land be-
longing to his subchief, the Kontihene. On discovery of the sale, the Kontihene first
‘‘caused trouble with the Beseasehene’’, but ‘‘we enstooled him, so (…) we don’t want to
quarrel with him. But the buyer can’t come and work on it. If you come to work you will
meet the Konti’’ (Interview Kontihene subchief of Beseasehene and one of the Konti el-
ders, 20 May and 1 July 2003).
17 For instance, the Beseasehene sold land that did not belong to his family (or to the fa-
mily of his Kontihene subchief, as in the footnote above). When the buyer started to de-
velop the land, the land-owning family restrained him. After the buyer applied to the
chief to recover his losses, the chief ‘‘went to the land-owing family to plead, but he
nearly got beaten up’’ (Interview elder of Kontihene subchief of Beseasehene, 20 May
2003).
18 The other three land-owning chiefs of Besease were not present at this meeting, because
at a previous meeting a fight had nearly broken out between them and the Beseasehene,
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who is trying to gain control over the land of the other chiefs. Another explanation for
the tense relationship between these chiefs lies in the fact that the paramount chief of
the area, the Ejisumanhene, has destooled (removed from office) the three chiefs, who
have not accepted that and have brought a case against the Ejisumanhene to the Asante-
hene.
19 Many localities are additionally installing so-called ‘development chiefs’ (Nkosuohene) –
outsiders that are honored with a traditional title after they have brought, or with the ex-
pectation that they will in future bring, development funds to the area (cf. Brempong
2001: 59).
20 One factor explaining why local government and traditional elite are largely uncon-
nected is that the UCs find their origin in revolutionary people’s committees (first called
the Workers’ and People’s Defense Committees, later replaced by the Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution), that were set up to ‘tame the rapacity and irresponsibil-
ity of successive political, military and bureaucratic elites’, including traditional elites
(Crook 1991: 98).
21 This paper forms part of a study on ‘‘Re-inventing African chieftaincy in the age of
HIV/AIDS, gender and development: Volume I Overview’’ which has not been pub-
lished yet.
22 Besease houses four subchiefs of the paramount chief in Ejisu. These chiefs all originate
from Besease and take part in village meetings in Besease. Only one of these chiefs is
the Beseasehene, the chief of Besease, dealing with all general matters of the village.
23 Throughout the villages 52.5% of the people said they knew all members of the UC in
their village; 21.5% said they knew many of them; 20.2% said they knew some of them;
5.4% said they knew none (0.4% invalid).
24 This does not correspond with Crook et al.’s opinion that the Unit Committees have
failed (Crook et al. 2005: 5).
25 Although the people of Adadeentem have elected this chief, the Ejisumanhene, the para-
mount chief of the area, is unwilling to enstool him. The Ejisumanhene preferred an-
other chief-elect with whom he had been cooperating to alienate village land, for their
mutual financial benefit.
26 Chiefs’ courts are not accorded judicial functions by the state, and they are regarded as
mere dispute settlement institutions. Chiefs are also not incorporated into state courts.
These courts, however, do frequently apply customary law, which is one of the sources
of law in Ghana.
27 Of the 25 disputes, 13 (52%) concerned land.
28 In my own survey, the origin of respondents did not produce significant differences on
the issues represented in this chapter.
29 Unfortunately, Crook et al. do not combine the data on first instance dispute settlers
with data on the kind of disputes at stake, nor do they provide data on later instances of
dispute settlement.
30 Although this was an understandable and sensible appeal considering the enormous
backlogs in state courts, the move was also a highly political one in which the Asante-
hene reclaimed the traditional trias politica of legislator, administrator and judge.
31 Crook et al.’s research shows that for land disputes, church leaders only rank 16th
(3.4%) on the list of most trusted dispute settlers (Crook et al. 2005: 73).
32 Religion being such an important sphere of life in the villages, some of the religious lea-
ders take an active role in the personal affairs of their followers. This was mainly con-
fined to counseling and dispute settling in the field of family matters and witchcraft. I
did not encounter in the case study villages instances in which they took an active role
in opposing the chief when his rule brought hardship to the people. Even in Besease,
where the assembly member was also a minister in one of the twenty-three local
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churches, this merely resulted in regular get-togethers of all religious leaders to pray for
the welfare of the village.
33 In answer to this question 57.3% of the charismatic Christians said yes, 51.6% of the
orthodox Christians, 31.3 of the Muslims and 66.7% of people with ‘no religion’.
34 In another survey in peri-urban Kumasi in which the extent of villagers’ satisfaction with
their chief was measured, 28% of the people reported to be very satisfied; 50% satisfied;
4% not satisfied; 10% absolutely not satisfied; and 8% did not know or did not answer
(Hueber and de Veer 1993a: 43).
35 The correlation is 0.357, significant at the 0.01 level.
36 Comaroff describes that the people use a formal code to praise the qualities of the insti-
tution of chieftaincy in contrast with an evaluative code – which can be highly critical –
when they speak about a particular chief.
37 Significant at the 0.001 level
38 Oomen in her research (at 219-222) also points to the role of chiefs as ‘portals of the
government’ and to the lack of alternatives for chiefly rule, but both these reasons were
hardly mentioned in peri-urban Kumasi.
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6. Courts and peri-urban practice: customary
land law in Ghana
Introduction
Like most urban centers in Ghana, Kumasi has flourished in the last
decades. Kumasi is the capital of the Ashanti Region, and houses the
still vibrant royal court of the Asantehene,1 the king of all Asantes. It is
a bustling city and an important transportation hub. Its number of in-
habitants has grown by 4.2% annually since 1960, to 1,400,000 at pre-
sent, due to both population growth and extensive urbanization. This
has led to an increased pressure on land in the peri-urban area. In-
creasingly farmland is being converted into mainly residential land,
but also commercial and industrial land, especially alongside the major
roads to Kumasi, where access to the city is easy and electricity avail-
able. Many peripheral villages have now become fully encapsulated by
Kumasi.
Most of the peri-urban land is ‘stool land’ – the word ‘stool’ denotes
the customary community, in reference to the carved wooden stool
which is believed to contain the souls of the ancestors and is a tradi-
tional symbol of chieftaincy. This land is regulated by customary law.
According to representations of customary law in textbooks and case
law, the ultimate or allodial title to every portion of stool land is held in
common by the members of a community (Asante 1969: 105-6; Dan-
quah 1928: 197-200, 206, 221; Ollennu 1962: 29, 55-6; Ollennu 1967:
252-5; Pogucki 1962: 180; Sarbah 1968: 64-7; Woodman 1996: 53, 66,
107).2 The chief of that community is the custodian of the land and he
is customarily and constitutionally obliged to administer the land in
the interest and development of the whole community (articles 36 (8)
and 267 (1) of the 1992 Constitution). The lands thus are communal
properties. As long as there is vacant land each community member
has an inherent right to use part of it for farming or building. This will
give the member a usufructuary title to the land, which is heritable
and is extinguished only through forfeiture,3 abandonment, or with
consent and concurrence of the farmer. The usufructuary cannot be de-
prived of any of the rights constituting the interest. Not even the chief
can lay adverse claim. After the death of a community member, the
usufructuary interest usually devolves to the member’s family and be-
comes family property.
In short, the allodial title of stool land lies with the community, the
usufructuary interest with an individual or family, and the role of cus-
todian is allocated to the chief. This multi-layered customary set-up al-
lows considerable space for struggles and negotiations over who has
the right to convert stool land from farmland to residential land and
lease it out to a stranger, and also what should be done with the reven-
ue generated in this process. Taking into account the fact that this con-
version has severe effects on the livelihoods of peri-urban farmers,4
and that plots of residential land in peri-urban Kumasi easily fetch a
price of E 2000, it is hardly surprising that these struggles encompass
a whole range of actors and are often severe and protracted.5
In many villages, the first and major actor in the conversion process
is the chief. In peri-urban practice the chiefs are often also the main
beneficiaries. Although local farmers and families attempt to influence
these processes in various ways in the local arena, they often achieve
limited effect. Realizing the low effectiveness of many local acts of re-
sistance, it is worth examining to what extent state courts serve as an
alternative channel for restraining chiefs. This depends on the one
hand on people’s access to and the functioning of state courts, and on
the other hand on the decisions reached by these courts and their ex-
ecution at the local level.
This chapter will demonstrate that the Ghanaian courts in individual
land cases protect the usufructuary interests of community members
in stool land. Land practices in peri-urban Kumasi are, however, not in
conformity with the rules of customary law as laid out in the courts.
This difference can be explained by two factors, a legal and a political
one. The legal factor consists firstly of the difficulty for a judge to de-
fine the applicable customary norm while there are in each locality var-
iations within and conflicts about the contents of customary law. Sec-
ondly, a judge needs to translate these norms of ‘local customary law’6
for use in state courts, creating a ‘judicial customary law’ (Cf. Allott
1975: 89 and Allott 1977: 11; Asante 1969: 100; Chanock 1989; Koes-
noe 1985: 105-7; Von Benda-Beckmann 1985b: 77-95; Woodman 1977:
115; Woodman 1996: 46). The political factor refers to the limited effect
of judicial decisions on peri-urban practice due to the political config-
uration at local and national levels, which is characterized by four fea-
tures: the prominence of chiefs and customary law in stool land ad-
ministration; the erosion of customary checks and balances; the very
limited shadow of state law in the localities; and the government’s atti-
tude and actions with regard to chiefs and chieftaincy affairs.
This chapter starts in section two with a description of struggles for
land in peri-urban Kumasi, the discourse and actions by chiefs and
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farmers, and the erosion of traditional controls on chiefly administra-
tion. Section three contains a brief introduction to the courts system of
Ghana, its bottlenecks, problems of access, and litigants’ reasons for
turning to a state court. Section four then analyzes judicial customary
law in court cases dealing with stool land. Special emphasis is put on
security of tenure, power of alienation, and the role of the chief as cus-
todian. This chapter in section five concludes with the non-conformity
of local practices with customary land law as pronounced in state
courts, and tries to explain this gap by demonstrating the legal and po-
litical causes.
Struggles for land in peri-urban Kumasi
Chiefs
Most Ashanti chiefs7 claim to have the authority to take farmland in
which community members have a usufructuary interest, convert it
into residential land, and lease it to strangers.8 These claims are sup-
ported by two dominant legitimizing discourses. A first discourse by
chiefs holds that the abovementioned customary rules – protecting the
usufructuary interest in land against anyone including the chief – date
from the days when communities were involved in subsistence farm-
ing in land abundant areas; however, these rules have become outdated
now that urbanization and population growth have enhanced the value
of land. Therefore these rules need to be adjusted to modern circum-
stances, in the sense that when communal land can be used in a more
productive way, it should be brought back into chiefly administration;
the chief will then centrally organize the conversion. In the words of
the Beseasehene: ‘‘It’s a law that when the town is growing and it
comes to your place, you don’t have any land, because the land is for
the chief. Therefore the community can use this land.’’9 These claims
seriously weaken the tenure security of the usufructuary: any time
there is a demand to change the use of land from agricultural to resi-
dential, the chief can claim the right to reallocate their farmlands.
Among some of the chiefs, an even more far-reaching discourse is
found. These chiefs claim that stool land does not belong to the com-
munity as a whole, but to the royal family only, ‘‘since they were the
ones fighting for the land.’’10 ‘‘The land belongs to certain families.
They fought for it or got it from the Asantehene or Ejisuhene because
of for instance marriage. If your forefathers did not have land, you can’t
claim it now.’’11 This feudal claim is facilitated by the fact that the word
‘stool’ is used in different contexts, sometimes denoting the whole indi-
genous community, other times only the office of the chief or the royal
family. In this discourse, the royal family had only given the land out
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for farming purposes, to temporary caretakers, and can at any time re-
claim it when its use is changed to residential. Obviously this line of
reasoning leaves no obligation on the royal family to compensate the
farmer or use the revenues in the general interest. ‘‘The farmer does
not lose any land, since he never owned any land. The farmer is only
the caretaker for the chief. The land was given to him free of charge,
so how can he claim part of the money when it is being sold?’’12 ‘‘The
division (of land revenue) depends upon the leniency of the chief. He
can decide to take everything himself.’’13 This narrowing down of the
land-owning community degrades the nature of the customary rights
of usufruct. The freehold is transformed into a permissive right of te-
nant-like character, based on the leniency of the chief instead of on the
communal ownership of the land. Obviously, this severely diminishes
the security of the usufructuary rights. The allodial title proportionally
gains in weight and it shifts from the community as a whole to the roy-
al family, on whose behalf the chief now claims outright ownership.14
Farmers
Besides the chiefs, indigenous farmers and families are the main ac-
tors in local struggles and negotiations for land. Some farmers, fa-
milies or communities accept the fact that the chief is converting and
leasing out their farmland, although they often do try to influence the
division of the revenue accruing from the lease. Many others, however,
do not agree to and try to resist the chief leasing out their land at all.
Resistance takes many forms: public consultations with the chief at vil-
lage meetings; private consultations between farmer or family and
chief or with the involvement of members of the local Unit Committee
or the assembly member of the village;15 farmers or families selling
their own land before the chief can do it; making threats of destool-
ment against the chief or actually destooling him;16 violence against
the chief; chasing off the buyer when he comes to develop the land.
These acts of resistance are sometimes successful, sometimes not. The
varied outcomes depend on factors such as the approach taken by and
the power, position, and personality of the resisting actor; the personal-
ity and power of the chief; and the ability of both parties to build coali-
tions within the community and to mobilize support outside the com-
munity, notably at higher levels of chieftaincy and from the govern-
ment. A number of short case studies are described to make this point
clear.
In the village of Brofoyeduru, on the road to Obuasi, strangers
started to ask for residential land approximately 15 years ago. At first it
was the chief demarcating the land and leasing the plots out to stran-
gers, without paying any compensation to the farmer who lost his land.
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But after a while, his sisters went to talk to him, and he allowed first
one and then all of his siblings to convert and lease out their own land.
When word got out, other people in the village also started to do that.
The chief is not protesting. He signs the allocation papers of the farm-
ers, for which he receives a signing fee. In the village of Tikrom, a few
kilometers off the road to from Kumasi Accra, the chief has been stea-
dily converting and leasing out village farmland. The community, led
by the Unit Committee chairman and the assemblyman, has tried to
talk to him to get him to agree to give a certain fixed percentage of
stool land revenue to the village for development projects, but unsuc-
cessfully. The community has sought publicity on a local radio station;
has written a letter to the Asantehene; has appealed to the Asomenya-
hene, the chief of their hometown, to intervene; and has brought in
the Environmental Protection Agency to stop the chief from sand win-
ning close to the streams. All to no avail. A large part of the farmlands
in the village are now sold, and the villagers have not seen any commu-
nity development, but for the construction of a primary school, which
was funded by the EU.
The village of Besease is situated on the main road from Kumasi to
Accra, approximately 23 kilometers from Kumasi. The Beseasehene
has already converted and allocated most of the farmland of his own fa-
mily. Looking for new sources of revenue, he is now trying to allocate
land of other families in the village. He has for instance allocated two
plots of land belonging to the lineage of his Kontihene subchief. The
Kontihene and his elder made the following remark about these alloca-
tions: ‘‘The Beseasehene has no say in our land. I also have a black
stool, so I am next to him, not subject. We have challenged him. But
we, as the rulers of Besease, do not want to take him to court. But the
buyer cannot come and work on the land. If he comes to work, he will
meet the Konti. He will either get part of his money back from the Be-
seasehene, or maybe get only one of the two plots. Or he will pay some
extra 5 million Cedis to the Konti to be allowed access to the plots (that
were sold for Cedis 15 million). We want that person to summon the
chief in court.’’17 Beseasehene has also allocated one plot of land of a
different family to a stranger. When the stranger came to develop his
plot, he was chased off by the farming family. When the stranger com-
plained about this to the Beseasehene, the chief went to the family ‘‘to
plead with them to settle the case’’, but the family nearly beat him up.
The chief then refunded money to the buyer.18
Besease does not only house the Beseasehene and his subchief the
Kontihene, but also three of the subchiefs of the Ejisumanhene, the
paramount chief of the area. One of these subchiefs is the Kyidom-
hene. An elder of this lineage, and the next in line to become Kyidom-
hene, has recently allocated seven plots of family land to pay for the re-
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novation of the family house. When asked whether permission of the
chief is needed to lease your land to a stranger, Mr. D, the elder, an-
swered: ‘‘Things are changing. It depends upon the animosity. The
chief has to sign the land allocation paper and the site plan. But we
first sell and then we go to the chief.’’19 He later explains that his fa-
mily consists of three houses or gates, from which the chief is selected.
The people from these three gates can sell their own land, whereas the
others cannot.20 According to the Kyidomhene, however, ‘‘D was
wrong when he said that members of the three gates can sell their own
land. He says that because he has sold seven plots. It is the chief who
will sell the land and divide the revenue.’’ Mr. D, however, is not on a
bad footing with the Kyidomhene, since D did not connive with the
paramount chief, when the latter wanted to get the Kyidomhene des-
tooled and D enstooled as new Kyidomhene. No formal actions were
therefore taken against Mr. D on account of the land sales. Another of
the subchiefs of the paramount chief residing in Besease is the Gyaase-
hene. Recently the Gyaasehene has been selling land without the
knowledge of his family members who were farming on that land and
also without paying them any compensation. A family member ex-
plained that ‘‘If you are very difficult, the chief cannot take your land
away. You can sell and give part of the money to the chief. But if you
are unlucky the chief will take it, and if you don’t fight it, you don’t get
anything.’’ Now that she knows the Gyaasehene is selling land without
consent of the farmers, she will prepare a plan when the town starts to
reach her land, because ‘‘that gives me the possibility to fight.’’21
The short cases described above clearly show that the peri-urban area
of Kumasi is an arena of severe and protracted negotiations and strug-
gles over land. Practices regarding customary land are thus more nego-
tiated than based on clear and unambiguous rules of customary law
(cf. Berry 2001; Chanock 1998; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Mann and
Roberts 1991; Moore 1986; Oomen 2002; Otto 1998; Ranger 1983; Ro-
berts 1979: 182; Von Benda-Beckmann 1979). Customary law, or rather
interpretations or claims of customary law, should be seen as one of
the resources actors in these struggles use. Actors try to use the some-
what flexible, unwritten nature of customary law to legitimize their ac-
tions and defend their interests. Chiefs and elders do so explicitly,
farmers more implicitly. But the negotiations over land are and always
have been power struggles, to a high extent influenced by other factors,
such as historical narratives, personalities, and social and economic
capital.
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Traditional Controls on Chiefly Administration
Despite many acts of resistance, chiefs are often able to re-appropriate
a considerable proportion of stool land and to lease those plots to outsi-
ders. This is strongly connected with a shortage of checks and balances
on chiefly administration on the one hand and a lack of accountability
on the other. Authoritative writers have described a number of custom-
ary checks and balances on the performance of chiefs in Ghana, such
as the fact that chiefs ought to take decisions in council with their el-
ders or subchiefs, and the possibility to destool a seriously malfunc-
tioning chief (Busia 1951; Danquah 1928; Hayford 1970: Ch. 2; Kasan-
ga and Kotey 2001; Kofi-Sackey 1983; Obeng 1988: Ch 7-11; Ollennu
1962; Ollennu 1967; Pogucki 1962; Sarbah 1968).22 They seem, how-
ever, to depict an idealized version of customary law rather than effec-
tively functioning checks and balances in present-day village practice in
peri-urban Kumasi.
According to customary law, a chief can only bind the community if
he acts with the consent and concurrence of the whole community re-
presented by the principal councilors from all major families of the
community (Busia 1951: 14; Hayford 1970: 73; Ollennu 1962: 130).
Therefore, the chief is controlled in the enjoyment of the communal
lands by his councilors, called elders or subchiefs (Pogucki 1962: 182;
Sarbah 1968: 66, 87). A chief who repeatedly ignores the advice of his
people, especially of his councilors, is liable to destoolment (Danquah
1928: 57, 116). Current practice in peri-urban Kumasi shows an entirely
different picture. In a number of villages, the councilors are selected
from the royal family only and not from all major families of the com-
munity. Furthermore, when elders criticize their chief, in many villages
the chief does not listen to them. ‘‘Beseasehene is a new chief. He
doesn’t mind the rules. I tried to talk to him, but he didn’t take my ad-
vice. If I wasn’t educated, he would try to cheat me as well.’’23 In other
villages, the chief co-opts his elders by sharing the benefits from land
administration with them, removing their incentives to effectively
check the use of power and if necessary stand up against the chief.
‘‘The subchiefs support the chief, because they get a share of the
money. When they argue with him, they won’t get anything.’’24 ‘‘The
natives of the town have to try to stop the chief from malpractices. If
you attack him constantly, he has to change. This is usually done by
the elders, but in many villages the elders connive with the chief.’’25
When the people of a community want to destool their chief, a case
has to be brought to the Traditional Council, constituted of the para-
mount chief and his subchiefs.26 Removing a chief thus always re-
quires the involvement of other chiefs. This can be complicated. Para-
mount chiefs often have a direct interest in the person who will be
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elected to occupy the village stools, mainly because of their claims to a
share of the villages’ land revenues. But even if paramount chiefs do
not have such an agenda, it is still chiefs judging their fellow chiefs.
Many of the current destoolment charges have in one way or the other
to do with land administration. And often the charges against the
chief-on-trial, such as not using enough stool land revenue for commu-
nity development, are also items of contestation in the villages of the
judging chiefs. Often their personal interest in such cases therefore
stands in the way of objective and impartial judgments. Besides the
fact that other chiefs always have to be involved, an additional obstacle
to destoolment is that, according to customary law, charges cannot be
brought by commoners, but only by the ‘kingmakers’, i.e., those sub-
chiefs and members of the royal family who can also make or enstool
a chief (cf. Hayford 1970: 36). As discussed above, these subchiefs are
often restrained by their proximity to the chief or co-opted and there-
fore not likely to take the lead in actions against the chief. And if they
do dare take action against their chief, this is only ‘‘after many years of
wrongdoing. The chief will first be given the benefit of the doubt.’’27
When you add to those waiting years the years the destoolment proce-
dure itself may take, one can imagine that a chief can alienate a consid-
erable amount of stool land in those years and spend the proceeds as
well.
The main customary checks and balances on chiefs – ruling in coun-
cil with subchiefs and the possibility of destoolment – are thus not very
effective. One can add to this the fact that chiefly accountability is ex-
tremely low. Through a lack of registration most land administration is
concealed. A good chief may account to the people for his administra-
tion on his own accord, but this is an exception rather than the rule.
Some people claim that ‘‘nobody has the right to ask the chief to ac-
count’’28 and ‘‘[I]f it goes wrong, there is nothing to do about it.’’29
This is often explained by the fact that the chief also has his profes-
sional income, and therefore one does not know whether he is spend-
ing personal or stool money. Or it is said that ‘‘the chief does not re-
ceive any remuneration, but he does have job-related expenses, to
which the people do not want to contribute;’’ 30 the chief continues to
bear obligations for which the customary provisions, such as the chief’s
right to portions of skins of wild animals, tributes of fish, and commu-
nal work on his farm, have ceased (Annor 1985: 157; Busia 1951: 44).31
Others claim that to ask a chief to account to the people is considered
a vote of no confidence – ‘‘If a chief does his work well, no one will
ask him to account’’32 – and most people will not dare to do that unless
there are more than clear indications of serious misrule by the chief.
And even then, ‘who is to bell the cat?’ The chief is still a powerful fig-
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ure in most villages and you are sure to bring his wrath upon you by
agitating against him.
Besides by traditional controls, chiefs could also be constrained by
governmental checks and balances. Although such state controls exist
on paper, this chapter discusses in section five under the heading ‘the
political factor’ why they are hardly effective in reality.
Considering the difficulty of resisting the chiefs from re-appropriat-
ing and leasing stool land and the weak accountability of chiefs over
their administration and the revenues, it is worthwhile to examine to
what extent state courts serve as an alternative channel for resistance
to indigenous farmers, families, and communities. As said, this de-
pends on the one hand on people’s access to and the functioning of
state courts, and on the other hand on the decisions reached by these
courts and their execution. These issues will therefore be discussed in
the next two sections.
The court system and its bottlenecks
The Ghanaian court system currently consists of the superior Courts of
Judicature – the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Courts
and the Regional Tribunals – and the lower courts – the Circuit Courts,
Circuit Tribunals, and the Magistrates Courts.33 The Magistrate’s Court
is the lowest level of civil court which hears land cases. In the peri-ur-
ban areas, however, most land cases start in the High Court.34 From
the High Court an appeal lies at the Court of Appeal and from there at
the Supreme Court (Brobbey 2000).
The state courts – especially the Magistrates Courts and the High
Courts – have been in a state of crisis for some years. Although this is
a generally acknowledged fact in Ghana, there is little research on the
functioning of state courts, in particular from a people’s perspective. A
positive exception to this rule is the research done by Crook, who has
undertaken an in-depth study into court use in Ghana, with a survey
among 186 litigants in land cases in Kumasi High Court, 10 in Wa
High Court, and 47 in Goaso Magistrates Court (Crook 2003). The
courts are overwhelmed with the large volume of cases, of which land
cases form a significant proportion.35 Few of these land cases can be
heard or settled within a reasonable time, causing a huge backlog of
unheard cases and long delays for litigants. According to Justice Geor-
gina Wood ‘‘land litigation in Ghana has been found to be a complete
nightmare’’ (Wood 2002: 1). It is a nationwide problem that the rate of
disposal of land cases is far lower than the rate at which these cases
are filed in the courts (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba
2004: 78; Wood 2002).36 According to Wood, for a case to travel
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through the entire hierarchical court structure takes an average mini-
mum of 3-5 years and a maximum of 8-15 years (Wood 2002: 2).37 A
farmer narrates his experience with the court: ‘‘I went to court and it
took more than five or six years. Then the lawyers advised me to settle
the case at home. I was sure that I would win, but there was an injunc-
tion on the cocoa farm and that cost so much that settling would be
cheaper.’’38 The number of times litigants have to come to court is also
problematic. In Crook’s research 40.9% of the respondents said they
had attended court more than 21 times since the case began – often
only for the case to be adjourned without a hearing – 6.1% even claim-
ing they had attended more than 100 times (Crook 2003: 9).
These adjournments are largely caused by lawyers, witnesses or even
parties simply not turning up when their cases are scheduled, or in the
case of lawyers turning up insufficiently prepared.39 But there are also
a number of administrative and procedural problems causing adjourn-
ments and backlogs: insufficient number of judges, caused by unattrac-
tive salary and working conditions; the very small percentage of out-of-
court settlement;40 too much reluctance to bring summonses for atten-
dance and to move cases to be struck out for lack of suit;41 over-opti-
mistic scheduling of hearings – up to 20 or 30 cases a morning; ‘miss-
ing’ dockets, either because of inefficiency or because of corruption by
court staff on behalf of one of the parties; not enough working months
due to long holidays; and parties who do not know when the date and
time of the next hearing is (Crook 2003: 9-10; Wood 2002: 4-9).
An additional obstacle for many people is to gain access to the sys-
tem. Abovementioned bottlenecks of duration of cases and number of
times a litigant has to come to court – usually accompanied by a law-
yer42 – have obvious implications not only for time but also for the
costs.43 In Crook’s research, 70% of the litigants had spent between
Cedis 500.000 and Cedis 5 million. Although he concludes that these
costs are not as out of reach for a family or somebody with a farm or
business as might have been expected, for subsistence farmers this
amount could severely hamper their access to courts.44 Kotey et al.
show that while the costs of initiating land cases is quite low they can
seriously mount up during the case. Some of the litigants are therefore
later unable to continue with the case for financial reasons, again caus-
ing delays, adjournments and backlogs (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond,
and Atuguba 2004: 104).
In addition to the financial aspect, there is also an emotional side to
access. State courts are often said to be remote from the villages, both
in physical and emotional distance. The culture of the court can be
alien, unintelligible, and intimidating for many Ghanaians. Crook qua-
lifies this criticism by stating that, although the core of the legal system
indeed remains the English common law, the courts have been operat-
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ing in Ghana for over a hundred years and their procedures have in
many respects been ‘Ghanaianized.’ The language has also been ad-
justed: whereas the recording is done in English, most hearings are
held in a combination of English and the local language.45 In Crook’s
survey, 82% of the respondents said they had understood the proceed-
ings, and over half of all respondents described the judge in positive
terms.46
With regard to disputes involving a chief, there is another possible
obstacle for bringing such a case to court: state courts have no jurisdic-
tion in a ‘‘cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.’’47 This is interpreted
as any cause, matter, question or dispute relating to the nomination,
election, selection, installation, deposition, or abdication of a chief.48
As a consequence disputes over stool land that are related to charges
for destoolment cannot be dealt with by state courts. In peri-urban Ku-
masi the access to state courts when chiefs are involved is even more
impeded by the appeal of the Asantehene to withdraw all land cases
pending at the state courts, to bring them to his ‘court’ for dispute set-
tlement.49
Nevertheless, in spite of difficulties of access, expense, and delays,
state courts are resorted to by very large numbers of litigants in land
cases (Crook 2003: 5).50 ‘Going to court’ is not only for the rich, power-
ful, or highly educated; a wide range of ordinary citizens use the
courts.51 According to Crook, the main reasons for choosing the state
court are the perceived need for authority and certainty and a suspicion
about the impartiality of arbitration.52 Many people also stated that ar-
bitration cannot be enforced.53 Because of the high number of land
cases, courts are in a position to play a significant role in enhancing
the tenure security of subject-farmers.54 This depends both on the kind
of decisions and the rules of customary law the courts pronounce, and
on the execution of the judgments in the localities. Unfortunately there
seems to be no literature available on the execution of judgments in
Ghana. The fact that execution is not discussed, both in Crook’s re-
search and in some other critical analyses of the functioning of Gha-
naian courts55 seems, however, to imply that execution of judgments is
not a major problem area in Ghana. This chapter will therefore ac-
knowledge the need for further research in that area and leave execu-
tion out of consideration. The next section focuses on the pronounce-
ment of rules of customary law in land cases in the Ghanaian courts,
i.e., on judicial customary law.
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Customary land law in the courts
The state courts are constitutionally endowed with the power to apply
all the rules of law recognized in Ghana, including customary law (arti-
cle 11 of the 1992 Constitution).56 In this section, the application of ju-
dicial customary land law is analyzed. This will show how Ghanaian
courts answer questions regarding competing claims for land by chiefs
and community members; tenure security of usufructuary rights in
land; the power of alienation of these rights; the role of chiefs in land
administration; and their accountability in this process.57 It draws on
reported cases – available up to 1996 and for the Supreme Court up to
200258 – and unreported cases from 1995 until 2004, studied at the
Council for Law Reporting in Accra and collected at law firms in Accra
and Kumasi.59
General Rules
According to state courts, the allodial title to every portion of stool land
in Ghana is vested in one of the customary communities. It is also de-
scribed by such terms as the absolute, final, radical, paramount, or ulti-
mate title. Any community member has the right to occupy a vacant
portion of the stool land to develop a plot ‘‘by cultivating it in one form
or another, by building on it, or using it in any other way in which an
owner would use his land.’’60 The member then acquires an interest,
called the usufructuary,61 determinable, or possessory interest, or the
customary freehold. The term customary freehold is enshrined in var-
ious statutes, such as the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDCL
152). However, in line with the terminology in most dicta, this chapter
uses the term usufructuary interest.
Several cases have held that when it comes to rural and farming
lands, no express grant is required from the community holding the al-
lodial title.62 The members occupy and use the land by implied grant.
With the reduction in the area of vacant land, however, the members
have been subjected to more control (Woodman 1996: 90). In the case
of urban or peri-urban lands where the demand for land is higher and
there is a need for orderly development, it has become relatively com-
mon for members to seek an express grant from the allodial title
holder.63 For instance, in Oblee v. Armah (1958) it was held that:
‘‘the general rule that a stool-subject does not require the con-
sent of his stool, when seeking to occupy vacant stool land, gives
way where the land is outskirt land of an urban area and is ripe
for development. (…) In the case of such lands, express permis-
sion is always required, and limits are set to the extent of land
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which one subject may occupy, in order to maintain proper ad-
ministration of the land and ensure that each subject who re-
quires land to build gets his fair share.’’64
Under certain circumstances, express grants may even be necessary in
respect of some farmlands. In Frimpong v. Poku (1963) the Supreme
Court held that:
‘‘The principle of customary law which says that a subject is
free to cultivate any extent of stool land does not confer on a
subject an unlimited license for indiscriminate cultivation, and a
subject usually obtains the formal permission of the stool for
the purpose. Permission is never refused but it is necessary in
order to enable the stool to keep a check on cultivated areas. In
days gone by when land was plentiful and persons seeking to
cultivate it were few, a subject would be shown a site or would
choose his own site with the approval of the stool, and he could
then extend his cultivation to wherever ‘‘his cutlass could carry
him‘‘ as the saying goes. In modern times, however, it has be-
come necessary to ensure a more equitable distribution of avail-
able land for cultivation and the practice has been for limited
areas to be demarcated for subjects of the stool.’’65
And in Amatei v. Hammond (1981) it was held that:
‘‘where a subject of a stool requires land (…) and engages him-
self in commercial mechanized farming he should be required
to obtain an actual grant in the form of a lease. If such a person
with the necessary resources and equipment is permitted to rely
on this inherent right to clear miles and miles of stool land, it
would not be long when other subjects of the same stool would
be deprived of any share of the land.’’66
Although it has become relatively common for members to seek an ex-
press grant from the allodial title holder, this does not mean that the
creation of the interest is dependent on the obtaining of such a grant
(Woodman 1996: 90-1). There may even be a right to receive that grant
on request.67
Other issues include whether interests created through express
grants differ from interests created through implied grants, and
whether allodial title holders can attach certain conditions to express
grants. In 1951, Jackson J. held in the Kokomlemle Consolidated Cases68
that the ususfructuary title which a subject of the Gbese stool acquires
in Gbese Stool land upon express grant confers upon him only farming
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rights and nothing more. According to Ollennu this case was upheld
by the West African Court of Appeal69 in two cases (Ollennu 1962:
56).70 In Woodman’s opinion, however, these cases did not discuss the
correctness of this part of Jackson J.’s judgment (Woodman 1996: 100-
1). In any case, Jackson J. seems to have erred in his earlier opinion71
and went back on his statement in a later case.72 In this judgment of
1952 he interpreted the subject’s title – which he called farming right –
as follows:
‘‘ (…) which right includes all the incidents of living, whether by
residence on the land by members of the family or by leases of
the land to strangers, i.e. so long as they do not alienate the land
from the stool of which they are subjects.’’73
This judgment seems to represent the current legal opinion. For in-
stance in Thompson v. Mensah counsel for plaintiffs argued that when a
subject obtains an express consent of the stool to occupy stool land, the
stool can prohibit the alienation of the usufructuary title without the
previous consent and concurrence of the stool. But this was not ac-
cepted by Ollennu J., who held that such a condition would be void
and unenforceable, since it is a violation of the subject’s inherent right
to occupy stool land without any burden except the recognition of the
title of the stool which carries with it certain customary services.74 In
Oblee v. Armah Ollennu J. also argued against conditional grants, stat-
ing that ‘‘the rights exercised by a stool-subject over land in his occupa-
tion are not limited by the purpose for which he has acquired the land
or for which it was demarcated in his favor. Thus where a stool-subject
occupies or is granted land for farming purposes he is not thereafter
restricted to farming in his use of the land.’’75 Presumably based on in-
creasing awareness of the need for planning, High Court Kumasi
decided in 1997 that when a subject wanted to change the nature of
the land from agricultural to commercial, he did need an express grant
from the stool.76
In conclusion, areas with pressure on land show a trend from im-
plied to express grants. It seems, however, that according to judicial
customary law allodial title holders do not have the ability to use ex-
press grants to alter the usufructuary interests of community mem-
bers.
Security of Tenure
In many cases it has been asserted that the usufructuary interest is a
potentially perpetual interest: when a usufruct has come into existence,
the stool has no power to grant conflicting rights to anyone else unless
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the interest-holder consents, and the interest is lost only by abandon-
ment, forfeiture, extinction by operation of legislation (compulsory ac-
quisition by the state), because of failure of successors, or with consent
and concurrence of the interest holder.77 For instance in Total Oil Pro-
ducts v. Obeng (1962), a case concerning a lease by a stool to a stranger
of land in the possession of a subject of the stool or his grantee, High
Court Accra stated that this practice was ‘‘absolutely against customary
law.’’78 And in Mansu v. Abboye (1982-3), Francois J.A. held that ‘‘(it is)
a hallowed canon of customary law, that stool subjects in possession
can only be dispossessed of their usufruct in land with their consent or
on proven and unrectified breaches of customary tenure, or upon aban-
donment.’’79 The usufructuary can sue the stool for a declaration of ti-
tle, damages for trespass, or recovery of possession.80
In a few cases it has been suggested that the stool may have some
powers to deprive the usufructuary of his rights (Woodman 1996: 107).
Woodman cites a 1911 case that held that a person who buys land from
the community may dispossess a member on the land in return for
reasonable compensation.81 And a 1949 case held that ‘‘there was
some authority for the view that the cultivator could be compensated
for his trees, after a proper valuation, instead of continuing on the
land. The defense had not however proved that they had such a right
in this case.’’82 Yet according to Woodman, these cases appear to be
contrary to the numerous dicta stressing the security of title.83
Another decision suggests that a community has the power to ex-
change land held by a member.84 In this 1950 case the chief of the Bra-
zilian community of Accra claimed the right to alienate, free of all in-
terests, land which had been cultivated by a member. The case was dis-
missed, because he failed to show a decision by the community to
convey the land. But Coussey J. held:
‘‘If the plaintiff had shown that the elders of the (…) community
had concurred with him in selling land for the benefit of the
community and that they had resolved that in the interests of
the community the defendants’ occupation should be shifted to
three other plots of land, he might have been entitled in certain
circumstances, subject to the defendant’s interest being defined,
to a declaration.’’
In a later similar case (1959) a chief claimed that he could exchange
land in the possession of a subject because the area was laid out for or-
derly development. This was rejected by the court:
‘‘It is difficult to appreciate this argument. Once land has been
granted to a person, it cannot be taken away from him and other
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piece given him in substitution without his consent. The grantor
would be acting unlawfully if, without the consent of the gran-
tee, he should grant the original land to another person, allocat-
ing another piece of land to the original grantee. And the party
to whom a purported grant of such land is made would be guilty
of trespass if he entered upon it without permission of the origi-
nal grantee.’’85
In another case, in 1961, defendants claimed that the people, chief,
and elders of two towns had agreed that no compensation would be
paid for any farms which might be destroyed in the process of raising
a new township. High Court Accra held that such an agreement which
interfered with vested individual private rights is ultra vires. For an indi-
vidual to be deprived of his rights in property it must be shown that he
personally agreed to waive that right.86 In Total Oil Products v. Obeng87
counsel for the plaintiffs raised the point that subjects of a stool tradi-
tionally had an inherent right to the exclusive use of a portion of stool
land in return for war services. Now that subjects are no longer called
upon to lay down their life to acquire or preserve stool land, their
rights to stool land are at the will of the stool. Therefore the stool could
alienate land in the possession and occupation of a subject without re-
ference to the subject-owner. The High Court rejected this argument
and there has been no other attempt to establish that the member
holds at the will of the community (Woodman 1996: 108).
Security of Tenure in Peri-urban Areas
Because of the peri-urban practices as described in earlier sections it is
interesting to look specifically at court cases dealing with land that is
being converted from farmland to residential land. In Baddoo v. Botch-
way (1949) it was held that this change in the category of the land
causes the member’s title to lapse.88 But this decision was based on
the view that a member who received a grant of vacant communal land
from the community was a mere licensee without a power of aliena-
tion, and this would be regarded as bad law today (Woodman 1996:
109). In four cases decided in 1959 and 1961 the same argument was
rejected.89 For instance in Ashieoma v. Bani (1959) it was held that
‘‘the Court of first instance was right in rejecting the alleged custom
by which a landowner was divested of his title when his land became
outskirt land (and) that such a custom would be contrary to natural jus-
tice, equity and good conscience.’’90 However, in 1979 it was suggested
by Edward Wiredu J. in Amatei v. Hammond that these holdings should
be ‘‘looked at again’’:
182 JANINE M. UBINK
‘‘Where an outskirt land in possession of a subject is required
for general development of the community such as for building
a school, lavatory, etc. or where as in this case, the area already
in the occupation of the plaintiff had been carved into building
plots for the use of the general community and the complete
lay-out of the area has changed, I am of the view that the sub-
ject’s prior occupation should give way subject, of course, to pre-
ference being given to him in the allocation of such plots if he
requires one to build or in the alternative another suitable area
given him in place of the one lost and his consent should not be
a prerequisite to the stool taking over control of such an outskirt
land.’’91
And in 1997 High Court Kumasi decided a case where subjects of
Trede protested against the surveying and selling of the land by the re-
gent of Trede.92 Although the court held that the regent could not alie-
nate the land because of a dispute between two stools about the land, it
also stated that the subjects could not ‘‘hold onto their farmland as
farming land when development of Trede reaches that area, as that will
not be in the interest of the community at large.’’ This case does not
make any statements as to procedure, compensation, or division of rev-
enue, but does seem to indicate that consent of the usufructuary is not
necessary for a change of land use.
Despite these few exceptions, it seems fair to conclude with Wood-
man that ‘‘the courts have been unsympathetic to attempts to subordi-
nate the interests of the individual customary freeholder (usufructuary)
to those of the community’’ (Woodman 1996: 109). And even where
the courts did make such exceptions, they posed conditions such as
that the land is required for the general interest of the community and
that the usufructuary would be properly compensated with other land.
Power of Alienation
Under judicial customary law, the holder of a usufructuary interest
may grant a tenancy to be held from the usufructuary as a landlord
(Woodman 1996: 100). The usufructuary may also seek to alienate his
or her usufructuary interest outright (Id: 101). Until 1957, the general
opinion was that alienation of a usufruct from a member to a stranger
required prior consent of the community, and that consent could be gi-
ven conditionally.93 From the 1950s onwards there was a change to-
wards the view that ‘‘usufructuary title can be transferred without the
consent of the real owner, provided that the transfer carries with it an
obligation upon the transferee to recognize the title of the real owner,
and all the incidents of the subject’s right of occupation, including per-
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formance of customary services to the real owner.’’94 The change was
mainly effected in decisions of Ollenu J.,95 whose view was also ex-
pressed in 1961 by the Supreme Court96 and the Privy Council.97 In
this last case Lord Denning held:
‘‘Their Lordships have been referred to a series of decisions in
the Land Court in recent years, affirmed on occasions by the
Court of Appeal, from which it appears that the usufructuary
right of a subject of the stool is not a mere right of farming with
no right to alienate. Native law or custom in Ghana has pro-
gressed so far as to transform the usufructuary right, once it has
been reduced into possession, into an estate or interest in the
land which the subject can use and deal with as his own, so long
as he does not prejudice the right of the paramount stool to its
customary services.’’98
Two decisions went the other way, including a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1960.99 The idea that transfer of the ususfructuary title does
not need the consent of the allodial titleholder, however, came to repre-
sent the dominant view.100 For instance, in 1997 the Court of Appeal
held that:
‘‘(a)ll the text writers and decided authorities agree that it is the
owner of the possessory or ususfructuary or determinable title
to land who has the right of alienation (…) without prior consent
and concurrence of the paramount owner, so long as the aliena-
tion carries with it an obligation to recognize the title of the allo-
dial owner and to perform customary services due to the allodial
stool when called upon.’’101
Interestingly, this was decided not only in cases dealing with transfers
of land for farming purposes, but also for residential purposes102 and
for a cemetery.103
The Chief as Custodian
In most cases it is stated that the allodial title is vested in the ‘stool.’104
It seems incorrect to say that the title is vested in the chief (Danquah
1928: 200; Woodman 1996: 191). However, it has been held that the
chief is a ‘trustee’ or ‘in the position of a trustee.’105 Woodman explains
clearly why this word is ‘‘uninformative, and maybe even misleading’’:
‘‘The word ‘‘trustee‘‘ is a common law term which signifies the
existence of a trust, whereby one title to property, usually the le-
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gal title, is vested in a trustee, and a different, equitable title to
the same property in a beneficiary. Customary law does not dis-
tinguish between legal and equitable interests in land, so clearly
the term cannot be used in that sense here. The meaning closest
to it would be that the interest was vested in the chief, but that
the chief could not validly deal with it without the consent of the
stool council. However, it is not normally said that title is vested
in the chief at all, and indeed some of the authorities comparing
the chief with the trustee state that title is in the stool. Thus the
term trustee appears not to refer to title, but merely to empha-
size the restraints placed on the chief as representative of the
community.’’ (Woodman 1996: 191-2)
It is more accurate to say that the chief, as the leader and principal re-
presentative of the community, is the custodian of stool land. He is re-
quired to act with the advice of the stool council, and failure to do so
constitutes grounds for destoolment. It was long held that although
the chief’s activities are controlled by the council, he cannot be held li-
able for accounts.106 He could, however, be destooled and then re-
quired to render an account. As late as 1981, the Court of Appeal up-
held the rule that chiefs could not be held liable for accounts, even
though Charles Crabbe, J.S.C. admitted that:
‘‘The circumstances of this case require that the appellants, i.e.
the second defendant and the co-defendant, the occupant of the
Kumawu stool, be called upon to account. More so, the co-defen-
dant. I freely admit that his conduct is reprehensible, if not sor-
did. Yet, I am of the view that perhaps the Supreme Court, but
certainly not this court, is the proper forum for the explosion
called for. And at best (…) ‘‘legislation not litigation, is the only
satisfactory way of delimiting the bounds of so complex a sub-
ject.’’’’107
The facts of the case were that the chiefs and kingmakers of Kumawu
in the Ashanti Region had fraudulently claimed and received for them-
selves compensation paid out by the government in respect of acquisi-
tion of Kumawu stool lands. Respondents, all of whom are subjects of
the Kumawu stool, successfully instituted an action at High Court Ku-
masi for the recovery of the compensation. On appeal, the Court of Ap-
peal accepted the trial judge’s findings that the Kumawuhene had per-
petrated fraud on the stool or oman of Kumawu. But it reversed the
High Court decision on the basis of the facts that (1) at customary law,
only a chief could bring an action to recover stool property; the plain-
tiffs, not being chiefs, had no standing to initiate the action; and (2) at
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customary law, a chief could not be taken to court by his subjects and
asked to render accounts.108 The Court of Appeal did not accept the
analogy of family property, in relation to which a previous Court of Ap-
peal had decided that where the family elders for their own selfish rea-
sons were not acting to save family property, other members would be
allowed to litigate to protect such property.109 This was harshly criti-
cized in an article by Fui Tsikata, who claimed that:
‘‘Here was even a stronger case, as findings of fraud were made
against the head and at least one elder. (…) (T)he arguments in-
voked in support of the immunity rule are the need to (1) up-
hold the dignity of the head of family or chief, (2) protect them
from frivolous actions, (3) preserve an area within which the
community can take its own decisions, in its discretion, without
being imposed upon by the courts. Surely, none of these takes
us to the point that if the head of family or chief has fraudu-
lently diverted communal funds into private hands, the courts
will not protect those funds unless the head or chief is deposed.
Anyone who has been involved in organizing against wrong-
doers who are backed by established social connections and
wealth will appreciate what tremendous difficulties the plaintiffs
in this case must have surmounted even to have the action in-
itiated. (…) Any attempt to depose the chief would have con-
fronted infinitely greater obstacles.’’110
He therefore concludes that: ‘‘We submit that the pronouncements of
the Court of Appeal on the customary law rules ought not to be fol-
lowed, and that it should take advantage of the next available opportu-
nity to distance itself from them.’’111
Whereas the Court of Appeal was unwilling to extend the exceptions
adumbrated in Kwan v. Nyieni from family to stool property that was
exactly what the Supreme Court did on appeal in 1991.112 The Supreme
Court had to decide on two main issues: whether the appellants were
competent to bring the action and whether a chief could be held ac-
countable. With regard to the first question the SC held that the appli-
cants were competent to bring the action because:
‘‘the principle in Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] GLR 67, CA providing
exceptions to the general rule that the head of family was the
proper person to initiate suits for recovery of family land was
not confined to land. Under customary law wherever those
clothed with authority to protect family interests failed to do so
but rather formed an unholy alliance or conspiracy to damage
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the interests of the family an urgent situation had to be deemed
to have arisen allowing for a relaxation of rules and permitting
more responsible members of the family to protect the endan-
gered family interests. Since the respondents who should have
protected Kumawu stool revenue formed an unholy alliance to
enrich themselves at the expense of the state, their conduct
which amounted to fraud disabled them from performing their
duty in preserving Kumawu stool revenue. And it could hardly
be expected that they would take steps on their own volition to
refund moneys they had illegally appropriated or rather misap-
propriated. In the circumstances, it was only the plaintiffs who
were the remaining entity capable of championing the rights of
the state. Accordingly, the exceptions to the general rule in Kwan
v. Nyieni (supra) applied to clothe them with capacity.’’113
With regard to the second question, the Supreme Court held that:
‘‘He (the chief) can receive no protection for his illegal conduct
by relying on the traditional immunity from accountability. That
principle cannot be urged as a cloak for fraud. Since it is a statu-
tory imperative that moneys from stool land acquisitions should
be lodged in a designated fund, it would be improper for this
court to overlook a defalcation that illegally subverts this rule.
The principle of non-accountability cannot be projected above
statutory requirements to afford a viable protective umbrella.’’114
Thus, although there is no general statutory provision allowing the
chief to be sued for an account,115 the principle of non-accountability is
overruled when a specific statutory provision – currently found in arti-
cle 267 (2) of the 1992 Constitution and section 2 of the Office of the
Administrator of Stool Lands Act, 1994 (Act 481) – requires the reven-
ue from stool lands to be paid into stool lands accounts.
Courts and peri-urban practice
In this section, we will compare practice in peri-urban Kumasi with ju-
dicial customary law and try to explain the gap between the two. Prac-
tice in peri-urban Kumasi displays the chief as the most powerful actor
in local struggles for land. Chiefs are often able to re-appropriate stool
lands – in which community members have a usufructuary interest –
with the aim of converting this farmland to mainly residential land in
order to lease it to outsiders. As said previously, they try to legitimize
their actions mainly with two discourses. The first discourse says that
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when land can be used in a more profitable way, the chief has the right
to reallocate land and alter its use. The second discourse holds that the
land belongs to the royal family instead of to the whole indigenous
community, and this family can therefore reclaim the land from the
farmers at any time. The second discourse explicitly dismisses any rea-
son for compensating the farmer or using revenues for the welfare of
the community. The first discourse, however, implies that the proceeds
of the conversion are used for community development such as infra-
structural or educational projects. Although most interviewed chiefs ac-
knowledged that they have at least a moral obligation to use part of the
revenue for compensation of the farmer and/or for community devel-
opment, the actual practices differ considerably and on average the
chiefs receive unsatisfactory marks from the villagers.116 Both dis-
courses bring about serious tenure insecurity for the farming commu-
nity members. Attempts to hold chiefs accountable for their adminis-
tration of land and the revenue accruing from the conversions have
proven extremely difficult in the research area.
Land practices in peri-urban Kumasi are not supported by judicial
customary law as described in the preceding section. Customary law in
the Ghanaian courts conveys an image of protection of the interests of
the individual usufructuary against the chiefs’ attempts to re-appropri-
ate stool lands for ‘development’ purposes. First, usufructuary rights
are quite secure. Second, the transfer of the usufructuary title does not
need the consent of the allodial title holder. This seems even to apply
when farmland is transferred for non-farm purposes, such as for hous-
ing or cemetery plots. And even if an express grant were needed to
change land use from agricultural to residential, as was stated in one
court case,117 it seems that the community member has a right to re-
ceive this grant unless overriding communal interests prohibit it.
Thirdly, chiefs can be held accountable for the way they use stool land
revenues, since there is a ‘‘statutory imperative that monies from stool
land acquisitions should be lodged in a designated fund.’’118 What can
be discerned in judicial customary law is a trend towards more power
to the chief as administrator, ensuring sound town planning and more
equal distribution of land through the instrument of express grants.
This trend cannot be interpreted to mean that the chief has the power
to deal with land upon his own volition, without regard for community
interests or compensation for farmers.
This gap between the customary rules as laid out in the Ghanaian
courts and peri-urban practice can be explained by two factors. First,
the difficulties for judges to know what the rules of local customary
law are and to ‘translate’ these rules from the local level to state courts.
This will be called ‘the legal factor.’ Second, the limited effect of judi-
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cial decisions on peri-urban practice due to the political configuration
at local and national level: ‘the political factor.’
The Legal Factor
It is common knowledge that there is often a wide gap between cus-
tomary law as pronounced in the courts – judicial customary law – and
actual local practices (Cf. Allott 1975: 89; Allott 1977: 11; Asante 1969:
100; Chanock 1989: Koesnoe 1985: 105-7; Von Benda-Beckmann
1985b: 77-95; Woodman 1977: 115; Woodman 1996: 46). This gap can
be explained firstly by the difficulty of knowing what the applicable
rule of local customary law is, and secondly by the nature of the state
legal system, which inevitably transforms local customary norms. Inter-
estingly, High Court judge Baffoe Bonny turned the argument around,
saying that: ‘‘what is in the courts is the customary law. Local practice
differs from customary law because of ‘ignorance’ and opportunity.’’119
Both aspects are dealt with below.
The first aspect is the difficulty for a judge to define the applicable
rule of local customary law. Obviously this is difficult because each lo-
cality has its own customary laws, and judges rotate through the coun-
try. But more fundamentally the complication lies in the fact that with-
in one locality there are always variations within and conflicts about
what local customary law is. Customary norms should not be regarded
as the expression of values of the whole group, but rather as represen-
tations of the interests of parts of groups, which are focused into nor-
mative statements to give legitimacy to these partial interests (cf. Cha-
nock 1989: 174).120 This makes it hard for courts to enquire locally
after the appropriate local rule of customary law. For who are to be re-
garded as authoritative experts of customary law? Allot points out that
apart from reasons stemming from their personal or group agenda, ex-
perts may also give a misrepresentation of local customary law because
of a tendency to idealize the law, to present what it ought to be instead
of what it is, and because of the connected failure to appreciate that
the ancient traditional law has been modified by subsequent practice
(Allott 1975: 78). He furthermore shows the ‘‘contrast between the in-
formality, the flexibility, the ‘‘political‘‘ bargaining quality and the un-
predictability of dispute settlement and the precision of the norms
which will be quoted by members of the same society’’ (Allott 1977:
10). Under colonial rule, it was mainly the African ruling groups of
male elders who were able to put their morality forward as ‘custom’
and whose claims were countenanced by courts and administrators
(Chanock 1989: 179, 184; McClendon 1995). Although Ndulo claims
that this ‘male elderly bias’ has not fully disappeared in the post-colo-
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nial period, the protection of farmers’ usufructuary rights against
chiefs qualifies this criticism (Ndulo 1981).
It is equally problematic for judges to deduce, by themselves, the
rules of customary law from local practices. For not only dispute settle-
ment – as Allott points out – but also out-of-dispute-negotiations show
a flexibility and unpredictability, and consist of political bargaining em-
bedded in power relations. Customary law, or rather claims as to what
is local customary law, form only one of the resources used by local ac-
tors in such negotiations over land. So how should a judge deduce
rules of customary law from the outcome of struggles over land, from
local ‘‘customary’’ practices?
This is all connected to the opacity as to who is the lawmaker in cus-
tomary law. Is it the people who by practicing a certain custom turn it
into law, or is there a special role for chiefs in this respect? A Ghanaian
researcher in an interview once said: ‘‘This Asantehene has said that
all land belongs to him and that families and individuals cannot sell
land. So this is now the customary law, which the courts should fol-
low.’’121 On the one hand, custom may confer on some person or body
the authority to legislate. When that power is used, the result could be
regarded as customary law because that is its source of legitimacy. On
the other hand, the Ghanaian Constitution defines the corpus of cus-
tomary law as comprising ‘‘rules of law which by custom are applicable
to particular communities in Ghana.’’122 This seems to indicate that
practice is essential to the creation of customary law, and that its con-
tinued observance is required to keep the norm in being (cf. Allott
1975: 89; Allott 1977: 11). According to S.K.B. Asante:
‘‘this definition postulates an empirical reference for the content
of the law, reaffirming the truism that customary law is
grounded on the customs actually prevailing in the community.
There can be no retreat to a remote and unsullied haven of logi-
cally coherent juristic norms. The very nature of customary law
makes reference to contemporary practice and usage in society
an integral part of the legal process.’’ (Asante 1969: 99)
This brings us to the second legal factor located within the state legal
system, which by its nature inevitably changes local customary law. For
– despite the abovementioned reference to empiricism – in a common
law system, once custom has been settled by judicial decision, its bind-
ing force depends on the doctrine of precedent. Today in the majority
of land cases the courts do not look for local norms and usage, but to
precedent for the rules and principles of customary law (cf. Woodman
1996: 43). A divergence is therefore likely between judicial and local
customary law. High Court judge Baffoe Bonny acknowledges this gap
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by saying that ‘‘even when I know better I am bound to follow case
law.’’123 According to S.K.B. Asante:
‘‘(A) meaningful and scientific clarification, as well as a purpose-
ful application, of contemporary customary law has been me-
naced by a tradition which restricts the orbit of the law to the
narrow confines of authoritative decisions, and strictly commits
decision-makers of today to the dubious wisdom of past experi-
ence. Nowhere is this cleavage between textbook law and social
reality more glaring than in the customary land law of Ghana.’’
(Asante 1969: 100)
Although precedent does not establish a fixed rule in perpetuity,124 the
system does not provide the same amount of flexibility that charac-
terizes local customary law, with its ability to respond to changes in so-
cial reality.125 The system of precedent has the tendency to somewhat
‘freeze’ the law at one stage of its development and complicate further
change (Allott 1975: 95).126 The notion of flexibility of customary law
should, however, be used with caution. It can easily be – and often is –
misused by actors in local power struggles. An instance occurs in this
chapter’s description of how chiefs are trying to legitimate their claims
to land with reference to ‘‘evolved’’ customary law.
The mere imposition of a state court, with the power to impose rules
and to enforce decisions in disputes already transforms the fluid nature
of customary law. Whereas in local dispute settlements customary rules
set the ‘parameters of the dispute’ and the ‘guidelines for decisions’, in
state courts these rules will be strictly applied and imposed (Allott
1975: 73; Chanock 1989: 180; Von Benda-Beckmann 1985a: 78, 87).
Furthermore, state courts cannot capture the ‘processual aspect’ of cus-
tomary law. For instance, African marriage should not be seen as an
event or condition, but as a developing process, with many steps
(Woodman 1977: 117). For a long time, parties are in interim conditions
being neither totally married nor completely single. State courts, how-
ever, will have to decide in a certain case whether a couple was married
or not at a certain point in time. State courts often also ignore local var-
iation. Either due to ignorance, or as a purposeful policy, judges have
gradually integrated customary law over the years, leading to the evolu-
tion of a body of principles which they have proclaimed to be of univer-
sal application in the country (Asante 1969: 101; cf. Koesnoe 1985:
98).127
There are a number of additional reasons why courts have no alter-
native but to establish as judicial customary law rules which are not
identical to local customary norms: 1) it is impossible for the courts to
convert all customary norms into legal rules. They will need to select
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from a large body of customary norms a relatively small number to be
accorded judicial enforcement; 2) when social changes have left the re-
levant norm uncertain, the courts are compelled to act ahead of the
customary norms and make law; 3) developments in other types of law
binding on the courts prevent them from adopting some customary
norms, although these norms may continue to operate in practice. For
instance, the courts cannot recognize a customary marriage contracted
by a person already married under the Marriage Ordinance;128 4) pres-
sures to attempt to produce social change through judicial action are in
practice irresistible;129 and 5) local dispute settlement institutions and
state courts have different procedures, different rules of evidence, and
a conflict at a state court must be formulated to fit the requirements of
‘civil disputes’, whereas in village institutions disputes tend to be for-
mulated in terms of proper behavior and procedures behavior and pro-
cedures (Kludze 1985: 97; Von Benda-Beckmann 1985a: 80-82; Wood-
man 1977).
It is often said that the fact that judges inevitably ‘create’ judicial cus-
tomary law which differs substantially from local customary norms
and local practices can affect the local legitimacy of court decisions (Al-
lott 1975: 89; Allott 1977: 11; Asante 1969: 100; Chanock 1989; Koes-
noe 1985: 105-7; Von Benda-Beckmann 1985b; Woodman 1977: 115;
Woodman 1996: 46). This does not, however, seem to be an important
factor in explaining the gap between court decisions and local practice
in peri-urban Kumasi. In fact, the protection of the usufructuaries by
the courts is in close keeping with the perceptions of many local small-
holders.
The Political Factor
Whether the rules of customary law as pronounced in the courts will
be complied with in the local arena – outside of the direct scope of the
decided case130 – depends to a large extent on the political configura-
tion at both the local and the national level. With regard to the local le-
vel we have already seen that stool land administration is characterized
by chiefs in leading positions and the prominence of customary law.
Local negotiations over land are fluid and intimately tied to fluctuating
social and political relations. Norms and rules are sources of power,
manipulated and used selectively by parties in these negotiations (Cha-
nock 1998; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Mann and Roberts 1991;
Moore 1986; Oomen 2002; Otto 1998; Ranger 1983; Roberts 1979:
182; Von Benda-Beckmann 1979). The critical question is, which actor
or group of actors has the power to issue definitions or is able to mobi-
lize support – from community members, the traditional system, the
state – for its version of customary law. Since chiefs are generally re-
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garded as authorities in the field of customary law and as guardians of
stool land, they are in a strong position to point to ‘custom’ to acquire
and legitimate power over land in the local arena.131
Furthermore we have seen that customary checks and balances on
chiefly functioning have eroded. Theoretically, these checks and bal-
ances are supposed to constrain the chief in his administration of land
and in his use of the pliability of customary law. But as we have seen,
in many localities the customary notion of ruling in council with elders
or subchiefs has been severely eroded, destoolment procedures are
prone to difficulties, and accountability structures are lacking.
Finally, it deserves mentioning that in peri-urban Kumasi knowledge
of state law and court decisions appears to be minimal. During my
fieldwork, people hardly referred to legislation and case law to stake
their claims. And when they did, they often quoted sections that did
not exist: ‘‘It is a constitutional provision that the town receives thirty
percent of stool land revenue’’132; ‘‘Land revenues are supposed to be
divided into thirds, one part to the farmer, one part to the chief who
signs the allocation paper and one part to the town. That is even in the
Constitution.’’133 The ‘shadow of the law’ thus seems minimal in peri-
urban Kumasi.134
With regard to the national level it is worth considering whether the
government shows a clear commitment to curb mismanagement of
stool land or whether they are reluctant to interfere in such matters. It
is clear that the current government is providing hardly any checks
and balances on local land administration. The ‘policy of non-interfer-
ence in chieftaincy affairs’ shows itself in governmental land manage-
ment. The government continually emphasizes the sovereignty of the
chiefs and the fact that land administration rests exclusively in their
hands. An instance is the wording, drafting process, and content of the
National Land Policy – the first comprehensive land policy ever formu-
lated by the Ghanaian government – and its implementing Land Ad-
ministration Program (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 1999; World
Bank 2003a). Public consultation about the formulation of the policy
and the program has been minor and there seems not to have been a
wide and open discussion on the role of chiefs in the administration of
stool land – including the tendency of chiefs to adopt landlord-like po-
sitions – and the possible checks and balances the state can put in
place with regard to stool land administration (Alden Wily and Ham-
mond 2001: 25). The ‘policy of non-interference’ also becomes clear in
general governmental discourse: government officials at all levels regu-
larly proclaim in the media that they will not ‘‘meddle in chieftaincy af-
fairs’’, by which they not only mean chieftaincy disputes, but chiefly
administration in general.135 Administrators, lawmakers, and policy
makers also pay little heed to judicial customary law. They rather leave
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the interpretation of customary law to the locality or follow the practice
of the most powerful local actors, the chiefs. It is not hard to under-
stand that this governmental ‘policy’ gives additional legitimacy to the
chiefs, provides them with ample leeway to administer land the way
they please, and places the power to define customary law squarely in
their hands.
This ‘policy’ is not surprising when one takes into account the politi-
cal power of chiefs, who are still regarded as strongly influential, and
‘‘who are still vote-brokers, especially in the rural areas.’’136 Further-
more, the current tendency to fill chieftaincy positions with highly edu-
cated professionals, blurs the traditional distinction between state elite
and chiefs, and creates new alliances between these two groups. The
elite of the party presently in power, the NPP, is especially closely con-
nected to the chiefs. Not only does it have its stronghold in the Ashanti
Region, with its resilient chiefs, but president Kufuor himself is
through marriage connected to the royal family of the Asantehene.
Many members of the current government, up to those at high levels,
are or have been chiefs or royal family members in their hometowns.137
A clear example of the pro-chieftaincy course of the NPP government
is the current plan to ‘return to the chiefs’ land that the government
has compulsorily acquired over the last decades, but which it has not
yet put to its intended use. This returning to the chiefs is done without
any conditions on the way the land should be used or that its revenue
should be accounted for. In this way the government lacks any consid-
eration for the community members who used to farm or live on this
land.
This chapter does not allow enough space to elaborately discuss the
functioning of state institutions involved in stool land management,
such as the Lands Commission, the Office of the Administrator of
Stool Lands, and the Town and Country Planning Department of the
District Assembly. It suffices here to say that these institutions effectu-
ate little control on chiefly functioning. They are severely hampered by
a combination of factors. Internal factors include the lack of funds,
qualified staff, equipment, and vehicles on the one hand, and misman-
agement and corruption affecting their legitimacy in the eyes of the
people on the other. Externally, the uncooperative behavior of the chiefs
and lack of high-level government support to tackle that behavior also
severely hamper the functioning of state institutions.138
There are two additional ways in which the position of the chiefs is
enhanced by the state. First, local government cannot bypass chiefs in
local land use planning: planning schemes can usually only be drawn
up with the cooperation of, or at least consultation with, the chief;139
and the District Assembly only issues a building permit when the ap-
plicant can present an allocation paper that has been signed by the
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chief. Second, article 267 (5) of the 1992 Constitution could be inter-
preted as enhancing the position of the chief. This article provides that
‘‘no interest in or right over any stool land in Ghana shall be created
which vests in any person or body of persons a freehold interest, how-
soever described.’’ There is considerable controversy as to how this pro-
vision should be interpreted, and whether it means to include custom-
ary freeholds.140 According to Da Rocha and Lodoh, ‘‘the tenor of this
provision is that not even members of a stool, as from 7 January 1993
(commencement date of the 1992 Constitution) acquire a (customary)
freehold interest in any land in Ghana in which the stool holds the al-
lodial title. The provision is however silent on the transfer of existing
freehold interest in such lands. The deduction is that the transfer of
freehold interests in existence prior to 7th January 1993 is not prohib-
ited by the constitutional provision’’ (Da Rocha and Lodoh 1999: 1-2).
Toulmin et al. quote an unpublished court case – The Republic v. Regio-
nal Lands Officer, Ho, ex parte Professor A.K.P. Kludze, 1994141 – in
which the judge as an obiter dictum seemed to confirm that the Consti-
tution prevents any freehold interest being created over stool lands
(DFID 2004: Annex 3). However, in Gyan’s opinion, which was ac-
cepted by the Attorney General’s Office, article 267 (5) does not prohi-
bit the grant of a customary freehold in stool land, where the grantee
or transferee is a subject of the land-owning stool (Gyan 2005).142 The
significance of this discussion lies in the fact that if the Constitution is
interpreted to prevent the creation of customary freeholds ‘‘chiefs could
feel justified in issuing only leases even to their own subjects (…) thus
further eroding the rights of customary landholders and their ability to
resist re-appropriation of customary lands for ‘development’ purposes
by Stools which wish to cash in on peri-urban land values’’ (DFID
2004). Furthermore, it could then be argued that it would be illogical
and unjust if the customary land holder can pass on his/her customary
freehold to a stranger, since that would give the stranger a stronger title
than he/she could get if he/she applied directly to the stool.
Courts as Alternative Channel of Resistance?
In response to the question posed in the introduction, this chapter
shows that courts could serve as an alternative channel of resistance in
individual cases for farmers in peri-urban Ghana whose land is being
re-appropriated by the chief. However, notwithstanding the high num-
ber of land cases in the courts, many more land conflicts never reach
the courts, either because of the lack of access or interest of the ag-
grieved parties, or because they are embedded in ‘chieftaincy affairs’,
for which state courts have no jurisdiction. In peri-urban Kumasi this
is even aggravated by the appeal of the Asantehene to withdraw all land
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cases pending at the state courts, to bring them to his ‘court’ for dis-
pute settlement. In particular, cases dealing with chiefs’ appropriation
of peri-urban farmland for development purposes are only sporadically
dealt with in state courts. Furthermore, court decisions in those cases
that do reach the state courts do not seem to have much effect on local
negotiations for land outside the scope of the decided cases. This is,
firstly, because of the limited knowledge local people have of court deci-
sions. And secondly, as we have seen, a combination of factors at local
and national levels creates an arena for strong local chiefs, hardly con-
strained by local checks and balances, and barely controlled by the gov-
ernment. It is therefore not surprising that chiefs do not comply with
the rules of customary law as set out by the courts that protect the in-
terests of the usufructuary. As said before, customary law is only one
of the resources in local power struggles over land, and a multi-inter-
pretable one.
Notes
1 Ohene is the word for king or chief in (Ashanti-)Twi, the indigenous language of the
Asantes. Within the Ashanti Region each village chief (ohene or odikro) is subordinate to
a paramount chief (omanhene), who again is subordinate to the Asantehene.
2 See for a description of relevant case law the section ‘customary land law in the courts’
in this chapter.
3 Forfeiture results from denial of the landlord’s title.
4 In the villages close to Kumasi, this causes the near total disappearance of farmland,
creating increasing income insecurity for community members. They are no longer able
to grow their own food and generate some income by selling the surplus at the market.
Most of the mainly lowly educated farmers become jobless or resort to petty trading.
The food prices in these communities rise, leading to increased costs of living. Further-
more, locals cannot compete with outsiders with a formal job for a plot of land, making
it very hard for them to find land for residential purposes in their own village. In the vil-
lages further away from Kumasi or the main roads the conversion process is in full
swing, but there some farmland still remains within walking distance. Cf. Berry 2002a:
124; Hammond 2005; Kenton 1999: 31; Similar stories are told for other urban centers
in Ghana, see Abudulai 1996; Abudulai 2002; Alden Wily and Hammond 2001: 12, 36-
40; Hammond 2005; Kasanga et al. 1996; Kasanga and Kotey 2001: 17-18; Maxwell et
al. 1998; Wehrmann 2002: 26-32.
5 Struggles for peri-urban building land are not new. For instance McCaskie in his de-
scription of the expansion of Kumase between 1945 and 1950 already shows the unpre-
cedented struggles over rights in land as people tried to assert title to potentially valuable
building plots (McCaskie 2000a: Ch. V). These struggles were not conducted as exclu-
sive affairs between chiefs. ‘‘Owners and occupiers, squatters and speculators, or indeed
anyone who hoped to cash in on the building boom pitched into battle over rights in
land. The lineages that made up the pre-colonial population fought each other over his-
torical prerogatives and split internally over issues of family or personal control over
prime building sites’’ (p. 214). ‘‘Rights in building land and the income to be gained
from them was a key locus of conflict between chiefship and its opponents in this peri-
od. The objects of groups (…) were to attack chiefly authority by challenging its rights in
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land; to accumulate money from such activities for political and personal use; and – per-
haps above all – to expose to public gaze the corrupt self-interest of the Asantehene and
his associates in profiting from the building boom through their insistence on historic
prerogatives of access to and control over land’’ (p. 219).
6 The terminological question here is a tricky one. Authors use a wide variety of terms
and phrases such as ‘local customs’, ‘living law’, ‘social rules’, ‘social norms which peo-
ple customarily regard as binding upon them’, ‘sociologists customary law’, ‘practiced
customary law’ or ‘contemporary practice in the social process’ (Asante 1969: 99; Ehr-
lich 1936; Oomen 2002; Woodman 1977: 115). Each terminology has its own drawbacks.
This chapter uses the term ‘local customary law’, in contrast with ‘judicial customary
law’, and sees norms of local customary law as one of the resources in the struggles and
negotiations that determine local practices.
7 In my field research not only 11 of the 12 village chiefs were of this opinion, but so were
the Ejisumanhene, a paramount chief in the area, and the Asantehene, according to his
land secretariat. A number of quotes illustrate this: ‘‘The king of Besease has overall
power of the land. (…) It is a law that when the town is growing and it comes to your
farm, you don’t have any land’’ (interview Beseasehene, 11 May 2003); ‘‘It is only the
chief who can lease land for residential purposes’’ (interview Gyaasehene of Ejisuman-
hene, 1 June 2003); ‘‘The chief is the total owner of the whole place’’ (interview Konti-
hene of Ejisumanhene, 1 January 2004); ‘‘It is the chief of the town who allocates land’’
(Interview Asantehene’s secretariat, 10 September 2003); ‘‘When the lands turn profit-
able, they turn back to the stool (interview Asantehene’s land secretariat, 2 July 2003).
At a stakeholder meeting about the construction of an inland port in Boankra, someone
was talking about ‘‘our land’’. This enraged the Ejisumanhene, who grabbed the micro-
phone and said that no one owned land but him (personal communication at workshop
on ‘‘land law and its legal institutions’’, Accra, 5 September 2003). The literature men-
tioned above in note 7 shows that the same kind of claims are made by chiefs of other
peri-urban villages, near Kumasi as well as other towns.
8 Chiefs have played a key role in giving out land to strangers since the rise of cocoa and
cash crop cultivation. See for instance Polly Hill, who writes in 1963 that for at least a
century chiefs in Akim Abuakwa have been selling land to strangers. This concerned
unoccupied portions of land that chiefs could sell in order to pay debts incurred by their
stool. This last condition, however, ‘‘as time went by, was more honored in the breach
than the observance’’ (Hill 1963: 139). Berry shows that the chiefs’ rights to land and
land revenues were already disputed in the early twentieth century: ‘‘Chiefs also had a
penchant for treating cocoa rents as their personal income, rather than public revenue
belonging to the stool, and for selling land or levying their subjects to raise money for li-
tigation (…). Such practices occasioned widespread discontent and contributed directly
to the increasing number of destoolments in the 1920s and 1930s’’ (Berry 1993: 112).
See for literature on the chiefs’ role in giving out land to strangers and chiefs’ contested
rights to land and land revenue also Berry 1997: 1233-1235; Berry 2001; Rathbone 1996.
9 Interview Beseasehene, 11 May 2003.
10 For instance Nana Sir Ofori Atta, the king of Akim Abuakwa during the most important
decades of colonial rule, argued that Akim Abuakwa’s monarchs had taken land by con-
quest; although the royal family had afterwards distributed the land to the divisions,
they never relinquished their ultimate right to this land (Rathbone 1996: 511). The argu-
ment that it was the royal family that ‘‘fought for the land’’ is in contrast with a Gha-
naian proverb which says: ‘‘In the fight, to secure the land and save the stool, no per-
son’s ancestor carried two swords, each carried one’’ – meaning that the ancestors of all
community members including those of the occupant of the stool made equal sacrifices
or contributions to win the land. And therefore each one has an inherent right to occupy
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any portion of it which is not already occupied by another community member (Ollennu
1962: 30).
11 Interview Kontihene of Beseasehene, 23 October 2003.
12 Interview former Akyeamehene subchief of Tikromhene, 7 January 2004.
13 Interview Asantehene’s land secretariat, 2 July 2003.
14 See also chapter 3, p. 59-60.
15 The Unit Committee and the District Assembly are the two lowest levels of local govern-
ment in Ghana.
16 A chief’s throne is called stool. The installation and deposition of a chief are therefore
called ‘enstoolment’ and ‘destoolment’.
17 Interview elder Besease Kontihene, 20 May 2003.
18 Interview elder Besease Kontihene, 20 May 2003.
19 Interview elder Kyidomhene, 7 May 2003.
20 Interview elder Kyidomhene, 22 May 2003.
21 Interview farmer Besease, 27 August 2003.
22 In an interview, prof Kasanga, the Minister of Lands and Forestry until mid 2003, in-
sisted that ‘‘there are enough local checks and balances in the customary systems’’ (in-
terview prof Kasanga, 3 December 2003).
23 Interview Kontihene subchief of Beseasehene, 1 July 2003.
24 Interview Unit Committee member Tikrom, 26 June 2003.
25 Interview Asantehene’s Land Secretariat, 2 July 2003.
26 Due to section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act 1971 (Act 370), which confers exclusive jurisdic-
tion in any ‘cause or matter affecting chieftaincy’ to the Traditional Council, such cases
cannot be taken to the regular state courts, only to the Supreme Court in last instance.
27 Interview Kontihene subchief of Ejisumanhene, 27 May 2003.
28 See a.o. interview ‘father’ of the Beseasehene, 5 June 2003.
29 Interview Gyaasehene subchief of Ejisumanhene, 1 June 2003.
30 Interview Jachiehene, 29 June 2003.
31 A complicating factor in this discussion is that a distinction should be made between
the costs of administration of the stool and a personal emolument for the chief. That the
community should bear the cost for administration of the stool is hardly disputed, but to
what extent should the chief also receive a salary? In colonial times big chiefs received
salaries according to their ‘grade’, but they were simultaneously under an obligation to
account for their revenue through the Native Treasury (Crook 1986: 90-94). Since inde-
pendence, the chiefs have not received any salary from the government, but they do re-
ceive a percentage of stool land revenues from the Office of the Administrator of Stool
Lands. This office disburses stool land revenue in the following proportions: twenty-five
percent to the stool through the traditional authority ‘‘for the maintenance of the stool
in keeping with its status’’; twenty percent to the traditional authority; and fifty-five per-
cent to the District Assembly (Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act 1994 (Act
481)). The wording of this section implies that the twenty percent to the traditional
authority can be regarded as personal emolument for the traditional authority.
32 Interview Okyeame subchief of Beseasehene, 12 June 2003.
33 Courts Act 1993 (Act 459), later amended by the Courts (Amendment) Act 2002 (Act
620). Magistrate Courts were set up only in 2002. Under the 1993 Courts Act the low-
est court was called Community Tribunal and incorporated a lay panel of assessors be-
sides a legally qualified magistrate – if such a person could be found in the area. For in-
stance, in the Upper East Region the tribunal consisted of lay persons only (interview
circuit court judge Wa, 20 July 2001; interview circuit court judge Accra, 7 August
2003). These tribunals were replaced by the amending Act of 2002 by Magistrate Courts
that operate under a single legally qualified judge. The term Magistrates Court is a rever-
sion to an older title, used for the District Courts created in 1958. Since 1993 the Fast
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Track High Courts have been added to the system. These courts differ only in proce-
dures.
34 Until 2002, the Magistrates Courts were limited to cases involving property not exceed-
ing 5 million Cedis in value. In practice this meant that they did not hear any land cases
in the urban and peri-urban areas which routinely started in the High Court. In 2002,
the limit on Magistrates Courts was raised to 50 million, which is hoped to ease some
of the pressure of the High Court. According to Crook, this is however unlikely, since
the pattern of going straight to the High Court has become well entrenched, unless law-
yers begin to advise their clients to use the Magistrates Courts for reasons of speed and
cost (Crook 2003: 2).
35 According to Kotey et al., in the period 1990-2002, land cases made up approximately
30% of all pending cases (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba 2004). According
to Wood, land cases in 1967 already accounted for approximately 50% of the total cases
filed nationally (Wood 2002: 2). In Kumasi High Court, land cases have accounted for
an average of 45% of all cases between 1998 and 2002 (Crook 2003: 2). At the begin-
ning of 2002, the number of land cases pending in the High Courts alone – and only in
first instance, not on appeal – was estimated at 14964 (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and
Atuguba 2004: 67). In a 2003 report it was claimed that there were then about 35000
land disputes before the courts (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003).
36 Crook describes that in the Kumasi High Court the rate at which land cases were being
settled was constantly outstripped by the rate at which new cases were being added each
year, in spite of efforts of the Asantehene since 2000 to withdraw stool land cases from
the courts (Crook 2003: 2).
37 Of 149 land cases documented in Ghanaian law reports between 1961 and 2003, half of
them took more than 4 years to be disposed of. However, 34% of the cases took less
than two years (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba 2004: 90).
38 Interview farmer Besease, 22 May 2003.
39 In some instances, a court action seems a form of harassment calculated to cause the
defendant expense and inconvenience (Crook 2003: 9). ‘‘If you have money you can
‘outlive’ the other’’ (Interview elder Kyidomhene, Besease, 7 May 2003).
40 According to Wood, this only happens in approximately 5% of the cases (Wood 2002: 1).
41 High Court Justice Baffoe Bonny explained this in the following way: ‘‘when I strike out
a case, often the lawyer will come to me the next day and if he has good reasons I have
to reinstate the case. So what is the use? And I can proceed with the case without the
lawyer, but then he will want to read the proceedings the next day. The handwritten
notes therefore have to be typed out, which takes a long time, leading to more delay
than another adjournment’’ (personal communication 5 September 2005).
42 In 94% of the reported cases both plaintiff and defendant were represented by lawyers
(Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba 2004: 113-4). In Crook’s research 96.4% of
the respondents in the High Courts had employed a lawyer as compared to 36.4% of
the litigants in the Magistrates Court (Crook 2003: 11).
43 Besides lawyers’ fees, the costs can include court fees, lost income, travel and accommo-
dation costs, costs of bringing witnesses to court and bribes or speed money.
44 Note that Crook’s data reflect the costs at various points during legal procedures, not ne-
cessarily nearing the end (Crook 2003: 11).
45 In Crook’s research, in Kumasi High Court a combination of Twi and English was used
in 78.3% of the cases. In 13.0% only Twi was spoken, and in 8.7% only English (Crook
2003: 12-13).
46 In Kumasi High Court, 42.5% of the respondents said they could not answer this ques-
tion because they had not started their trial yet (35%) or had not understood the trial
(7.5%). Only 4.4% gave a negative answer, 1.3% a mixed answer, and 51.9% a positive
one (Crook 2003: 13-14).
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47 The jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter relating to chieftaincy is placed exclu-
sively in the hands of the Traditional Councils – consisting of the paramount chiefs and
their subchiefs – and the Regional and National Houses of Chiefs (sections 15 (1), 22 (1),
23 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act 1971 (Act 370); see also chapter 22 of the 1992 Constitu-
tion).
48 Section 117 (1) Courts Act 1993 (Act 459).
49 From a rule of law viewpoint this is a dangerous development, since it leads to the Asan-
tehene – a very important administrator in the field of stool land – as almost the only
‘judge’ in this field. That again could evolve into the Asantehene as the main law-maker,
when his ‘decisions’ would be published and taken as a leitmotiv in other disputes and
administration in general. The Asantehene is currently taping all his dispute settlements,
opening up the possibility of publicizing them in future (interview legal advisor of the
Asantehene, 21 September 2005).
50 Even after being confronted with all the adjournments and delays, 61.2 % of the respon-
dents in Kumasi High Court stated that going to court was worth all the trouble. Female
litigants were the most enthusiastic of all, 70.4% saying the case was worth it. This
might be explained from a deeper dissatisfaction with the – male-biased – traditional
system. Litigants in cases involving unauthorized disposition by a chief or by a stranger
were less satisfied (50%), which according to Crook suggests that in these cases delay is
critical, since land once alienated is difficult to reclaim (Crook 2003: 14-15).
51 As an illustration, of all reported cases between 1961 and 2004, 69% of all plaintiffs
and 73% of all litigants were farmers (Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba 2004:
110-2).
52 These reasons explain why the rate of out-of-court settlement is extremely low in Ghana.
In Kumasi High Court, of the group going straight to court – 52% of the respondents –
33% specifically mentioned the authority of the court as main reason; 28.3% said to be
frustrated by the lack of response of the other party or the unwillingness to reach an
agreement. They therefore saw a court action as a way of using an authoritative force to
get the issue resolved.
53 Of those respondents who went through other forms of dispute settlement before the
court, as many as 73% said that ‘enforcement’ of the judgment was their main reason to
turn to court (Crook 2003: 8).
54 In Crook’s research 12.8 % of the land cases studied dealt with unauthorized disposi-
tions of rights in land by chiefs or strangers (Crook 2003: 6).
55 Such as Kotey, Dowuona-Hammond, and Atuguba 2004 and Wood 2002.
56 The modern legal system of Ghana came into existence in 1876 with the passing of the
Supreme Court Ordinance 1876, which set up a Supreme Court with the power to ad-
minister all the laws of the Gold Coast, including customary law. Until 1916 customary
law had to be proved as a fact, which could be done by calling witnesses or by providing
documentary evidence found in textbooks. In 1916 the doctrine of judicial notice was ac-
cepted in Angu v. Attah ((1916) P.C. ’74-’28, 43 (P.C.)). This decision says that custom-
ary law must be proved in first instance by calling witnesses ‘‘until the particular cus-
toms have, by frequent proof in the courts, become so notorious that the courts will take
judicial notice of them’’. Even if customary law is the indicated law, its application may
be excluded by reason of some other supervening factor. Such factors can be classed un-
der two heads: (i) incompatibility with legislation for the time being in force in the terri-
tory; (ii) repugnancy to natural justice, equity or good conscience. See Allott 1960: 72-
98, 194-5; Allott 1970: 25.
57 This section describes judicial customary land law in entire Ghana, not specifically in
the Ashanti Region. Despite the tendency of courts to unify the various customary laws
(Asante 1969: 101; Koesnoe 1985: 98), certain cases have no bearing on the Ashanti si-
tuation. This section presents a selection of those cases that are most relevant for and
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comparable with the Ashanti situation. Such cases do not abound in Ghanaian case law,
for which a number of explanations can be named. First the fact that in cases involving
unauthorized disposition by a chief or stranger delay is critical, since land once alienated
is difficult to reclaim (Crook 2003: 14-15). The delays in the judicial system might make
state courts an unattractive option for the aggrieved party. Secondly, the farmer often
chooses to resist the buyer instead of the chief. This might also lead to a court case, but
the buyer might also go back to the chief to claim a different plot of land. Thirdly, many
people still do not feel comfortable in suing their own chief. Either because of socio-cul-
tural inhibitions, or because of the chief’s powerful position in the village.
58 The Supreme Court Law Reports 2003/4 have also been published, but I have not been
able to get hold of it during my stay in Ghana.
59 For the selection of relevant cases until 1986, I have benefited strongly from Woodman’s
elaborate analysis of customary land cases in the Ghanaian courts (Woodman 1996).
The Council for Law Reporting is the institution that compiles the Ghana Law Reports.
All courts of superior judicature – High Courts, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court –
send (part of) their decisions to the Council. The author wishes to express her gratitude
to the council’s editor and librarian, for their generous co-operation and discussions, as
well as to the interviewed lawyers, for their insights and case files.
60 Norquaye-Tetteh v. Malm [1959] G.L.R. 368, at 370-71.
61 According to Ollennu ‘‘the word ‘‘usufruct’’ does not appear to be a correct legal term
for this sort of estate in land because it suggests rights and attributes less than really are
the case. The estate in question is both inheritable and alienable and these both negate
the word ‘‘usufruct’’’’ (Ollennu 1962: 10).
62 See Thompson v. Mensah (1957) W.A.L.R. 240 (C.A.); Oblee v. Armah (1958) 3 WALR
484; Bruce v. Quarnor [1959] G.L.R. 292; Akwei v. Awuletey [1960] G.L.R. 231.
63 See for instance Mensah v. Ghana Commercial Bank 1957; Oblee v. Armah (1958) 3
WALR 484; Akwei v. Awuletey [1960] G.L.R. 231; unreported judgment of HC Kumasi,
No. 5/97 of 13 May 1997. But see contra Ameoda v. Pordier ([1962] 1 G.L.R. 200), where
it was held that any ‘‘subject has an inherent right by grant expressed or implied (…) to
occupy portion of the land not already in possession of another, for the purpose of build-
ing, and living thereon, for any lawful purposes including erecting a kraal in rearing cat-
tle, and farming’’. Cf. Ollennu 1962: 32, 55; Woodman 1996: 90.
64 (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 484.
65 [1963] 2 G.L.R. 1.
66 [1981] G.L.R. 300, at 310.
67 See for instance Frimpong v. Poku [1963] 2 G.L.R. 1: ‘‘Permission is never refused (…)’’.
Cf. Woodman 1996: 91, 92.
68 (1951) D.C. (Land) ’48-’51, 312.
69 This court functioned as the Court of Appeal for all British colonies in West Africa from
1928 until 1957.
70 Golightly v. Ashrifie (1955, 14 W.A.C.A. 676) – this was the appeal case of the Kokom-
lemle Consolidated Cases, see note 287; Bannerman v. Bossman (Unreported judgment
of WACA of 27 February 1957, quoted in Ollennu 1962: 56).
71 This was stated explicitly in Kotei v. Asere Stool [1961] G.L.R. 492, at 495; and in Ollen-
nu and Woodman 1985: 60.
72 The consolidated suits W.S. Annan v. P.O. Ankrah, Unreported judgment of the Land
Court delivered 27 October, 1952, quoted in Ollennu 1962: 56.
73 A citation repeated literally in Nyamekye v. Ansah [1989-90] 2 G.L.R. 152.
74 Thompson v. Mensah (1957) W.A.L.R. 240 (C.A.). See also Kotei v. Asere Stool [1961] G.
L.R. 492, at 495. Cf. Ollennu 1962: 55.
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75 (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 484, at 485. Cf. Atta Panyin v. Nana Asani II [1977] 1 G.L.R. 83, at 91:
‘‘For customary law abhors the placing of fetters on a usufructuary title other than the
obligation to provide commutable services’’.
76 Unreported judgment, No. 5/97 of 13 May 1997.
77 Kokomlemle Consolidated Cases (1951) D.C. (Land) ’48-’51, 312; Golightly v. Ashrifi
(1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676; Thompson v. Mensah (1957) W.A.L.R. 240 (C.A.); Ohimen v.
Adjei (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275; Oblee v. Armah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 484; Norquaye-Tetteh v.
Malm [1959] G.L.R. 368; Ameoda v. Pordier [1962] 1 G.L.R. 200; Total Oil Products v.
Obeng [1962] 1 G.L.R. 228, at 237; Bressaah v. Asante [1965] G.L.R. 117 (S.C.); Mansu v.
Abboye [1982-83] G.L.R. 1313; Kwadwo v. Sono [1984-86] G.L.R. 7; Awuah v. Adututu
[1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 191; Nyamekye v. Ansah [1989-90] 2 G.L.R. 152; Unreported judg-
ment H.C. Sekondi No. 3/92, 16 May 1995; Unreported judgment of H.C. Sekondi No.
7/92, 16 October 1995; Unreported judgment of H.C. Ho No. 1/99, 3 May 2000. Cf.
Woodman 1996: 97, 107.
78 [1962] 1 G.L.R. 228, at 237.
79 Mansu v. Abboye [1982-83] G.L.R. 1313, at 1315.
80 Ohimen v. Adjei (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275; Tawiah v. Gyampo (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 293.
81 Amin v. Mensah (1911) Ren. 636, D. & F.C. ’11-’16, 4 (D.C. and F.C.), quoted in Wood-
man 1996: 108.
82 Takyi v. Tettey (1949) D.C. (Land) ’48-’51, 101. Woodman also mentions the case Wutoh
v. Gyebi (1959), reported in Ollennu 1962: 197. In this case it was implied in a passage
from a Native Court judgment cited with apparent approval by the High Court, that a
purchaser from a stool could dispossess the usufructuary in return for reasonable com-
pensation. This passage, however, could be interpreted as suggesting that the consent of
the usufructuary was necessary. This particular point was, however, not in issue in Wu-
toh v. Gyebi, and the judgment can therefore not provide direct authority on such a rule
(Woodman 1996: 108).
83 See above, especially note 294.
84 Azuma III v. Aruna (1950) D.C. (Land) ’48-’51, 258.
85 Bruce v. Quarnor [1959] G.L.R. 292, at 298.
86 Mensah v. Amagyei [1961] 1 G.L.R. 384, at 386.
87 [1962] 1 G.L.R. 228.
88 (1949) D.C. (Land) ’48-’51, 191.
89 Ashiemoa v. Bani [1959] G.L.R. 130; Donkor v. Danso [1959] G.L.R. 147; Bruce v. Quar-
nor [1959] G.L.R. 292; Mensah v. Amagyei [1961] 1 G.L.R. 384.
90 [1950] G.L.R. 130.
91 [1981] G.L.R. 300, at 310.
92 Unreported judgment, No. 98/95 of 18 December 1997.
93 Owiredu v. Moshie (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 11; Golightly v. Ashrifi (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676.
Cf. Woodman 1996: 102.
94 Coussey J. in the unreported judgment of the W.A.C.A., CA No. 107/49 of 15 January
1952, an extract of which appears in Ollennu 1962: 59. Ollennu J. also refers to this de-
cision and quotation in his judgment in Thompson v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 240 (C.
A.) at 249. Cf. Woodman 1996: 102.
95 Ohimen v. Adjei (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275; Thompson v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 240 (C.
A.); Baidoo v. Osei (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 289; Donkor v. Danso [1959] G.L.R. 147; In re Pub-
lic Lands (Leasehold) Ordinance [1959] G.L.R. 163; Norquaye-Tetteh v. Malm [1959] G.L.
R. 368; Ameoda v. Pordier [1962] 1 G.L.R. 200; Total Oil Products v. Obeng [1962] 1 G.
L.R. 228.
96 Asseh v. Anto [1961] 1 G.L.R. 103 (S.C.).
97 Kotei v. Asere Stool [1961] 1 G.L.R. 492, followed by Jiagge J. in Kotey v. Odoi [1962] 1
G.L.R. 347.
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98 Kotei v. Asere Stool [1961] 1 G.L.R. 492 at 495.
99 Buor v. Bekoe [1957] 3 W.AL.R. 26 (a decision of Ollennu J.); Akwei v. Awuletey [1960]
G.L.R. 231 (S.C.). See Woodman 1996: 102.
100 Ollennu’s view was for instance followed in Robertson v. Nii Akramah II (consolidated)
[1973] 1 G.L.R. 445; Atta Panyin v. Nana Asani II [1977] 1 G.L.R. 83; Awuah v. Adututu
[1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 191; Nyamekye v. Ansah [1989-90] 2 G.L.R. 152; Unreported judg-
ment No. 59/95, 10 April 1997. Cf. Da Rocha and Lodoh 1999: 18; Woodman 1996:102.
101 Unreported judgment No. 59/95, 10 April 1997. When the usufructuary rights are alie-
nated to a stranger, proper provision needs to be made for commuting the customary
services. It is the stool whose duty it is to commute the customary services, commuting
is not the responsibility of the subject-transferor. The usual custom is that when a stool
notices a stranger on a portion of the stool land the stool calls upon him to come for
consideration of his case as to whether the stool would admit him to performance of the
customary rites to the stool, or whether the stool would commute the services (Total Oil
Products v. Obeng [1962]1 G.L.R. 228, at 235-6).
102 Robertson v. Nii Akramah II (consolidated) [1973] 1 G.L.R. 445. The case Atta Panyin v.
Nana Asani II ([1977] 1 G.L.R. 83) did not specify the land use of the transferred land,
but since it dealt with land of a whole village, it can be assumed that this included both
farmland and residential land.
103 Nyamekye v. Ansah [1989-90] 2 G.L.R. 152. Cemetery land shares with residential land
the feature of relative permanency.
104 See e.g. Thompson v. Mensah (1957) W.A.L.R. 240 (C.A.); Ohimen v. Adjei (1957) 2 W.
A.L.R. 275; Baidoo v. Osei (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 289; In re Public Lands (Leasehold) Ordi-
nance [1959] G.L.R. 163; Total Oil Products v. Obeng [1962]1 G.L.R. 228; Mansu v. Ab-
boye [1982-83] G.L.R. 1313.
105 Amodu Tijani v. Secretary to the Government of Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.
C., from Nigeria), an extract of which appears in Ollennu 1962 5; Ohimen v. Adjei
(1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275; Unreported judgment of H.C. Ho, No. 1/99, 3 May 2000.
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sentative of custom is (…) a matter of current politics (Chanock 1989: 173-4, 185).
121 Interview researcher KNUST, 30 July 2003.
122 Article 11 (3) of the 1992 Constitution
123 Personal communication, 5 September 2003.
124 In certain cases a court may consider it justifiable to question the reliability of the evi-
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cisions do not establish the customary law on a point beyond possibility of doubt, it is
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of reliability, texts recognized as authoritative by the courts, past decisions of native
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125 Another difference is that whereas changes in local customary law are induced by the
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126 According to Koesnoe, ‘‘(w)hen the English common law was getting similarly fossilized
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the customary law in Africa’’ (Koesnoe 1985: 99).
127 Other state institutions also cling to the fiction of uniformity of customary law. For in-
stance the Lands Commission has been directing land buyers in the Upper West Region
to the local chief, whereas in that area land ownership is separated from chieftaincy and
lies with the tendamba, the earth priest (interview researcher KNUST, 30 July 2003).
128 Doctrines of state law pose that courts are bound not to adopt as customary law any rule
or principle which is contrary to statute or overriding policy – comparable to the ‘repug-
nancy clause’ of the colonial period, which read that courts were bound not to apply any
rule which in its opinion was ‘‘repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience’’
(Ekow Daniels 1991-2: 74-5; Koesnoe 1985: 98).
129 For these attempts the same doctrines can be used as in the preceding footnote.
130 As said before, due to a lack of literature, this chapter does not discuss the execution of
court decisions in Ghana.
131 ‘‘Chiefs coat their actions in custom’’ (interview OASL Kumasi, 27 June 2003). Dr
Adinkrah, a legal scholar and a chief himself, calls this ‘‘the prostitution of customary
law by the chief’’ (Interview Dr Adinkrah, 4 September 2003).
132 Interview member Plot Allocation Committee Besease, 29 May 2003.
133 Interview elder Kyidomhene, 7 May 2003.
134 Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979. Especially the media and NGOs could play a significant
role in awareness creation. Whereas there are hardly any local NGOs working on land
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matters in Ghana, the media are to a certain extent already involved. For instance the
Kumasi based radio station Capital Radio broadcasts a weekly show on land matters and
newspapers regularly comment on court cases.
135 See a.o. Daily Graphic 25 August 2003: 3; Ghanaian Times 5 August 2003: 1, 25 August
2003: 3.
136 Interview District Assembly Ejisu, 12 January 2004. Chiefs are said to be especially in-
fluential in the Ashanti Region with its hierarchical chiefly structure with the Asante-
hene at the top.
137 Due to article 276 (1) of the 1992 Constitution chiefs are not allowed to take part in ac-
tive party politics. Any chief who wishes to do so and seek election to Parliament has to
abdicate his stool. The second clause of this section does however permit a chief to be
appointed to any public office for which he is otherwise qualified.
138 See for a more elaborate discussion of the functioning of these state institutions Ubink
and Quan 2008, in press.
139 In many areas chiefs have even drawn up their own unofficial planning schemes with-
out involving the District Assembly.
140 As said above, this is another way to denote the usufructuary interest.
141 The ratio decidendi of this case was that ‘family lands’ are not subject to the administra-
tive regulations that the Lands Commission imposes on ‘stool lands’, nor are they
caught by article 167 (5) of the 1992 Constitution.
142 He deducts this from a number of factors. First, he implies that the rationale behind the
article was to assure some intergenerational equity, through the prohibition of perma-
nent alienation and resultant loss of stool lands in a manner detrimental to the future
generations of the stool subjects. The grant or existence of the customary freehold is in
no way inconsistent with this policy objective. Secondly, the operative part of article 267
(5) is ‘‘shall be created’’. This does not apply to the subject of the land-owning stool, be-
cause the subject’s entitlement to a customary freehold is inherent and not based on an
act of creation. Thirdly, article 267 (5) starts with the words ‘‘subject to the provisions of
this Constitution’’, which makes provision to read and construe the article in the light of
other provisions of the Constitution. The article should therefore be read and interpreted
in the light of article 267 (1), which provides: ‘‘All stool lands in Ghana shall vest in the
appropriate stool on behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with
customary law and usage’’ (emphasis added). One of the most important customary laws
is that the subject of a stool is entitled as of right to a portion of vacant stool land and
upon such occupation the member acquires the customary freehold. It is most illogical
to fathom an interpretation of article 267 (5) which takes away this time-honored cus-
tomary principle. Had the Constitution sought to make such a radical departure from
an age-old custom and practice, the Constitution would have clearly done so categori-
cally, clearly and unambiguously.
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7 Conclusion: Stool LandManagement and the Quest
for Customary Law
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7. Conclusion: stool land management and the
quest for customary law
Introduction
To analyze the functioning of customary law and traditional rule, this
book describes the management of stool land in peri-urban Kumasi.
The findings presented here, however, hold relevance beyond Kumasi
or Ghana. Throughout the book, literature on other countries in Africa
and occasionally other continents has been studied, both to analyze the
research material at hand, and to draw conclusions from the data.
Many countries, especially within sub-Saharan Africa, but also outside,
are faced with similar issues of commodification of land, weak govern-
ments, increasing inequity in customary land management, and the
role of traditional authorities therein. The conclusions and recommen-
dations therefore have a relevance outside Ghana. Furthermore, the ap-
proach of this research provides insights for legal anthropology, with
regard to the field study of customary law and the official interpretation
and ascertainment of customary norms and rules. These issues – with
which I was confronted during my fieldwork and for which answers
were not sufficiently provided in existing literature – are central for le-
gal anthropologists, working with concepts such as legal pluralism and
living law (Ehrlich 1936; Moore 1973). This concluding chapter starts
with an outline of the main findings of the earlier chapters on custom-
ary stool land management, traditional rule, land policy, state and do-
nor involvement, and court decisions. It then turns to a discussion of
more general insights regarding the study, application, and interpreta-
tion of customary law, before it concludes with a preview of possible ac-
tions to enhance tenure security in peri-urban Kumasi and other parts
of Ghana.
Stool land management in peri-urban Kumasi
Shattering the Myth of Equality
We have seen in this book that peri-urban Kumasi currently witnesses
a growing demand for residential land, triggered by factors such as po-
pulation growth, urban expansion, and remittances by Ghanaians liv-
ing abroad. Especially in the outskirt villages along the major roads
from and to Kumasi, this demand is high, and farmland which is
being cultivated by community members is rapidly being converted to
residential land and being leased or ‘sold’ mainly1 to outsiders. This
process of monetization of land has led to severe debates and struggles
revolving around the question of which actors should be involved in
the decision making and the execution of the conversion and lease of
land to strangers, and the question of revenue division amongst farm-
ers, families, traditional authorities, and the community as a whole.2
Gains largely depend upon the opportunity or ability to initiate sales,
since the undoing of established transactions is often very difficult. In
some villages farmers were able to sell their farmland, but in most vil-
lages chiefs utilized their position as custodian of the land to become
the prime actors in selling land. In many indigenous tenure systems a
traditional leader who administers land is viewed as holding a tenure
in that land, and sometimes the traditional leader is able to convert his
‘administrative estate’ to a personal right (Bruce 1988: 42). This strong
customary position of the chiefs is enhanced by the system of land use
planning, in which local government supports the chiefs’ administra-
tive tools to allocate land, such as their capacity to draw up planning
schemes and demarcate village farmland into residential plots.
Farmers and families who had been working on the land for genera-
tions, lost their farmland and with it their livelihood. When sales led to
disputes between chief and farmer, the position of buyers was also li-
able to suffer. They lost part of the allocated land, were threatened or
assaulted by the aggrieved party, or were asked to pay an additional
sum for the land or for the signing of papers. Sales of residential land
have thus disproportionately benefited the traditional elite at the cost of
small-scale farmers and stranger buyers. Customary tenure in peri-ur-
ban Kumasi does not constitute a guarantee of security for the poor.
The general trends described in peri-urban Kumasi are confirmed by
mounting evidence from other parts of Africa and beyond that the pro-
cesses of commodification of land – whether due to urbanization, im-
migration, population growth, possibilities for logging and mining, or
high quality agricultural land – are restricting access to land for the
poor, increasing the appropriation of land by influential elites, and ex-
acerbating socio-economic inequalities. In these cases also, the winners
are often found among chiefs, elders, and heads of families.3 Since lo-
cal communities are sites of inequalities, measures to strengthen cus-
tomary institutions, and local control to access to land without regulat-
ing checks and balances on local power holders, may actually reinforce
inequality.
A number of authors impute the increased inequality under custom-
ary tenure to the differentiated bargaining positions within a commu-
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nity and the limits of negotiability and ambiguity.4 Although the data
from peri-urban Kumasi endorse both these aspects, too much empha-
sis on negotiability results in an overestimation of people’s agency, and
the image of relatively open, negotiable, and adaptive customary sys-
tems of land tenure obscures the processes of exclusion and class for-
mation. A description of struggles and debates in Besease has shown
that local land contestations range from negotiations in which parties
have more or less equal power, and negotiations within highly unba-
lanced power relations, to unilateral actions in which one party is pre-
sented with a fait accompli regarding an alteration in rights but where
resistance may succeed in changing the outcome to a certain extent, to
unilateral actions in which acts of resistance remain ineffective and the
strongest party imposes a new constellation of rights or even negates
all rights of the weaker party.5 The tendency to call all local dealings
with land ‘negotiations’ is not only incorrect but also dangerous, as it
obscures the stratification of the local communities in which these pro-
cesses take place, overemphasizing the positive aspects of customary te-
nure, while neglecting its injustices. This sends a wrong signal to pol-
icy makers who are currently revaluating customary tenure systems yet
often still lack an eye for issues of social differentiation and equality.
Overemphasizing the negotiability of customary tenure will sustain the
gap between empirical realities of customary land tenure and its char-
acterization in policy debates.
Customary Law and Power
Although many of the chiefs’ current practices in the research area are
diametrically opposed to descriptions of customary law in authoritative
literature, case law, and articles of the Ghanaian Constitution, the
chiefs still claim to act according to customary law, but a different kind
of customary law. Some chiefs claim that the customary rules protect-
ing usufructuary rights in farmland are outdated and need to be ad-
justed to modern circumstances. Communal land that can be used in a
more productive way should therefore, in their opinion, be brought
back into chiefly administration. Other chiefs even fully deny the exis-
tence of any rights of indigenous (non-royal) community members in
stool land. They claim that land belongs to the royal family who had
only given land out for farming purposes to temporary caretakers, who
have no inherent right to this land. The chiefs thus can reclaim it at
any time, without paying compensation.6
Many farmers were highly critical about the land conversions by tra-
ditional authorities and they have tried to confront their leaders and
change their behavior. This was done in various fora ranging from pub-
lic village meetings to private consultations; communicated by locals or
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influential outsiders; and termed in deferential pleas or vehement de-
mands, sometimes even pressed home by acts of violence. Often local
members of the District Assembly and the Unit Committee were cen-
tral figures in the resistance against mismanaging chiefs. The effective-
ness of these actions depended on many factors, not least on the per-
sonality of the chief involved and the power configuration of the local
arena. In general, however, chiefly accountability was low and local
checks and balances feeble. The two main traditional checks on chiefly
functioning, i.e., ruling in council with the elders and the option to
destool a seriously malfunctioning chief, were no longer very effective.
Even development-oriented chiefs who were spending most land reven-
ue, and sometimes even their own funds, on community development
were not overly taken with the idea of accounting for their land man-
agement to the people. Neither were they inclined to reproach other
chiefs for their land administration.7
On account of the prominence of customary law in the field of land
administration, all actors in land struggles have to legitimize their ac-
tions and claims largely with appeals to customary law.8 When circum-
stances change and new opportunities arise, they will try to use the un-
written and somewhat pliable nature of customary law to construct
norms in their own interests. Struggles over land will thus often take
the form of interpretative struggles over meaning in which ‘‘the power
to name’’ can be a highly political issue (Bassett 1993: 21; Shipton and
Goheen 1992: 309-311). The critical question is which actor or group of
actors has the power to issue definitions and is able to mobilize sup-
port – from community members, the traditional system, and the state
– for its version of customary law. Since chiefs are generally regarded
as authorities in the field of customary law and as guardians of stool
land, they are able to point to custom to acquire and legitimate power
over land in the local arena and to resist interference by the state. Cus-
tomary law thus seems not to constrain the conduct of chiefs with re-
gard to land management and is perhaps, to speak with Mamdani,
‘‘not about limiting but rather enabling the power of local native autho-
rities’’ (Mamdani 1996: 109-10). According to Berge, customary law’s
lack of strong defenses of individual rights in a modern society with
land scarcity does not come as a surprise, as the rules on land tenure
were fashioned in a society where there was abundant land (Berge
2006: 16). Where customary rules originally strongly linked the ability
to exercise a right with the fulfillment of obligations (Odgaard 2003:
83), chiefs are currently trying to separate the two, claiming the right
to administer land while neglecting the duty to use it in the best inter-
est of the community (cf. Mtengeti-Mgiro 1991).
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A Policy of Non-interference
Over the years, consecutive governments have taken piecemeal mea-
sures in the area of land use planning, land title registration, issuance
of formally registered leases, and stool land revenue collection. We
have seen that the principal agencies involved in this field, despite their
mandate, in practice do not check customary land management by tra-
ditional authorities. The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands,
The Lands Commission and the District Assembly hardly have any in-
fluence at village level, and local members of the District Assembly
and Unit Committee, who often do play an important role in local de-
bates and struggles for land and revenue, are not backed up by their
superiors at the district level. The failure of these state institutions to
control stool land management is due to a combination of factors: a
lack of chiefly co-operation; limited challenging of the chiefs by Land
Sector Agency (LSA) officials; lack of political support for challenging
actions; LSAs’ lack of funds, staff, and material; and their problems of
mismanagement and corruption. The lack of political support constitu-
tes a ‘policy of non-interference’ with regard to matters involving
chiefs.9
This policy – that should be seen as a deliberate course of the gov-
ernment (cf. Moore 1986: 320) – can be explained by the political
power of chiefs and their close alliances with regional and national po-
litical elites. The political party of the current president, the NPP, is
particularly closely connected to chiefs. The lack of political backing is
justified in state discourse, which continuously emphasizes the sacro-
sanctity of customary land management and chiefly rule in general, as
well as the ability of locals to solve their problems within the traditional
system. Despite frequent indications that local checks and balances
such as ruling in council and destoolment actions are often not very ef-
fective, the government continues to refer to ‘‘the morality of the local
space’’ (Khadiagala 2001: 59) to disclaim the need for external interfer-
ence. Such state discourse and the government’s ‘policy of non-interfer-
ence’ gives chiefs little reason to fear state intervention in land matters.
Moreover, the position of chiefs is even enhanced by the state, through
its tendency to formalize the chiefs’ role in local land use planning. A
clear example is that the District Assembly will only issue a building
permit when the allocation paper carries the signature of the (or a)
chief.10
In 1999 the government of Ghana, after decades of piecemeal legis-
lative and state management measures, formulated its first comprehen-
sive National Land Policy. This was followed in 2003 by a heavily donor
sponsored Land Administration Project (LAP), which included the plan
that the government should divest itself of responsibility for the man-
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agement of stool lands, to be transferred to Customary Land Secretar-
iats (CLSs) under the aegis of traditional authorities. The policy of non-
interference also influences the execution of the CLS component of the
LAP. The implementation of this component in the first years suggests
that the government is reluctant to openly debate, let alone restrict or
control, chiefs’ functioning, which entails a significant risk that govern-
ment will not commit fully to the proclaimed goals of enhancing equity
and accountability in customary land management arrangements. The
above shows that the LAP’s starting point that LSAs do not function ef-
fectively is justified. Nevertheless, the empowerment of chiefs through
the resourcing of CLSs, without enhancing accountability mechanisms
and effective checks and balances, brings a considerable risk that
powerful customary leaders may utilize CLSs to consolidate their politi-
cal control over land, with negative consequences for poorer, less
powerful land users. Although there are isolated cases of spontaneous
good practice (such as Gbawe), and some chiefs express goodwill to-
wards CLSs, land holding community members and other land users
currently lack forms of organization capable of counterbalancing the
power of chieftaincy. In peri-urban areas chiefs can be expected to try
to utilize their new power to convert farmland to residential land and
pocket the bulk of the revenue.11
The LAP teaches some valuable lessons with regard to stately inter-
ventions in the customary legal sector. Strengthening customary tenure
systems should be informed by thorough knowledge of the functioning
of customary systems and go hand in hand with a full consideration of
equity in such interventions. Designing the governance arrangement
for sound customary land management institutions, and determining
how different stakeholders will be empowered and their interests repre-
sented, presents considerable challenges. Implementation requires
strong political will from the side of the government, combined with
perseverance from the donors involved. Simply subsidizing traditional
authorities with material and technical support and hoping for the best
will not provide the basis of a sustainable approach.
Access to Justice through State Courts?
The above shows that the interventions of the Ghanaian government
have not led to an improvement of tenure security for peri-urban farm-
ers. The example of the CLSs shows that governmental policy might
even enhance the position of the chief at the expense of the farmer.
This book poses the question of whether Ghanaian courts can and do
protect the interests of peri-urban farmers. An analysis of published
and unpublished court cases shows that courts have decided firstly that
the usufructuary rights of indigenous farmers are quite secure and can
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in principle not be taken away by the chief. Secondly, the farmer does
not need the consent of the chief as allodial title holder to transfer his/
her rights in land. This seems to apply even when farmland is trans-
ferred for non-farm purposes, such as housing or cemetery plots. And
even if an express grant of the chief were needed to change land use
from agricultural to residential, as was stated in one court case,12 it
seems that the community member has a right to receive this grant un-
less overriding communal interests prohibit it. Thirdly, chiefs can be
held accountable for the way they use stool land revenues, since there
is a ‘‘statutory imperative that moneys from stool land acquisitions
should be lodged in a designated fund.’’ All in all, courts seem to pro-
tect the interests of the individual usufructuary against the chiefs’ at-
tempts to re-appropriate stool lands for residential purposes. There is a
trend in judicial customary law, however, towards giving more power
to the chief in his capacity of administrator, with the goal of ensuring
sound town planning and more equal distribution of land through the
instrument of express grants. Considering the above, this trend cannot
be interpreted to mean that the chief has the power to deal with land
as he pleases, without regard for community interests or compensation
for farmers.13
Hotly debated issues in Africa and beyond centre around access to
courts and the effects of court decisions on local reality. In Ghana, not-
withstanding the high number of land cases in the courts, many more
land disputes never reach the courts, either because of lack of access or
interest of the aggrieved parties, or because they are embedded in
‘chieftaincy affairs’ for which state courts have no jurisdiction (section
15, Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370)). This is especially true in cases deal-
ing with chiefs’ appropriation of peri-urban farmland for development
purposes, which are only sporadically dealt with in state courts.
Furthermore, court decisions do not seem to have much effect on local
negotiations and struggles for land outside the scope of the decided
cases, due to a number of reasons. Firstly, knowledge of state law and
court decisions is extremely limited in the localities. Secondly, local
chiefs are hardly constrained by traditional checks and balances and
are barely controlled by the government and therefore feel little pres-
sure to comply with the rules of customary law, as set out by the
courts, that protect the interests of the usufructuary.14
Traditional Authorities and Their Local Legitimacy
Policy makers often claim the local legitimacy of chiefs as the rationale
for their pro-customary land policies. This coincides with a renewed
policy interest in chieftaincy. A large number of African countries has
been enhancing or formalizing the position of their chiefs since the
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1990s. In the literature the resurgence of chieftaincy is often explained
by either pointing to how international trends of multi-party democ-
racy, decentralization, liberalization policies, and structural adjustment
have opened up new public spaces for traditional leaders, on which
they have aptly and skillfully capitalized, or by pointing to the func-
tions performed – successfully in the authors’ opinion – by chiefs. Both
explanations pay hardly any attention to how people feel about chiefs,
the way they rule, and the institution of chieftaincy. Chieftaincy litera-
ture in general hardly provides any data on people’s perceptions. This
is reflected in the fact that national and international policies on chief-
taincy often do not seem to take into account people’s perceptions.
Chapter 5 discusses popular perceptions in peri-urban Kumasi in a
number of fields, structured around the main functions of the chief as
listed by the people. The chiefs’ land conversions with their severe ef-
fects on the livelihoods of the people, have received strong criticism by
the villagers. In the survey, 43.9% of the interviewees outright rejected
the claim that chiefs can allocate farmland to strangers for residential
purposes.15 Of the 56.1% that did accept this claim, many criticized
harshly the scale of land conversions, the decision-making process, and
the division of revenue. This brought forth the question of how and to
what extent the chiefs’ dealings with land affect people’s views on other
tasks and activities of chiefs and their attitude towards chiefs and chief-
taincy in general. Although chiefs are often said to be seen by local
people as lines to civil authority, in peri-urban Kumasi the chief was re-
garded as only the third or fourth most appropriate actor in the field of
local development projects, behind the Unit Committee and the local
assembly member. The field of law and order showed a stronger but
ambiguous role for chiefs. Whereas village chiefs are considered the
most trusted persons for resolving a dispute,16 chiefs account for only
a minority of dispute settlement institutions resorted to17 and the conti-
nuing conflict over the role which chiefs play in the appropriation of
village lands for sale as urban plots affects their ability to judge local
land cases (cf. Crook et al. 2005: 74-5). With regard to the field of tradi-
tional religion the data showed that most people surveyed were Chris-
tians and Muslims. Although this most likely impacts negatively on
their faith allegiance to the stool, it does not imply a total rejection of
all aspects of traditional religion, and the role of chiefs in its perfor-
mance.
The survey data showed that the assessment of village chiefs is corre-
lated to their ‘style’ of land management. But despite very negative
judgments on chiefly performance in that area, chiefs’ overall perfor-
mance assessments are not overly negative but range from slightly less
than average to good. We have seen that this cannot be attributed to
the performance of chiefs in other fields, and that in order to explain
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we need to make a distinction between the person of the chief and the
institution of chieftaincy. The survey data display that people’s opinion
about chieftaincy hardly depends on the performance of current village
chiefs. Rather, it seems that the institution of chieftaincy carries weight
in and contributes to the assessment of individual chiefs. In peri-urban
Kumasi dissatisfaction with local land administration and anger to-
wards a particular chief hardly seem to lead to discussions of the desir-
ability of the institution of chieftaincy. For the majority, chieftaincy is a
fact. It is almost unthinkable for a village not to have a chief, for who
will represent the community at traditional and cultural festivals, and
at the Asantehene’s palace? As said, the institution should be distin-
guished from the person on the stool. For it is not uncommon for villa-
gers to evaluate and openly disapprove of the performance of their
chief. In peri-urban Kumasi the support for chieftaincy is thus not
based on high satisfaction with the way chiefs perform their tasks. Rea-
sons are rather found in the realms of culture and identity.
This is an important lesson for African governments and interna-
tional policy makers, since it demonstrates that people’s support for
the institution of chieftaincy does not necessarily go hand in hand with
satisfaction with chiefly performance. People can simultaneously sup-
port the institution of chieftaincy and be highly critical of the perfor-
mance of certain chiefs or certain tasks. Whereas governments’ moves
towards more formal recognition of chieftaincy are sensible in coun-
tries where chieftaincy is regarded as a naturalness by most people,
this should not lead to unquestioning acceptance of the way chiefs per-
form all their functions. Policy makers should critically assess chiefly
rule – and popular perceptions of it – in various fields, taking into ac-
count the performance of other actors in these fields, including local
government representatives. Based on such assessments, governments
should determine the desirability to recognize, formalize or enhance,
in a ceremonial or more material form, the various functions of the
chiefs. And if necessary they should place checks and balances on the
functioning of chiefs in general and regulate or control certain fields in
particular.
Default Policy
As said earlier, the events in peri-urban Kumasi do not stand alone.
Many other areas in Africa with a high pressure on land show a se-
verely reduced security of customary tenure, with often a negative role
for chiefs, elders, and heads of families. In these cases often one or
more of the above-mentioned explaining factors are found: traditional
checks and balances have been more or less eroded; the state gives free
rein to chiefs, elders and heads of families; and these traditional autho-
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rities can manipulate the unwritten and somewhat negotiable nature of
customary law to serve their own interests.18 In the face of land compe-
tition and the lack of both traditional and state checks and balances,
the negotiability and ambiguity of customary law mainly serve certain
privileged classes and increase inequity. And this is not a new process
either. Similar events have been described since the colonial period.
The large amount of available literature allows us to conclude that,
when the economy rapidly changes and land becomes a high-priced
commodity, customary systems are often unable to evolve equitably
and the tenure position of local farmers is increasingly precarious.
Despite this crisis in customary land administration, at present the
policy pendulum is swinging towards a more positive view of custom-
ary tenure systems. A return to the local arena as the place of action
matches with the democracy and decentralization discourses, and with
structural adjustment policies that argue for a smaller state, cuts in
public expenditure, and the strengthening of civil society. This trend
seems to a large extent inspired by the practical necessity of starting
from existing systems and by default reasoning: disappointment with
state programs of titling and registration – fed by mainly economic re-
search on the negative effects and the lack of positive results of such
programs – turned the attention of policy makers towards customary
tenure systems. A positive stance towards customary tenure systems
should, however, not be born out of weariness with the alternatives.
Neither should it be based on idealized notions of customary law – of-
ten brought forth by traditional authorities themselves – or stem from
research in areas with abundant land only. Not everything customary is
by definition good. Concerns of equity and power have to be brought
back into the discussion. Policy responses and strategies need to be dif-
ferentiated, based on analyses of whether certain communities do or
do not possess the characteristics and institutions to manage their land
effectively and equitably. If the communities are capable of self-regula-
tion, the recognition of local arrangements in land policies will suffice.
If, however, certain groups or actors experience serious negative conse-
quences for their livelihoods, land policy should not give free rein to lo-
cal leaders, but voice its concern with local developments and seriously
consider a more or less far-reaching governmental intervention.
The quest for customary law
One of the recurring issues in this research is the existence of various
claims as to what are the valid rules of customary law. This book shows
that at present there is no consensus in peri-urban Kumasi on the cus-
tomary norms and rules regulating the conversion and allocation of
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farmland for residential purposes. With a broad brush three main rules
can be painted. Some people claim that it is farmers or families, who
have had secure use rights in the land for generations, who can decide
to convert and sell their farmland, with a marginal administrative role
for the chiefs for the sake of land use planning and central manage-
ment. Chiefs thus have no right to alienate farmland. Others claim that
this power does lie with the chiefs, as they are in the best position to
take care of communal matters, with the implicit or explicit condition
that the chief should act in the best interest of the community. This
set-up requires a well-functioning system of accountability, with des-
toolment as the ultimate sanction. Still others claim that chiefs have
this power because they are the leaders and the owners of the land,
and can therefore use it any way they please, although they are mostly
considered to be under the moral but unenforceable obligation to take
care of communal interests. Not only between but also within these
three groups varying answers can be found regarding questions such
as: Does a chief need prior consent of a farmer to sell? Does a farmer
need prior consent of the chief to sell? On what grounds can consent
be denied? How should the revenue be divided over farmer, chief, and
community?
The above raises the question of how an investigator looking for the
customary norm on allocation of residential land should go about his
or her quest to ‘‘distinguish the real law from that which merely was
claimed to be law’’ (Tamanaha 1997: 102); or should he abandon any
such attempt as futile (Von Benda-Beckmann 1984a: 30)? Most legal
anthropologists share an orientation to the observation of patterns of
actual behavior. For some scholars, such as Malinowski (1926), Ehrlich
(1936), Galanter (1981) and Moore (1978), the relevant behavior was
that of people within the community or social group; whereas for
others, including Hoebel (1954) and Bohannan (1967), the relevant be-
havior was that of the disputing actors or institutions themselves (Ta-
manaha 1997: 101). The first category focused on regularized conduct
or actual patterns of behavior; the second on dispute processing. Both
methodologies offer difficulties for the study of customary norms re-
garding residential land in peri-urban Kumasi. Disputes over residen-
tial land in peri-urban Kumasi are not often dealt with in local dispute
institutions, generally regarded as the main arena for the study of dis-
pute processing, because those who would be supposed to adjudicate,
the chiefs, were a party in most disputes. The study of regularized con-
duct or patterns of behavior also runs into difficulties, since practices in
peri-urban Kumasi show as much variation as the normative state-
ments by the various actors. Peri-urban Kumasi also does not show
much of Holleman’s ‘‘supported’’ forms of law observance and of ‘‘pre-
ventive law care’’, where legal transactions ‘‘take place in the presence
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of the local authority, family heads or interested others who are in a po-
sition, if necessary, to challenge their execution’’ (Holleman 1973: 593-
4). Holleman’s term ‘troubleless cases’ seems anyhow misplaced in
peri-urban Kumasi.
‘‘Direct observation of the rules of custom as they function in actual
life’’ (Malinowski 1926: 125) thus is a complicated activity in circum-
stances of change, conflict and imposition, when customary norms are
contested and the rights and duties of chiefs are part of the debate (cf.
Chanock 1998: 17). Traditional authorities are then excluded as possi-
ble dispute settlers or authoritative presences at legal transactions.
When few legal transactions are ‘troubleless’, all that can readily be stu-
died are instances of struggles and negotiations. Outcomes of these
contestations are determined by the various resources at the disposal of
the parties, of which customary norms are only one. To further compli-
cate things, these norms are often not explicitly referred to and, as said
earlier, ideas about them will differ between various groups (cf. Cha-
nock 1989; Chanock 1998). An anthropological description of custom-
ary law in peri-urban Kumasi thus shows that there are various cus-
tomary norms, both in statements and in practice, regarding the alloca-
tion of residential land and that not one customary rule has
crystallized as generally acceptable.
Whereas researchers can spend a considerable period of time in the
field to come to a real description of customary normative systems in
all their complexity, emphasizing the fluidity and negotiability of cus-
tomary norms, and concluding that no certain rules can be ascertained
from this exercise, both the amount of time invested and the conclu-
sion reached are luxuries officials cannot afford. First, the methodology
of scholars studying local customary law is simply impracticable for of-
ficials. In line with Palmer, it has to be acknowledged that prescrip-
tions about method must carefully distinguish the principal user
groups ‘‘for the complex methods of scholars may be unworkable in
the practical world where investigations must be cost-justified’’ (Palmer
2004: 1). Second, judges instructed to decide cases on the basis of ‘‘the
rules of law which by custom are applicable to customary commu-
nities’’19 do not have the option to ‘‘shift the analytical focus from rules
and outcomes to on-going negotiation and debate’’ (Berry 1997: 1229).
And the new paradigm in national and international natural resource
policy circles, i.e., to build on customary norm systems and local regu-
lation, equally demands from African legislators and policy makers
some broad formulation of customary norms and rules. Whereas Von
Benda-Beckmann rightly criticizes the search for ‘‘the’’ customary law
as a futile venture, an idea that ‘‘can only come up in the confinement
of legalistic doctrines’’ (Von Benda-Beckmann 1984a: 30), officials are
expected to either apply the local customary rule or select and apply
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one of the existing rules (cf. Seidman 1983-4), a choice that will deter-
mine which parties will effectively have certain rights. In the latter si-
tuation, a gap between official customary law (which has selected one
rule) and local practice (following varying rules) is inevitable and has
to be accepted, at least if we want customary law to enter the state
realm.20 The divergence can and should, however, be kept to a mini-
mum by making sure that the official rule is in keeping with the wider
customary normative framework. The next section discusses the possi-
bility of finding normative benchmarks to guide the selection of cus-
tomary rules.
Normative Bench-marks
Many countries that have declared customary law applicable have not
defined what they mean by customary law. Others have provided a defi-
nition – article 11 (3) of the Ghanaian Constitution for instance states
that customary law consists of ‘‘the rules of law which by custom are
applicable to particular communities’’ – but their definitions do not ‘‘in
any way describe any phenomenon of any kind’’ (Mensa-Bonsu 2002-
4: 3). However, for rules to qualify as customary law, it is generally ac-
cepted that they ‘‘must spring from the practices of a particular ethnic
community’’ (id.). But which practices constitute customary law? The
literature is not fully congruent on this topic but displays two often re-
curring requirements: repetition of facts (usus) and a normative mo-
ment (opinio necessitatis) (Allott 1970: 147 and Allott 1977: 11; Elias
1958; Franken 1995: 117-8; Hogue 1906; Mensa-Bonsu 2002-4: 4-6;
Okany 1985: 39; Walker 1980: 328; Weber 1967: 65-7).
Usus exists when a fixed line of behavior is followed by a more or
less constant group of persons for a certain period. This raises the
dilemma of how long certain practices need to be repeated to be able
to speak of usus.21 When very little time is needed to establish usus,
change becomes an intrinsic feature of customary law. This not only
creates problems for examining processes of change as a product of
struggle between different social forces (Amanor 2001: 16), but it
would also mean that any substantial group, by diverging from a cus-
tomary rule, can abolish the rule and create a new one. This would
make it impossible to evaluate whether changed behavior of a majority
group is right or legal according to customary law. This would in fact
deny customary law any normative character. On the other hand, when
the establishment of usus requires long periods of repetition adapta-
tions of customary norms to changing circumstances becomes diffi-
cult.
The second requirement, opinio necessitatis, holds that a custom, in
order to be law, must be commonly believed to be obligatory (Hogue
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1906: 197; Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941: 283-4; Walker 1980: 328; Weber
1967: 65-7). Allott, writing on African law, speaks of rules of behavior
that are not only followed as a matter of practice, but must be followed
as a matter of law (Allott 1970: 147; cf. Elias 1958; Okany 1985: 39).
Can these two requirements be helpful for determining the rules of
customary law in peri-urban Kumasi? We have seen that there is no
usus or fixed line of behavior in peri-urban Kumasi with regard to the
conversion and allocation of residential land. Throughout history, how-
ever, there has been usus with regard to the security of indigenous
farmers’ usufructuary rights. The literature tells ample stories of chiefs
profiting from customary land, but rarely at the expense of the custom-
ary freehold of indigenous community members. They tell, for in-
stance, of chiefs selling unused land at the expense of expansion of
land by current farmers and future generations, with much of the prof-
its flowing to the chiefs; of chiefs posing conditions such as fees and
tribute systems on the use of land for market crop production; and of
chiefs reclaiming land sold to foreigners (Berry 1997; Firmin-Sellers
1995; Fred-Mensah 2000).22 While these actions can have serious con-
sequences for indigenous and stranger farmers, mostly they do not
tamper with the customary freehold itself. In this regard, a rule that a
chief can at his own discretion at any moment decide to terminate a
customary freehold and sell the land in question, does not square with
the historical usus of secure customary freeholds. Such a rule would
rather be in keeping with a strongly feudal system where chiefs can
rule arbitrarily.
With regard to the conversion and allocation of residential land there
is no opinio necessitatis in peri-urban Kumasi. Customary land manage-
ment in general, however, seems to be based on the shared opinion
that a chief should act in the interest of his community. We can find
this norm in various written sources, such as the Constitution,23 case
law,24 and certain literature including that by writers closely related to
chiefs.25 This norm is also often prevalent in local discourse, not in the
least by chiefs and elders themselves, who use it as legitimation of
their power.26 Their reference to this norm of course does not mean
that chiefs always comply with it.27 The ideal system of traditional
checks and balances with its possibility to destool malfunctioning
chiefs also underpins a general norm that chiefs should act in the com-
munal interest. Also here, however, we have seen that practice some-
times differs from the norm. Nevertheless, it seems to be widely be-
lieved that chiefs are obliged to act in the best interest of their commu-
nity.
The selection of customary rules by functionaries such as judges,
dispute settlers, policy makers and lawmakers in situations where local
practices differ should not imply free choice based on the personal pre-
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ferences of the functionaries or on political considerations of how to
structure and control the local. They need to be informed by usus and
opinio necessitatis with regard to related issues, as new rules are path-
dependent and not isolated from the wider customary normative fra-
mework. Judges are under the explicit obligation to do so as they are
told to adjudicate on the basis of customary law, but also legislators
and policy makers who try to build on existing local norms cannot
freely choose between the various practices without regard for the
wider customary normative framework. This is especially relevant in
view of the current trend in national and international land policy to
start from ‘existing realities and systems.’ To make this more concrete,
let us link the somewhat abstract theoretical discussion to the three
broad rules currently found in peri-urban Kumasi on the issue of land
conversions, as described above. These rules vary from much (1) to
some (2) to little (3) recognition of the interests of the indigenous farm-
ers. The third rule, placing full unrestrained power in the hands of the
chiefs, clearly violates the earlier usus of secure customary freeholds
and the opinio necessitatis that chiefs act in the interest of their commu-
nities. This rule tries to form new customary law contrary to the time-
honored principles of customary law. The first and second rule, de-
pending on their specific workings, could fit with these principles of
customary law while also offering space for social evolution and the de-
mands of modernity. The selection of one of these two rules would
thus be in accordance with the wider framework of customary law.
It is difficult to know whether Ghanaian officials in practice follow
these two normative bench-marks, usus and opinio necessitatis. Judges,
to start with one group of officials, almost always base their decisions
on precedent (cf. Woodman 1996: 43). They hardly ever acknowledge
that they are creating or selecting a rule of customary law from the var-
ious existing practices. It is scarcely a topic of discussion among Gha-
naian judges how changes in practice are to be reflected in judicial de-
cisions. Some judges even deny that practice should influence judicial
customary law, as becomes evident in this statement by High Court
judge Baffoe Bonny: ‘‘Even when I know better I am bound to follow
case law.’’28 The few court cases that deal with the conversion and sale
by traditional authorities of communal farmland for developmental
purposes display that courts do not accept the third rule mentioned
above, placing full unrestrained power in the hands of the chiefs. None
of these cases, however, offers an extensive explanation as to how the
judges come to their interpretation of customary law.
It is even more difficult to know how other officials determine what
customary law is. Lawmakers, administrators and policy makers often
do not make explicit how they have come to their decisions. The imple-
mentation of the LAP and the government’s policy of non-interference
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imply, however, that often these officials leave the choice to the locality
and follow the interpretation or practice of the most powerful local ac-
tor. They do not seem to pay much heed to judicial customary law. The
third rule mentioned above, widely adhered to and practiced by tradi-
tional authorities, shows that focusing too much on the local reality
and the current local practices of powerful actors as a guide to deter-
mine customary rules brings the risk of accepting ‘whatever is out
there’ as customary law, regardless of its (in)consistency with the wider
framework of customary law. An overemphasis on the negotiable nat-
ure of customary law can have the same effect, i.e., a de facto recogni-
tion of the outcome of local power struggles. Both approaches will
therefore disproportionately benefit powerful local actors. Although
customary law is to a certain extent negotiable, flexible, and relational
in nature, this book posits that it does have normative content, which
makes it possible to recognize deviations from the norms, even when
they are legitimized with reference to alleged changed norms.
Custom and state: looking ahead
This book has analyzed customary land management in peri-urban Ku-
masi and its determining factors at the level of the locality, district, re-
gion, nation, and international arenas. This multi-level analysis showed
the mutually constitutive relationships between traditional rule and lo-
cal customary law on the one hand, and governmental administration,
official versions of customary law, and state law on the other. We have
seen that the reasons why chiefs can profit from the commodification
of land include the fact that customary law does not constrain them, a
lack of local checks and balances, and the government’s ‘policy of non-
interference.’ This constellation poses the dual question of whether
problems of tenure security that the National Land Policy and the Land
Administration Project aim to tackle can be solved within the sphere of
customary law and chiefly rule and, if so, to what extent and how the
national legal system can play a role in this process.
Let us be brief with regard to the first part of the question: can pro-
blems of tenure security be solved within the sphere of customary law
and chiefly rule? First, the desirability of a transfer of local land man-
agement to governmental authorities can be questioned by the flawed
record of the government of Ghana on various matters of administra-
tion and on land management in particular.29 Such a transfer would
likely result in the dichotomy we see in so many other places: a govern-
ment agency responsible for managing land which cannot possibly do
so, in part because it does not have the required information, while
chiefs go on doing the job, badly or well, but less transparently because
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legal sanction has been withdrawn. Second, the high popular alle-
giance to chieftaincy and the importance of customary law for many
people make it hard to leave these features out of consideration, even if
that would be deemed desirable. This research recognizes customary
law and traditional leadership as realities of political life in contempor-
ary Ghana, and concludes that problems of tenure security have to be
solved in the sphere of customary law and traditional rule. As said be-
fore, this does not mean that the government should uncritically accept
the way chiefs perform all their functions.
This brings us to the second part of the question: to what extent and
how can the national legal system play a role in the enhancement of te-
nure security of customary land? First, this book has shown that only a
small percentage of land conversion cases reaches the state courts, and
decisions in these cases have limited effect outside the scope of the
decided cases. Second, local land management is hardly influenced by
state legislation, as it falls almost exclusively in the realm of customary
law.30 Third, the creation of Land Sector Agencies with a mandate to
check chiefly land management has not been very effective in the local-
ity. It could be said that the main way the state currently influences lo-
cal land management is through some administrative actions, or their
absence, and through its discourse. Examples of the way government
(in)activity influences the local power balance are found in the formali-
zation of the chiefs’ role through the establishment of Customary Land
Secretariats and in land use planning in general; in the policy of non-
interference with its omnipresent discourse; and in the unwillingness
to back up local government representatives in their struggle for equi-
table land management. These examples all communicate the message
that the chiefs have free reign in the field of customary land manage-
ment, unrestricted and often even supported by the state, which will fa-
cilitate the chiefs’ appropriation of communal rights, such as the con-
version of peri-urban land in which community members have usu-
fructuary rights.
The national legal system currently does not operate to guarantee te-
nure security of local smallholders and various recommendations can
be made to affect a change in that area. Access to state courts should
be enhanced and the processing time of cases shortened. Government
should find ways in their administration to back up judicial customary
law outside the realm of the decided cases. For instance, where LAP
documents now talk of the need to clarify the legal interests of usufruc-
tuaries, government could base itself on judicial customary law. With
regard to customary land management in general, and the CLS compo-
nent of LAP in particular, government should spread the message of
the legitimacy of community interests in land and actively propagate
the need for accountability of the chiefs. There is a need to actively
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educate the people and strengthen civil society organizations to em-
power local farmers. This means a break with the current non-interfer-
ence discourse, as ‘the shadow of the state’ is needed for an effective
and equitable functioning of customary tenure systems. In situations
where the customary rule is unclear, government needs to take into ac-
count the whole framework of customary norms, rules and practices,
and should not uncritically accept claims by powerful actors, who are
deviating from that framework, that norms have changed. Government
should no longer favor working with (paramount) chiefs rather than
the people out of administrative efficiency. With regard to land use
planning, which now seems to enhance the position of chiefs through
the formalization of certain procedures, government should aim to in-
crease the participation of villagers in mapping and demarcation exer-
cises. This will foster open discussion of the role and powers of chiefs
and prevent the semblance of state backing for conversions of land by
chiefs. Local initiatives to install a Plot Allocation Committee should be
supported and consolidated by the District Assembly. In line with this,
the activities of representatives of District Assemblies and Unit Com-
mittees in the villages should no longer be suppressed but rather wel-
comed by their superiors. They perform a necessary role in the control
of chiefly land management, and their power is often needed in local
struggles to compel more chiefly accountability. An additional way to
increase chiefly accountability would be to establish a rule that the allo-
cation papers need to state the amount of money, including ‘drink
money’, paid to obtain rights in land. If government were to tackle the
excesses of chiefly land management, this would not only benefit the
smallholder but – although it would provoke serious opposition from
chiefs – it would in the long run even benefit the interests of the chief-
taincy class, as it could help the system as a whole to retain and/or re-
gain the credibility necessary to function.
A number of conditions need to be fulfilled for such measures to be
effective. These include the adequate funding, staffing, training, and
equipping of Land Sector Agencies, local governments, and state
courts; the tackling of problems of mismanagement and corruption
within these institutions; and the existence of high-level political will.
The latter seems to form the greatest challenge of all, especially within
the current pro-chieftaincy NPP government. Here thus lies the role of
international donors to keep their foot down with regard to issues of
chiefly accountability and equity in customary land management. And
if that is unfeasible under the current political constellation, their aim
of poverty alleviation requires them to reconsider their support for pro-
grams that enhance the position of chiefs. Although a study like the
present one cannot be expected to bring fundamental change to the po-
litical arena, it is hoped that the facts and narratives presented here at
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least provide a firm knowledge base to politicians, judges, legislators,
policy makers, and donors, and diminish the risks of these actors to be
misled by misinformation or ignorance.
Notes
1 See chapter 3, footnote 56.
2 See chapter 3 and 4.
3 See chapter 3.
4 See chapter 4.
5 See chapter 4.
6 See chapter 3 at 59-60.
7 Id.
8 To some extent, state legislation and statements by state officials are also used as a local
resource but in general claims are legitimized by referring to customary law.
9 See chapter 2.
10 For other examples see chapter 2.
11 See chapter 2.
12 Unreported judgment, no. 5/97 of 13 May 1997.
13 See chapter 6.
14 Id.
15 N=242.
16 In a survey among 677 respondents, the people most frequently mentioned as ‘trusted a
lot’ were, firstly, village chiefs (62.1%), second family heads (61.4%) and third court
judges (35.4%), with UC chairmen coming a close fourth (34.2%) (Crook et al. 2005: 73-
77). See chapter 5.
17 Out of 153 respondents that said they had personally experienced a land dispute, only
26.1% had turned in first instance to the chief, while 73.9% had initially taken other
roads to settle the issue (Crook et al. 2005: 72). See chapter 5.
18 See chapter 3.
19 Article 11 (3) of the 1992 Constitution.
20 This initial gap will increase when local practices evolve, while the formulated rule con-
tinues to exist in case law, legislation or policy documents.
21 In English law, to be recognized as customary law, a practice must have existed from
time immemorial – a time long settled as 1189, the accession of Richard I. The English
doctrine of immemorially old custom was instituted in the 16thcentury as a new and ef-
fective weapon to limit the operation of custom. According to Plucknett, ‘‘the whole idea
is as artificial as the date of limitation which it set’’ (Plucknett 1948: 293). Ghanaian jur-
isprudence has rejected the notion of ‘time immemorial’ in the first quarter of the
20thcentury when it became realized that customary law was not a variation from some
other law – as in England – but was, for its specified community, the general law applic-
able (Mensah v. Wiaboe (1925), selected judgments of the Divisional Courts of the Gold
Coast Colony 1921-1925, 170: 172, reported in Allott 1970: 152). The test of antiquity
would deny new or changed customs recognition in the courts (Allen 1958: 130; Hooker
1975: 136; Mensa-Bonsu 2002-4: 4-6). Beyond this, no effort has been made in Ghana
to provide an answer to the question how long it takes to establish a rule of customary
law.
22 See chapter 3 for more literature.
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23 Article 267 (1) holds that ‘‘All stool lands in Ghana shall vest in the appropriate stool on
behalf of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law
and usage’’.
24 See chapter 6.
25 Busia 1951; Danquah 1928; Dunn and Robertson 1973: 53; Hayford 1970; Kasanga
2000a; Kasanga 2002; Kwadwo 1994; Ollennu 1962; Pogucki 1962; Sarbah 1968;
Wehrmann 2002.
26 See chapter 3.
27 Some notable examples of chiefs ignoring the needs of their people out of self-interest
are found in Alden Wily and Hammond 2001; Amanor 1999; Berry 1997; DFID 2001;
Dunn and Robertson 1973; Firmin-Sellers 1995; McCaskie 2000b; Rathbone 1996.
28 Personal communication, 5 September 2003.
29 See chapter 2.
30 Areas where the state has expropriated land form an exception to this rule.
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Samenvatting
In het land van de chiefs
Gewoonterecht, grondconflicten en de rol van de staat in peri-urbaan Ghana
Dit proefschrift gaat over gewoonterecht en traditioneel leiderschap in
Ghana. Het bestudeert het functioneren van deze twee instituties aan
de hand van lokaal grondbeheer in gebieden rondom grote steden, zo-
genaamde peri-urbane gebieden. In internationale beleidskringen is
men teruggekomen van het idee dat individuele eigendomsrechten de
panacee zijn voor alle problemen. Gewoonterechtelijk grondbeheer
door traditionele leiders (chiefs) wordt nu aangeprezen als mechanisme
voor algemene toegang tot en zekerheid van rechten op grond. Deze
beleidsverandering valt samen met de liberaliseringsgedachte die sinds
de jaren 90 in zwang is en een geslonken staat en gedecentraliseerd
bestuur propageert.
Deze hernieuwde belangstelling voor gewoonterechtelijk grondbe-
heer, zo betoog ik in hoofdstuk 1, lijkt meer ingegeven door het falen
van projecten en programma’s ter individualisering van grondbezit dan
het resultaat van een positieve keuze op basis van een nauwgezette
analyse van het functioneren van dergelijke beheerssystemen. Zij
strookt namelijk niet met onderzoek dat heeft aangetoond dat in gebie-
den waar grond schaars en waardevol is – ten gevolge van bijvoorbeeld
bevolkingsgroei, de uitbreiding van stedelijke bebouwing, of de ontwik-
keling van nieuwe commercie¨le landbouwsectoren – de rechten van lo-
kale boeren vaak weinig zeker zijn en hun toegang tot grond steeds
verder wordt beperkt. Dit proces leidt geleidelijk tot groeiende ongelijk-
heid in de verdeling van grond en grondopbrengsten en vergroot de so-
ciale differentiatie binnen gemeenschappen.
Dit roept verscheidene vragen op met betrekking tot het functione-
ren van traditionele leiders, en het lokale normatieve systeem, het ge-
woonterecht. Hoe reageren traditionele leiders wanneer grond een
waardevol marktgoed wordt? Welk effect heeft hun bestuur op de ze-
kerheid van rechten op grond en daarmee op het levensonderhoud van
lokale boeren, en tot op welke hoogte kunnen deze boeren lokaal
grondbeheer en traditioneel bestuur beı¨nvloeden? Welke factoren bepa-
len wie de winnaars en verliezers van commercialisering van grond
zijn? Wat voor gevolgen heeft het grondbeheer van de traditionele lei-
ders op hun positie en taken en op het instituut traditioneel leider-
schap? Hoe proberen de verschillende actoren gewoonterecht te gebrui-
ken, vervormen of cree¨ren in dit proces, en welke factoren verklaren
hun (gebrek aan) succes? Hoe, in welke mate en met welke doelstellin-
gen heeft overheidsbeleid door de jaren heen getracht gewoonterechte-
lijk grondbeleid te reguleren, en wat voor effect had dit beleid? Zijn sta-
telijke rechtbanken belangrijke actoren in de opkomende strijd om
grond? Hoe en in welke mate vertaalt internationale beleidsdruk zich
in nationaal beleid? Hoe gaan wetgevers, beleidsmakers en rechters te
werk bij het interpreteren, toepassen en voortbouwen op (lokaal) ge-
woonterecht, waarom doen zij dat zo, en welke normatieve maatstaven
zouden hen kunnen en moeten leiden in dit proces?
Dit boek probeert deze en soortgelijke vragen te beantwoorden aan
de hand van veldwerk in peri-urbaan Ghana. Ook in Ghana heeft in de
laatste decennia een waardetoename en toenemende commercialise-
ring van grond plaatsgevonden. In vergelijking met andere Afrikaanse
landen hebben de traditionele leiders in dit land bovendien een uitzon-
derlijk sterke positie en een overheersende rol in grondbeheer. Daarom
vormt Ghana een geschikte casus om het functioneren van traditioneel
bestuur, gewoonterecht, en gewoonterechtelijke grondsystemen te be-
studeren. Dit is zeker zo in dorpen rondom Kumasi, een sterk uitbrei-
dende stad die het centrum vormt van de Ashanti regio, waar traditio-
neel leiderschap nog meer dan elders in Ghana een levend deel van de
samenleving uitmaakt.
Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op de staat en beschrijft in welke mate, hoe
en met welke doelstellingen Ghanese regeringen door de jaren heen
gewoonterechtelijk grondbeheer door traditionele leiders hebben gere-
guleerd. Zijn er maatregelen genomen om de zekerheid van grond-
rechten van kleine boeren te vergroten en bovengenoemde groeiende
ongelijkheid in de verdeling van grond en grondopbrengsten tegen te
gaan? En zo ja, hoe effectief waren deze maatregelen? Het hoofdstuk
beschrijft eerst de geschiedenis, de juridische mandaten en het daad-
werkelijk functioneren van verschillende statelijke instituten op dit
vlak, zoals de Lands Commission en de Office of the Administrator of Stool
Lands. Het laat zien dat zij, ondanks hun juridisch mandaat, in werke-
lijkheid weinig controle hebben uitgeoefend op gewoonterechtelijk
grondbeheer. Dit kan worden verklaard door de gebrekkige medewer-
king van traditionele leiders; de beperkte bereidheid van ambtenaren
om lokale misstanden aan te vechten; het ontbreken van daadwerke-
lijke politieke steun voor bestuurlijke controle op traditioneel grond-
beheer; de financie¨le, materie¨le en personele tekorten bij de statelijke
instituten; en hun problemen op het gebied van corruptie en wanbe-
stuur.
Het gebrek aan politieke steun, dat ook duidelijk naar voren komt in
het statelijke discours in de media en in beleidsstukken, vormt een im-
pliciet non-interventie beleid met betrekking tot traditioneel leider-
schap. Dit beleid beı¨nvloedt ook de uitvoering van het Land Admini-
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stration Project Ghana, een in 2003 met steun van verscheidene inter-
nationale donoren opgesteld lange termijn overheidsprogramma om
Ghana’s grondbeheer te hervormen tot een rechtvaardig en zeker sys-
teem. Het deelprogramma dat zich richt op de hervorming van de ge-
woonterechtelijke sector wordt geconfronteerd met problemen van ge-
vestigde belangen van traditionele leiders, gebrek aan middelen, en de
afwezigheid van een openbaar debat over het type instituties dat nodig
is voor een rechtvaardig grondbeheer. Het project beoogt om de be-
voegdheden van statelijke instituten met betrekking tot traditioneel
grondbeheer over te dragen naar lokale secretariaten (Customary Land
Secretariats) onder toezicht van traditionele leiders. Dit lijkt de eenvou-
dige grondgebruikers echter eerder rechten te ontnemen dan deze te
versterken. Er is een aanzienlijk risico dat de overheid zich niet vol-
doende zal inzetten voor het inbouwen van juridische en politieke con-
trolemechanismen. Kleine grondgebruikers hebben vaak niet de beno-
digde organisatiegraad om tegenwicht te bieden aan de macht van de
traditionele leiders. Het versterken van de positie van deze leiders door
middel van het financieren van lokale secretariaten zonder bepaalde
controlemechanismen te bevorderen leidt tot een aanzienlijk risico dat
machtige traditionele leiders de lokale secretariaten zullen gebruiken
om hun politieke macht over grond te consolideren, met alle negatieve
gevolgen voor armere, kwetsbaardere grondgebruikers van dien.
De veldwerkdata die worden besproken in hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat
in peri-urbaan Kumasi sprake is van een crisis in gewoonterechtelijk
grondbeheer, doordat traditionele leiders rijk worden van de omzetting
en verkoop van landbouwgrond – die in bezit was van lokale boeren –
voor woningbouw. Dit roept de vraag op hoe traditionele leiders de situ-
atie zo naar hun hand kunnen zetten en waarom de veelvuldige en
veelzijdige tegenstand van lokale boeren vaak zo weinig effectief is. In
dit hoofdstuk wijs ik op een aantal verklarende factoren die respectieve-
lijk in het traditionele systeem zelf en in de interactie met de staat lig-
gen. De combinatie van erosie van gewoonterechtelijke controlemecha-
nismen en het non-interventie beleid van de overheid met betrekking
tot traditioneel leiderschap heeft het fragiele evenwicht tussen traditio-
nele leiders en het volk verstoord. Dit heeft de traditionele leiders de
macht gegeven om hun prominente positie als hoeder van de grond en
experts in het gewoonterechtelijke domein te misbruiken en gewoonte-
recht te manipuleren om hun claims te legitimeren.
Er lijkt voldoende bewijs om te stellen dat de gebeurtenissen in peri-
urbaan Kumasi geen uitzondering zijn. Ook veel andere gebieden in
Afrika waar grond schaars is, laten een aantasting van zekerheid van
grondenrechten zien, waarbij traditionele leiders vaak een negatieve rol
spelen. Ondanks deze wijdverbreide crisis in gewoonterechtelijk grond-
beheer vertoont internationaal beleid, zoals gezegd, momenteel her-
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nieuwde belangstelling voor dergelijke lokale systemen. Dit hoofdstuk
waarschuwt dat een positieve houding ten opzichte van gewoonterech-
telijke systemen niet zou moeten voortvloeien uit teleurstelling over de
staat, noch gebaseerd zou moeten zijn op geı¨dealiseerde ideee¨n over
gewoonterecht. Zij behoeft een solide onderbouwing vanuit kennis van
het functioneren van gewoonterechtelijke systemen van grondbeheer
in hedendaagse omstandigheden.
Een dergelijke solide onderbouwing wordt echter bemoeilijkt doordat
er twee nogal gescheiden stromingen van onderzoek naar grondbeheer
bestaan. De eerste stroming concentreert zich grotendeels op economi-
sche aspecten zoals investeringen in en productiviteit van grond en ver-
gelijkt de economische effecten van respectievelijk statelijke en ge-
woonterechtelijke systemen van grondbeheer. De tweede stroming be-
studeert gewoonterechtelijk grondbeheer en grondbezit voornamelijk
als sociale processen. Deze onderzoekers doen meestal langdurig antro-
pologisch veldwerk naar grondbeheer en de sociale systemen waarin
dit plaatsvindt. Zij zijn gericht op de lokale arena en benadrukken de
ambiguı¨teit en onderhandelbaarheid van rechten op grond. Waar de
eerste stroming in constante dialoog is met nationale en internationale
beleidsmakers, stonden onderzoekers van de tweede stroming daar lan-
ge tijd nogal terughoudend tegenover. Deze tweede stroming, met haar
diepgaande analyse van het functioneren van gewoonterechtelijke
grondsystemen, is echter onmisbaar voor het maken van goed geı¨nfor-
meerd beleid. Enige meer recente literatuur probeert het gat te dichten
en kennis over lokaal grondbeheer te koppelen aan informatie over ef-
fecten van statelijke en internationale wetgeving, beleid en discours.
Dit hoofdstuk onderschrijft het belang van dergelijke literatuur en be-
oogt eraan bij te dragen.
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een gedetailleerde analyse van de strijd om rech-
ten op grond tussen verscheidene lokale actoren in het dorp Besease.
Deze rechten omvatten achtereenvolgens het recht grond te verkopen,
de overdrachtspapieren te tekenen, en de opbrengsten van de transactie
te ontvangen. Aangezien in dit dorp vier traditionele leiders ieder een
deel van de dorpsgrond besturen, vormt Besease vier casussen in e´e´n.
Deze casussen maken duidelijk dat ook in Besease de traditionele elite
disproportioneel profiteert van de verkoop van grond voor woningbouw
ten koste van kleine boeren en kopers. Zij laten zien dat traditionele
leiders niet alleen een sterke positie hebben doordat het gewoonterech-
telijke systeem hen aanwijst als bestuurders van de grond, maar ook
doordat zij de bestuurlijke instrumenten hebben om, vaak met instem-
ming van het ambtenarenapparaat op district- en regioniveau, bestem-
mingsplannen op te stellen en dorpsgrond te verdelen in percelen voor
woningbouw.
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Dit hoofdstuk trekt het nut en de bruikbaarheid in twijfel van de hui-
dige trend in de literatuur om alle lokale veranderingen in rechten op
grond te beschrijven als het resultaat van ‘onderhandelingen’ (negotia-
tions). De data van Besease laten immers zien dat het geregeld voor-
komt dat e´e´n van de partijen zijn macht gebruikt om de rechten van
de ander volledig te ontkennen of herdefinie¨ren. Te grote nadruk op de
onderhandelbaarheid van lokale rechten op grond leidt tot een over-
schatting van de manoeuvreerruimte van zwakkere partijen. Het beeld
van een relatief open, onderhandelbaar en aanpasbaar systeem van ge-
woonterechtelijk grondbeheer versluiert processen van uitsluiting en
klassevorming en leidt er vaak toe dat men vergeet te vragen wie er
wint en wie er verliest bij veranderingen. Bij de beoordeling van ge-
woonterechtelijk grondbeheer en de beleidsbeslissing dergelijke syste-
men te erkennen of te versterken moeten lokale stratificatie en machts-
verschillen in het oog gehouden worden. De positie van kwetsbare
groepen verbetert niet per definitie door maatregelen die gewoonte-
rechtelijke instituten en lokaal beheer van toegang tot grond verster-
ken. Wanneer zij niet vergezeld gaan van maatregelen die de macht
van lokale bestuurders aan banden leggen, kunnen zij de bestaande lo-
kale ongelijkheid juist versterken.
Hoofdstuk 5 stelt de vraag aan de orde wat voor gevolgen het grond-
beheer van de traditionele leiders heeft op lokale percepties van hun
positie en taken en van het instituut van traditioneel leiderschap. Dit is
een relevante vraag gezien de eerder genoemde hernieuwde interesse
van Afrikaanse overheden, internationale instellingen en donoren in
traditioneel leiderschap. Deze hernieuwde belangstelling wordt door
sommigen verklaard vanuit het functioneren of disfunctioneren van de
postkoloniale staten en het ontstaan van nieuwe publieke ruimte ten
gevolge van meerpartijendemocratie, decentralisatie en liberaliserings-
beleid. Anderen verwijzen naar de functies die traditionele leiders
(kunnen) verrichten in hun gemeenschappen. Beide verklaringen be-
steden nauwelijks aandacht aan hoe lokale mensen denken over hun
traditionele leiders, hun bestuurlijke prestaties en het instituut van tra-
ditioneel leiderschap. Dat is niet verwonderlijk, aangezien er hierover
zeer weinig data bekend zijn. Empirisch onderzoek naar percepties van
dorpelingen kan echter bijdragen aan een genuanceerder beeld van de
lokale rol van en waardering voor traditionele leiders, en derhalve van
belang zijn voor nationale en internationale beleidsmakers.
In dit hoofdstuk worden daarom de percepties beschreven van dor-
pelingen uit twaalf dorpen in peri-urbaan Kumasi, met betrekking tot
de door hen genoemde belangrijkste functies van de traditionele lei-
ders. Deze functies zijn in 4 groepen onderverdeeld: 1) grondbeheer; 2)
lokale ontwikkelingsprojecten; 3) rechtspraak en ordehandhaving; en 4)
traditionele religie. De surveydata laten zien dat de alom aanwezige
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steun voor het instituut van traditioneel leiderschap niet noodzakelijk
voortvloeit uit of zelfs maar samengaat met tevredenheid over de be-
stuurlijke prestaties van traditionele leiders. De steun lijkt eerder te
moeten worden verklaard vanuit het domein van de cultuur en identi-
teit. Mensen kunnen dus tegelijkertijd het instituut steunen, bijvoor-
beeld omdat zij het noodzakelijk vinden dat het dorp bij traditionele en
culturele ceremonie¨n wordt vertegenwoordigd door een traditionele lei-
der, en uitermate kritisch zijn over de verrichtingen van bepaalde lei-
ders of de uitvoer van bepaalde taken. Wanneer overheden besluiten
tot een meer formele erkenning van traditioneel leiderschap, zou dat
dus niet moeten samengaan met een kritiekloze acceptatie van de ma-
nier waarop traditionele leiders al hun taken uitvoeren. Beleidsmakers
moeten rekening houden met het daadwerkelijk functioneren van tra-
ditionele leiders – en de lokale percepties daarvan – en op basis daar-
van besluiten bepaalde functies geheel aan de lokale leiders over te la-
ten, maar andere te controleren of aan banden te leggen.
De rol van statelijke rechtbanken als toetsingsinstantie van de recht-
matigheid van gewoonterechtelijk grondbeheer vormt het onderwerp
van hoofdstuk 6. Uit de Ghanese jurisprudentie komt een beeld naar
voren van bescherming van de gebruiksrechten van de kleine inheemse
boer tegen pogingen van traditionele leiders om zich gemeenschaps-
grond toe te eigenen en te verkopen voor huisvestingsdoeleinden. In
de jurisprudentie is bovendien bepaald dat traditionele leiders verant-
woording verschuldigd zijn voor de besteding van opbrengsten uit ge-
meenschapsgrond. Er is wel een trend waarneembaar in de jurispru-
dentie om traditionele leiders meer bestuurlijke bevoegdheden toe te
kennen, maar die kan niet zo worden geı¨nterpreteerd dat zij gemeen-
schapsgrond geheel naar eigen wens kunnen beheren zonder rekening
te houden met gemeenschapsbelangen en compensatie voor boeren.
De praktijk van grondbeheer in peri-urbaan Kumasi wijkt beduidend
af van de rechterlijke interpretatie van gewoonterecht ten aanzien van
grondbeheer. Dit wijst erop dat het effect van rechterlijke uitspraken
op de dagelijkse realiteit beperkt is. Hoewel er enorme aantallen grond-
zaken worden behandeld in de rechtbanken, gaan slechts enkele daar-
van over bovenstaande problematiek. De meeste geschillen over toe-
eigening, omzetting en verkoop van gemeenschapsgrond door traditio-
nele leiders bereiken de rechtbanken niet, hetzij vanwege gebrekkige
toegang tot het rechtssysteem of ontbreken van interesse bij de par-
tijen, hetzij omdat deze conflicten deel uitmaken van conflicten over
‘‘chieftaincy affairs’’ waarin de statelijke rechtbanken geen jurisdictie
hebben. Daarnaast lijken rechterlijke uitspraken vanwege een aantal
factoren weinig effect te hebben op grondconflicten buiten de speci-
fieke zaken waarin de uitspraken zijn gedaan. Ten eerste lijkt de kennis
die dorpelingen hebben van rechterlijke uitspraken minimaal te zijn in
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peri-urbaan Kumasi. Ten tweede hebben we gezien dat traditionele lei-
ders worden beschouwd als autoriteiten op het gebied van gewoonte-
recht en hoeders van de communale grond en zich daardoor in een ui-
termate geschikte positie bevinden om gewoonterecht in hun voordeel
te interpreteren. Wanneer we hierbij de eerder genoemde erosie van lo-
kale controlemechanismen en het gebrek aan statelijke controle op tra-
ditionele leiders optellen, verrast het niet dat zij zich weinig gelegen la-
ten liggen aan de rechterlijke uitspraken die de rechten van de kleine
boer beschermen.
De besproken hoofdstukken laten zien dat er verschillende versies
van gewoonterecht onderscheiden moeten worden. In de dorpen leven
uiteenlopende ideee¨n over wat het lokale gewoonterecht is. Deze idee-
en worden niet alleen verwoord in normatieve uitspraken, maar ook
daadwerkelijk in praktijk gebracht. Naast deze verschillende versies van
lokaal gewoonterecht – of verschillende beweringen wat het lokale ge-
woonterecht is – cree¨ren rechters hun eigen versie van gewoonterecht,
ook wel ‘rechters gewoonterecht’ genoemd. Hoewel van wetgevers, be-
leidsmakers en openbaar bestuurders verwacht mag worden dat zij
deze rechtersversie volgen, blijken zij in de praktijk vaak hun eigen in-
terpretaties van en ideee¨n over gewoonterecht te hebben. Het zijn deze
ideee¨n die zij meestal als leidraad nemen voor bestuurlijke beslissin-
gen en nieuwe wetgeving of beleid.
De eindconclusie van dit boek, hoofdstuk 7, besteedt aandacht aan
de verschillende versies van gewoonterecht. Het bestudeert wat lokaal
gewoonterecht is, hoe het evolueert, hoe het bestudeerd kan worden,
en hoe een rechter, beleidsmaker, of wetgever het kan toepassen of in
tekst neerleggen. Dit boek laat zien dat er momenteel in peri-urbaan
Kumasi geen consensus bestaat over de gewoonterechtelijke regels met
betrekking tot de omzetting en verkoop van landbouwgrond voor huis-
vesting. De praktijk laat evenveel variatie zien als de normatieve uit-
spraken die er over het onderwerp worden gedaan. En aangezien con-
flicten zelden worden behandeld, laat staan naar tevredenheid van par-
tijen opgelost, door lokale geschillenbeslechting, kan ook daar de
geldende norm niet uit afgeleid worden. Het veld kenmerkt zich door
eenzijdige besluitvorming, strijd en onderhandelingen, waarvan de uit-
komsten slechts zeer ten dele worden bepaald door algemeen aan-
vaarde normen en regels van gewoonterecht. Hoewel onderzoekers
wellicht tevreden zullen zijn met een beschrijving van de veranderlijk-
heid en manipuleerbaarheid van gewoonterechtelijke normen, wordt
van rechters, wetgevers en beleidsmakers met de opdracht gewoonte-
recht toe te passen, verwacht dat zij uit de verschillende praktijken de
meest gee¨igende selecteren. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat deze keuze niet
geheel vrij gebaseerd mag worden op politieke overwegingen of op de
persoonlijke voorkeur van de ambtenaar. Zij moet passen binnen het
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bredere normatieve kader van het gewoonterecht en kent bepaalde nor-
matieve toetsstenen in de vorm van usus – herhaling van feiten – en
opinio necessitatis – het algemeen gedeelde gevoel dat men verplicht is
de regel na te leven.
De theoretische implicaties van dit inzicht reiken verder dan Ghana
alleen. Een exclusieve focus op de lokale werkelijkheid en lokale prak-
tijken van machtige actoren als leidraad om regels van gewoonterecht
te bepalen brengt het risico met zich mee dat ‘wat er ook lokaal ge-
beurt’ geaccepteerd wordt als gewoonterecht, zonder rekening te hou-
den met de samenhang met het bredere kader van gewoonterecht. Een
te grote nadruk op de onderhandelbaarheid van gewoonterecht kan het-
zelfde effect hebben, namelijk een de facto erkenning van de uitkom-
sten van lokale machtsstrijd. Hoewel gewoonterecht tot op een be-
paalde hoogte flexibel, onderhandelbaar en relationeel is, stelt dit boek
dat het wel ook een normatieve inhoud heeft die het mogelijk maakt
om afwijkingen van de norm te herkennen, zelfs wanneer die met ver-
wijzing naar veranderende omstandigheden en normen worden gelegi-
timeerd.
Hoofdstuk 7 sluit ten slotte af met een vooruitblik. Ondanks alle ge-
schetste problemen op het gebied van traditioneel grondbeheer erkent
dit onderzoek gewoonterecht en traditioneel leiderschap als politieke
en sociale realiteiten in hedendaags Ghana en concludeert dat de pro-
blemen grotendeels binnen deze kaders opgelost moeten worden.
Zoals gezegd betekent dat niet dat de overheid klakkeloos alle hande-
lingen en beslissingen van traditionele leiders moet accepteren. Het
boek besluit dan ook met een aantal aanbevelingen over de rol die het
statelijk rechtsbestel kan spelen in de vergroting van zekerheid op
grond van kleine boeren in peri-urbaan Kumasi en andere delen van
Ghana.
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